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ABSTRACT 
7 
This thesis deals primarily with the religio-political 
development in Lebanon during its recent history. The 
political history of Lebanon is the history of intermittent 
warfare between the varying religio-ethnic groups. The 
internal contradiction and regional politics in Lebanon 
often assumed the form of religious struggle between the 
various warring groups. The Civil War of 1975-76 was mainly 
the result of internal contradiction and regional politics. 
To understand the origin of confessional politics in Lebanon 
it is necessary to understand the fact that the origin of 
religious warfare lay in the feudal set up which Lebanon has 
inherited from its past history. 
The Druze constitute 7 percent of the Lebanese 
population. The sect originated in Egypt in the beginning of 
the eleventh century during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph 
al-Hakim (909-1171). Druze carried to an extreme the 
Isma'ili doctrine according to which each of the attributes 
of God was made manifest to mankind in the personality of a 
Prophet or Imam. Druze dominated Mount Lebanon and their 
hegemony established in the early seventeenth century, 
remained unchallenged for a long time. Mamluks and later on 
Ottomans permitted the Druze to maintain their special 
feudal tradition and to manage their affairs as they 
pleased. But by the end of mid-eighteenth century the growth 
of the Maronite community in number and social importance 
had became a matter of political consequence. The Druze 
ranks, on the other hand, had been steadily weakened by 
internal divisions. The policies of the Bashir Shihab II 
further weakened the position of Druze community who 
infringed upon the hereditory privileges of Druze feudal 
families. The Druze lost their former position as the 
dominant Muslim sect to the Sunnis with the establishment of 
Greater Lebanon. However, it was Kamal Junbalat who brought 
back his community at the centre stage of Lebanese, 
politics. No doubt, that the political and economic powers 
of DrRuze have been eroded. But they will continue to play 
important role in Lebanese politics due to their 
concentration in the, strategic Shuf and 'Aley regions and 
being a close knit society. 
The origin of Maronites can be traced back to the 4th 
century Syrian hermit, St. Maron who started a religious 
movement in Horns, Hama and Aleppo. However, a monk from 
Antioch brought the Maronites to the high valleys of 
northern Lebanon in the 7th century. Following the 
establishment of the Emirate in 1590, Maronites began to 
move from northern Lebanon to southern Lebanon. Freedom and 
protection were extended to them by the Druze feudal lords 
in matters of personal safety and the, exercise of religious 
activities. The Maronites Churches in particular started to 
grow and flourish under the auspices of the feudal lords. In 
the early stages of economic relations between the Church 
and the feudal lords, the interests of the two parties 
converged: the Church was then the weaker and dependent 
partner. However, as its economic strength grew, the Church 
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started opposing feudalism not only to defend the rights of 
the peasants but also to defeat the feudal lords, whom it 
now perceived as its poltical rivals. The clergy were the 
first to develop the idea of a Maronite state, claiming that 
Mount Lebanon had for centuries been an independent or 
autonomous Maronite homeland. It was due to the efforts of 
Maronite Church and its Patriarch which ultimately led to 
the establishment of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920. 
Even after independence in 1943 the Church and its patriarch 
continued to play important role in the Lebanese politics 
and influence the course of development there. 
Lebanon's Sunni community is of comparatively recent 
development. The population of Sunni sect was multiplied 
approximately eight times with the establishment of Greater 
Lebanon. The Sunni very much resented to the creation of 
Greater Lebanon. The incorporation of Sunnis areas in 
Lebanon involved a grave religious, cultural, political and 
economic crisis and a powerful emotional blow. Sunnis also 
resented the French mandate. In the beginning the Sunnis 
were reluctant to participate in the political process of 
Lebanon. They refused to participate in the census on the 
grounds that they were being defined as citizens of Greater 
Lebanon. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, with the rise to 
power of young generation of Sunni leaders who had grown up 
under the new Lebanese poltical system, was the way opened 
to a modus vivendi between these leaders and their Christian 
counterparts. The Sunni community suffers today from 
numerous problems and difficulties. Sunnis do not have a 
charismatic leader behind whom they could rally. They also 
have no political organization that appeals to the membera 
of the community wherever they live. Furthermore, the 
regional particularist tendencies of the Sunnis appear to be 
greater than they are among other communities. Their 
traditional leaders are weaker today than they were in the 
late seventies. They proved weaker during the Civil War due 
to lack of military power. However, the political claims of 
the Shi'a were blunted in favour of sunni Msulims in the 
Taif agreement brokered by the Arab League. The powers of 
Prime Minister were increased and Sunnis were given 22 seats 
in parliament equal to Shi'a. Thus, it may be said that the 
Sunnis will continue to have sufficient political powers in 
near future. 
Shi'a Muslim came into being as a result of a schism 
that took place in Islam in the decade after the death of 
Prophet Muhammad on the question of his successor 
(Caliphate). They are the oldest community in Lebanon. The 
socio-economic status of Shi'a fare poorly in comparision to 
their non-shi'a cohorts. From 1920s to the mid 1950s, Shi'a 
political representation was practically monopolized by the 
six prominent landowning families- the Asads, the Zeins and 
the Ossirans in southern Lebanon, and the Hamadehs, the 
Haiders and the Husseinis in Ba'lbek and Bint Jubayl. The 
social effects of the emigration to the Arab oil-producing 
countries in 1950s and 1960s were considerable. Tradtional 
notables and religious family lost much ground in favour of 
the wealthy returning migrants. Moreover, due to high birth 
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rate Shi'a community emerged as a single largest community 
in Lebanon. The Shi'a now had an active and radicalized 
intelligentsia, an ambitious and enterprising counter-elite, 
and other new strata with new demands. They began to 
challenge the rules of the game and to question the 
distribution of power and resources in the Lebanese system. 
In this context, the movement of Imam Musa al-sadr was born 
in 1970s, an expression of the demographic and socio-
economic shift of the Shi'a from the periphery towards the 
city-state of Beirut. During the years before the outbreak 
of Civil War in 1975, the movement attempted to satisfy its 
social and political demands through various forms of 
mobilization, pressure and action. Imam Musa al-Sadr*s 
mobilization strategy threatened both the traditional 
leadership and the left's hold on the young Shi'a. Sadr 
founded Amal, a militia group, attached to the Movement of 
Deprived, to protect the community in the Civil War. Two 
important militant group. Islamic Amal and Hizbollah, 
emerged after the Israeli invasion of 1982. These groups 
played important role in the withdrawal of Israeli troops to 
their self-proclaimed security zone and in withdrawal of 
Multi National Force from Lebanon. Although, the Taif accord 
of 1989 increased the political role of the speaker, 
traditionally a Shi'a Muslim who will now serve a four year 
term. Now the nomination of a prime minister by the 
President would require consultation with the speaker who 
conveys the results of binding parliamentary consultations. 
But the poltical claims of the Shi'a were blunted in the 
Taif accord in favour of the Sunni Muslims. The Shi 'a gained 
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only three of the new appointive seats given to them, like 
the Sunni Muslims, a total of 22 seats. The Shi 'a challenge 
ahead is to translate their strength into actual political 
power . 
The roots of confessionalism in Lebanese poltics can be 
traced back to the 16th century. It was the constitution of 
1926 which placed confessional ism on a firm footing. Article 
95 of this constitution reads : "As a provisional measure 
and for the justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably 
represented in public employment and in the composition of 
the ministry, provided such measures will not harm the 
general welfare of the state". Confessionalism was further 
strenthened in the unwritten National Pact agreed upon by 
the representatives of the combined Muslim and Christian 
communities in 1943. Initially, confessionalism served a 
number of conflict-management functions. But confessional 
system failed because it was a static solution, depending 
upon continued acceptance of the validity of the original 
proportions. Moreover, it institutionalized sectarian 
structures and perpetuated sectarian identifications. 
Abolition of confessionalism from Lebanon's political life 
has always been a major issue. It is through the abolition 
of this political system that the Muslim community aims to 
redress the existing distribution of power in the state and 
the concomitant special privileges which the Maronites have 
so far enjoyed. Ta'if Accord of 1989 represented the end of 
efforts to jettison the National Pact of 1943. Indeed, the 
Ta'if document implicitly ratifies the National Pact with 
its emphasis upou confessional compromise and intercommunual 
cooperation. Because confessionalism is an ideal political 
formula for Lebanon, a country composed of many religious 
communities, each with a keen sense of its peculiar 
historical and social identity and interests. 
The Lebanese Civil war is multi-dimentional. The 
combination of foreign forces and intervention have 
intensified the conflict. In fact it is primarily the result 
of domestic and indigenous conditions that have shaped the 
political cultures and socio-economic formation of the 
Lebanese conmfessional communities. Three factors were 
instrumental in leading upto a situation of Civil War. These 
are (1) The Emergence of Class Divisions in Lebanese Society 
and the coincidence of this division with the existing 
religious divisions in the country; (2) The Rigidity of the 
Political System and finally (3) The presence of a large 
number of armed Palestinians. Syria was the first which 
intervened in 1976, the Israelis in 1978 and atgain in 1982, 
culminating in the intervention of Western Multi National 
Forces (MNF) as "peacekeeper" led by the United States. The 
Syrian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War ensure the 
unity of Lebanon and prevented its partition along religious 
lines. Syrian involvement also maintained a power-balance 
between various militias and no single militia could become 
so powerful as to defeat other one. Moreover, it is due to 
the support of Syria that Gen. Michel Aoun was defeated and 
Taif agreement could be implemented which envisaged the 
moderate distribution of power between Muslims and 
Christians* Israel concern with ending the armed 
Palestinians presence on her northern borders drew her 
gradually into open involvement in the Lebanese Civil War. 
But the real objectives of Israel were the establishment of 
a Maronite dominated state in Lebanon, controlling the 
Litani River, and annexing southern Lebanon could not be 
realized. However, Israel carved out a security zone in the 
southern Lebanon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lebanon, on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, is 
today a small republic stretching one hundred miles along 
the Phoenician coast, with a total area of 4,015 square 
miles and a population of more than 3 million. Her 
territory, mostly rugged mountain, is dominated by the 
paralle ranges of the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon, and 
bounded on the north by the Eleutherus river (al-Nahr al-
Kabi r ) , on the east by the crest of the Anti-Lebanon, and on 
the south by a line across the highlands of Galilee. The 
Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges run north-east to south-
west, following the slant of the coast, and between them 
lies the rift valley of Bekka. West of Bekka, the Lebanon 
range runs so close to the coastline that in places it falls 
directly to the sea, its rocky promontories dividing the 
narrow coastal plain into a number of isolated strips. 
Beirut, the capital of modern Lebanon, is located in one of 
the broader coastal strips, almost exactly mid-way down the 
coast. 
In Lebanon, identification by religious groups sects 
plays the most important role in the political life of an 
average Lebanese citizen. Individuals participate in public 
life only through their respective sects which are the major 
focus of loyalty, self definition and self identification. 
Since interaction between citizens is effected exclusively 
through the religious communual web, this influences their 
social consciousness and political behaviou. They often tend 
to look at the political affair from the point of their 
religioua or curiimunal interests. Thus sectarian 
considerations far outweigh national considerations since 
each sect has its own world-view and its own interest which 
more often than not stands in opposition to the interests 
and world-views of other sects. 
There are seventeen recognised religious groups and 
sects in Lebanon. Some of them are extremely small. 
Relationship and alliances between the various religious 
groups have undergone considerable changes over the years, 
especially since the time of the Emirate. Nevertheless, 
religious divisions have always remained important. Each is 
an exclusive, closely integrated socio-political unit, which 
has been given identity not only by a common set of beliefs 
but also by the religious tradition of classifying people 
into groups by their faith. Today, as in the past, the 
Maronites continue to be the leading sect among the 
Christians of the country, followed, in traditional 
importance, by the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics. 
Among the major non-Christian groups the Lebanese Muslims, 
divided between the Sunni and Shi'a, dwarf the small but 
traditionally important community of the Druzes. To 
appreciate the historical and political peculiarities of the 
Lebanon, it is important to understand the circumstances in 
which each of these various sects became established in 
Lebanon, as well as the manner in which they developed. This 
thesis focuses on the most important denominational groups, 
their evolution, growth of sectarian identity and 
institutions and the interaction between these sects as it 
'I 
has evolved over a period of time. More emphasis is laid on 
their impact on the political development in Lebanon. 
Confessionalism which guarantees proportional 
representation to all faiths in all government functions 
forms the theme of chapter I. The historical roots of 
confessionalism in Lebanese politics can be traced back to 
the 15th century. It was the constitution of 1925 which 
placed confessional ism on a firm footing. Article 95 of this 
constitution reads : "As a provisional measure and for the 
justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented 
in public employment and in the composition of the ministry, 
provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of 
the state". After independence, the Lebanese leaders decided 
to retain the constitution of 1926. Confessional ism was 
further strenthened in the unwritten National Pact agreed 
upon by the representatives of the combined Muslim and 
Christian communities in 1943. Thus, confessional ism served 
a number of 'conflict-management' functions. We have also 
discussed, in this chapter, the failure of confessional 
system because it was a static solution, depending upon 
continued acceptance of the validity of the original 
proportions. It also institutionalized sectarian structures 
and perpetuated sectarian indentifications. Abolition of 
confessionalism from Lebanon's political life has always 
been a major issue. The demand of Muslims community, now the 
majority in the country, for the abolition of this political 
system has also been examined in detail. It is through the 
abolition of confc-ssionallsm that the Muslim communii.y aims 
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to redreea the ejciatincf distribution of power in the state 
and the concomitant special privileges which the Maronites 
so far enjoyed. However, the TA'if Accord of 1989 
represented the end of efforts to jettison the National Pact 
of 1943. Indeed, the Ta'if document implicitly ratified the 
National Pact with its emphasis upon confessional compromise 
and intercommunal cooperation. 
Chapter II deals with the origin of the Druze and their 
development as a political force. They are an offshoot of 
Isma'ilis (which itself is a splinter of Shiism, a major 
sect of Islam). The Druze first appeared as a community in 
Wadi al-Taym in south Lebanon. This religion sprang from the 
belief in the divinity of the sixth Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, 
Hakim (996-1020 A.D.) who declared himself to be the last 
incarnation of the deity. Two of his followers, Hamza and 
Darazi (after whose name the Druze are known), spread 
Hakim's doctrine, embellished with Isma'ili philosphy, in 
southern Lebanon. There the community lived in comparative 
seclusion, subsisting wholly on agriculture. The Druze once 
played a politically dominant role in Mount Lebanon, but 
have been relegated to secondary importance with the rise of 
Maronite community. The role played by the Junbalati family, 
particularly Kamal Jumbalat who brought his community to the 
centre stage of Lebanese politics in 1970s by joining forces 
with progressive elements in Lebanon is the subject of 
discussion in this chapter. 
Chapter III ia about the principal Christian sect, the 
Maronites. Originally farmers in the Orontes Vally of Syria. 
5 
the MaroniteE; take their name frora Saint Maron, a legendary 
fourth century figure. Theologians record the Maronite 
schism with the Roman Catholic Church as a result of their 
heretical belief in the monothelite nature of Christ which 
held that although Christ had two natures he had but a 
single will. In 680 the Council of Constantinople condemned 
the doctrine, holding that as there are two natures, there 
must be two wills, but the human will of Christ conforms in 
every way to his divine will. Between the seventh and 
twelfth centuries the Maronites increasingly retreated into 
the nearby mountains of Lebanon on account of breakdown of 
law and order in the Orontes valley due to incursion from 
Muslim and Byzantine invaders bent on punishing the 
heretics. The Maronite Church abandoned its monothelite 
doctrine in the twelfth century, moving closers to Rome 
until it finally and officially entered into communion under 
Rome in the eighteenth century. The Maronites were, however, 
allowed to retain their Syriae liturgy and non-celibate 
clergy. 
The Maronite Church was very weak and dependent upon 
the ruling class, in the beginning. It became independent 
and powerful as a result of certain socio-economic changes 
which took place in Mount Lebanon. The Maronite Church and 
clergy played a very important role in the realization of 
Christian aspirations for an independent and Greater 
Lebanon. The Church and religious leaders continued to play 
important political role even after Lebanon became 
independent in 19-J3. Following independence, the Church 
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became the aelf-atyled guardian of a Christian Lebanon and 
have remained in the forefront of the struggle over the 
question of Lebanese identity. 
The subject matter of Chapter IV is the sunni community 
of Lebanon which is basically an urban community. Their role 
in the Lebanese politics is comparatively a recent 
development. With the creation of Greater Lebanon, the 
population of Sunnis increased many times. The sunnis 
resented the creation of Greater Lebanon and refused to 
participate in the political process of the country. In this 
chapter we have discussed as to why the Sunnis resented the 
creation of Greater Lebanon. The reasons for the subsequent 
acceptance of Greater Lebanon albeit with reluctance by the 
Sunnis when the Prime Ministership, the second highest post 
in the Lebanese republic, was offerred to them has also been 
examined. 
Today Lebanese Sunnis are weak, almost ineffective in 
militancy and there is no political organization worth its 
name that appeals to the members of the community wherever 
they live in the country. Their religious leaders generally 
do not involve themselves in politics. However, the appeal 
of traditional leaders has considerably weakened after the 
Civil War of 1975-76. This chapter also examines the rise 
and growth of fundamentalist organizations among the Sunnis 
as well as the attitude and efforts of the community towards 
reforming the confessional character of the Lebanese polity. 
Chapter V gives an account of the political develpment 
of the Shi'a sect in Lebanon. The sect came into being as; a 
result of schism that took place in Islam in the decade 
after the death of Prophet Muhammad on question of his 
successor (Caliphate). Shi'a sect is one of the oldest 
Muslim sects, and the overwhelming population of the country 
belonged to one or other of the Shi'a communities. The vast 
majority of Shi'a live in the villages and their socio-
economic status is poor in comparision to their non-shi'a 
groups. They have been equally peripheral to the Lebanese 
political system. The intercommunal National Pact of 1943 
was essentially a division of power between the Maronites 
and Sunni political elite. Their political representation 
was practically monopolized by six prominent landowning 
families- the Asads, the Zeins and the Ossirans in southern 
Lebanon, and the Hamadehs, the Haidars and the Husseinis in 
Ba'lbek and Bint jubayl. However, the traditional leaders 
lost much ground in favour of the wealthy returning migrants 
from oil-producing countries in 1950s and 1960s. The role 
played by the Imam Musa al-sadr, a spiritual head and 
charismatic leader of the Shi'a (founder of the Movement of 
Disinherited and Amal) has also been discussed in detail. In 
this connection the role of militant groups like Hizbollah 
and Islamic Amal also forms the subject matter of this 
chapter . 
In the following chapter VI we have discussed the 
causes of the Civil War of 1975-76. The Lebanese Civil War 
is multi-diment1onal. The combination of foreign forces and 
intervention have intensified the conflict. In fact it is 
primairily the result of domestic and indigenous cor.ditions 
that have shaped the political cultures and socio-economic 
formation of the Lebanese confessional communities. Three 
factors were instrumental in leading upto a situation of 
Civil War. These are (1) the Emergence of Class Divisions in 
Lebanese society and the coincidence of this division with 
the existing religious divisions in the country. (2) The 
Rigidity of the Poltical system and finally (3) Presence of 
large number of armed Palestinians. 
The role of various outside powers and forces which 
have intervened overtly or covertly on one side or the other 
has been discussed. Syria was the first which intervened in 
1975, the Israelis in 1978 and again in 1982, culminating in 
the intervention of Western Multi National Forces (MNF) as 
"peacekeepers" led by the United States. 
There are some useful studies on the development of 
Lebanese politics, but unfortunately most of these studies 
consider that the history of the Lebanese nation has been 
mainly a history of factional conflicts, especially between 
the Muslims and the Maronites. This gives a distorted 
understanding of a nation, and ignores the national 
aspirations of the Lebanese people. This false notion about 
the Lebanese politics has been perpetuated by the vested 
interests. 
The conventional literature on Lebanon generally adopts 
this view point overtly or covertly. Kamal S. Salibi's 
studies (The Modern Hiutory of Lebanon, London, 1963. And 
CLoaaroadL.' tu Civil ',l^t: : Lebanon 1953-1976, London, 1976), 
provide us with the basic informations regarding the modern 
political history of Lebaonon, but he puts undue eraphasis on 
sectarianism in the form of confesssionalism as a decisive 
factor. Michael C. Hudson's The Precarious Republic : 
Political Modernization in Lebanon and other writings fall 
in the same category. Another important writer S. Khalaf 
has a serious doubt Lebaon's ability to become a viable 
political community. Another, J.P. Entelis, Pluralism and 
Party Tansformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970, 
emphasises sectarian solution of Lebanon with a view to 
Maronite preponderance. Among the other recent studies Meir 
Zamir's The Formation of Modern Lebanon, is not very 
different from the other studies of this type who adopts 
almost the same model. 
The present study is a modest attempt to present a non-
sectarian view of Lebanon while dealing with the 
relationship between religion and politics in Lebanon. 
i;i 
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CONFESSIONALISM: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
Generally speaking the mind of the Lebanese elite is 
conditioned by two considerations: Confessional ism (al-
Ta'iflyah) and absolute individualism. The confessional or 
sectarian considerations not only shape the thinking of an 
average Lebanese but also conditions his life and govern his 
relations with other communities. This observation of an 
ordinary Lebanese individual is very significant, since 
confessional ism in Lebanon has been a social fact and has 
remained the essence of the political system. It is 
embedded in Article 95 of the constitution^ which states 
that "for the reasons of amity and Justice" government posts 
should be equitably distributed between the various 
1. Cf., Labib Zuwiyya-Yamak, -Party Politics in the 
Lebanese Political System' in Leonard Binder, (ed.) 
Politics in Lebanon, New York, 1966 p. 147. 
2. The Lebanese constitution provided for a republican 
regime- the first to be proclaimed in the Arab East in 
modern times- and a bi-cameral Parliament, to be 
elected by a two-stage universal manhood suffrage. The 
Cabinet was to be individually and collectively 
responsible to Parliament. The President, elected by 
the two Houses of Parliament in a Joint session, was 
given the right to appoint the Prime Minister and, with 
a Vote of three-quarters of the Senate, to dissolve 
the Chamber of Deputies. This elaborate structure for 
a small state called for a revision in 1927, which 
increased the powers of the President, especially in 
expediting financial bills; it abolished the Senate and 
established a unicammeral Parliament. This 
constitution, continuing to function during the Mandate 
period, was suspended when war broke out in 1939. It 
was restored in 1943, when the independence of the 
country was formally declared and was purged out the 
Mandate clauses by an act of parliament on 8 November 
1943. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. II, London, 
1965, p. bbl. 
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comrauntties. The importance of confesslonalism is also 
acknowledged in the electoral law, which stipulates that 
parliamentary seats be apportioned on the basis of the 
sectarian division of the population. Since 1943 this has 
meant that, regardless of the number of deputies, the ratio 
of Christians to Muslims in the Legislature is six to five, 
and that the President of the Republic is always a Maronite, 
the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the House a 
Shi'a. All attempts to abolish confessionalism from the 
constitution or even to weaken its hold on the 
administrative system have so far met with failure despite 
the generally honest efforts of many leading public minded 
citizens and leaders. The main reason for the failure of 
these attempts has been the lack of consensus on a more 
viable basis for national unity as well as the absence of 
cohesion among the Lebanese population. As Hittl puts it, 
"What the country gained in area,"following the proclamation 
of Greater Lebanon in 1920, "it lost in cohesion. It lost 
its internal equilibrium.... The Christian overwhelming 
3 
majority was seriously reduced." 
Confessionalism may be defined as a system which 
guarantees proportional representation to all faiths in all 
government functions. In confessional system religion is 
3. P.K. Hitti, Lebanon in History, New York, 1957, p. 490. 
4. C G Hess and H Bodman, 'Confessionalism and Feudality 
in Lebanese Polities', Middle East Journal , Vol.8, 
No.l, (Winter, 1954), p. 10. 
u 
the driving force behind legislation and the government set 
up. Confessionalism stands in contrast to a syEtem based on 
secularism.^ Secularism is a belief that the state, laws and 
morals are independent of religion. 
The historical roots of confessionalism in Lebanese 
politics can be traced back to the 16th century. After 
having conquered Syria and Lebanon from the Mamluks in 1516, 
the Ottomans set about reorganizing the administrative 
structure of the conquered territories. It was, in 1590 that 
they set up an Emirate in the area of Mount Lebanon. Mount 
Lebanon had throughout its history provided a refuge to 
persecuted minorities fleeing the wrath of conquering 
invaders or religious intolerance. Mount Lebanon was in the 
main the home of two important minority communities, the 
Maronites who lived in north and the Druze who inhabited in 
the south. 
5. 
6. 
-What Secularism Means,' The Middle East No.20, (June, 
1976), p. 10. 
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Following the establishment of the Emirate, Maronites 
b^g^R t;« ropvs tvom nQfth^fn Ui^\;^^nan tp sonthefn Lebanpii. 
Freedom and protection were extended to them by the feudal 
lords of the area, particularly in matters of personal 
safety and the exercise of religious activities. The 
Maronite churches in particular, started to grow and 
flourish under the auspices of the feudal lords. The monks 
and their orders cultivated the land of the feudal lords, 
reclaimed waste lands and purchased land of their own 
wherever they could. Alongside this development a more 
fundamental socio-economic change of a unique nature was 
also taking place in the Emirate. This was the rise and 
growth of the silk industry. The Christian new comers who 
were the main silk producers began to buy land for farming 
and subsequently became peasants. 
In the early stages of economic relations between the 
church and the feudal lords, the interests of the two 
parties converged. The Church at that point was the weaker 
and more dependent partner. But as a result of its growing 
economic strength the Maronite Church began to oppose 
feudalism in Mount Lebanon with the twin purpose of 
defending the rights of the peasants perhaps in their own 
self interest and defeating their political rivals, the 
feudal lords. To achieve this purpose the Maronite Church 
sided with Shihabi Emir Bashir II (1788-1840) in his fight 
7. Ibid., p. 3. 
I:] 
against the Druze families (Junablat, the Imads, and Abu-
Nakads). In addition to this, the invasion and occupation 
of Lebanon by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from 1831 to 1840 gave 
the inter sectarian differences a country-wide character. 
The Maronites welcomed the occupation and sided with Ibrahim 
against Druze uprising. When the occupation became 
oppressive the Maronites sided with the Druze but the amity 
was short-lived. Finally in 1840 British, Austrian and 
Turkish troops, aided by the disaffected mountaineers 
9 
succeeded in driving Ibrahim from Lebanon. 
Bashlr Qasim was installed as the Governor General of 
Lebanon by the Ottomans largely at French insistence. 
This further alienated the Druze who had already suffered 
much under Shihabi rule. Through Bashir Qasim they tried to 
institutionalize the sectarian differences that had emerged 
to date. A diwan (provincial council) consisting of twelve 
men, two from each of the major religious sects was 
established. This measure did not satisfy the Druze. 
Unable to remove Bashir Qasim by peaceful and legal means, 
the Druze in 1841, turned to insurrection, which soon led to 
civil war and massacre of Christians in areas with mixed 
8. Malcom H Kerr,Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 
1840-1868, Beirut, 1959, p. 1. 
9. Hess and Bodman, op-cit., p. 12. 
10. Leila M.T. Meo, Lebanon;Improbable Nation, Bloomington, 
196S, p. 19. 
11. Ibid., p. 18. 
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12 population. Again the Five European powers, France, 
Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria- Hungary intervened 
which led to the abolition of Emirate. Instead a new syetem 
of government came into existence. 
The Ottoman authorities divided the Emirate into two 
districts or qa'im-maqamiyah, one Druze and the other 
Maronite, governed by a district ruler (gaim-maqam) who was 
appointed and could be removed by the Pasha of Sidon, the 
13 Sultan's direct representative in the coastal levant. 
This solution also failed. This new system in fact had 
neglected the fact that neither of the two ga'im magamiyah 
was homogeneous in a religious sense; there were mixed 
Druze- Maronite villages within each district whose affairs 
were still without any form of regulation. 
Between 1842 and 1845 the Porte and the Great Powers 
fashioned a series of fundamental laws for the Lebanon which 
attempted to solve this problem. In the Druze province of 
the south, where the nobility was predominantly Druze and 
the peasantry predominantly Maronite, steps were taken 
allegedly to safeguard the interests of both. In each of 
the mixed villages the Christian inhabitants could choose a 
12. Ibid., p. 20. 
13. Hess and Bodman, Op. cit. , p. 12 
14. Ibid., p. 12. 
15. Ibid., p. 13. 
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Christian wakil or agent to look after their interests. He 
would be responsible not to the Druze governor, but to the 
Turkish governor in Sidon. The Druze population in the 
mixed districts also had their wakiIs, and both Druze and 
Christian wakiIs exercised judicial authority over their 
coreligionists and collected taxes from them on behalf of 
the district feudal lords. Both functions traditionally 
belonged to the feudal lords who now found their powers 
sharply curtailed by the intrusion of elected wakiIs« This 
gave rise to disturbances in both governorates and a serious 
outbreak of fighting between Maronites and Druzes took place 
in 1845 which elicited a formal protest from the Concert of 
Europe. 16 
In response to the protest of the Concert of Europe 
Shakib Effendi, the Foreign Minister of Sublime Porte was 
sent to Lebanon, who worked out a plan. Reglement Shakib 
Effendi as the plan was called, endowed each governorate 
with a maJlis or council composed of twelve members. It 
included the qa'im magam, a judge and a councillor from each 
of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Druze, and 
Sunnl sects, and a Shi~a councillor. The Sunni Judge also 
represented the Shi'a. This plan again failed to satisfy 
both the religious communities in the mixed villages. A 
strong egalitarian movement, led initially by the Maronite 
clergy and aimed at a de facto overthrow of feudalism, had 
16. Leila M.T. Meo, op-cit., p. 22. 
17. Ibid., p. 23. 
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arisen in the predominantly Maronlte area of Klsrwan. This 
movement soon made itself felt in the villages where 
Maronite lived under Druze lords. At one point, the 
Maronite clergy ordered its followers to refuse to have any 
dealing with their Druze land-lords and even to withhold 
payments of rent. For the most part, the Druze peasants, 
linked by strong religious ties to their leaders, remained 
1 ft loyal to them. Added to these religious and political 
factors was the continuing efforts of the Porte to discredit 
the solution of the Lebanese guestion which had been 
dictated by the Great Powers. It appears that the 
representatives of the Porte continually incited the Druze 
population to violence. The massacres of 1859-50 ensued and 
the Druze, though now numbering a little over one third of 
19 the Maronites succeeded in overwhelming their opponents. 
Between 15000-30000 Christians died in the conflict and many 
more became homeless. 
The death toll shocked both Druze and Maronite leaders 
and at the prodding of the Sublime Porte, they were ready to 
18. The Druze 'ugqal (religious leaders of Druze), acting 
on behalf of the landlords, warned the Druze peasants 
of the imminence of a Christian danger, counselled them 
to avoid sedition, and urged them under no condition to 
renounce their solidarity with their chieftains. Kamal 
S.Salibi,The Modern History of Lebanon,London,1965,p.87. 
19. Hess and Bodman, op. cit., p. 13. For detail about the 
Maronite peasants revolt and subsguent Massacre see 
Scheltema, F.J, The Lebanon in Turmoil, Syria and the 
Powers in 1860, New Haven, 1920 and also, Kamal S. 
Salibi, op.cit., 1965, pp. 80-105. 
make total submission to Turkish author ity. ^ *^  But European 
powers once again intervened.Thus, the representatives of 
the five European powers met with the representatives of the 
Ottoman empire and on 9 June 1861 signed the organic statute 
which called for the unification of Mount Lebanon and the 
creation of semi-autonomous governership (Mutasarrafiya). 
The governor (mutasarrif) was to be a non-Lebanese 
Christian, designated by the Ottoman Sultan with the consent 
of the European powers. He was to report directly to the 
Sultan and was aided by an administrative council. The 
twelve members constituting this council were to be chosen 
from Mount Lebanon by the heads of each religious community. 
Originally each community had two representatives in the 
council but in 1864 amending statute distributed council 
seats on the basis of the size of each sect roughly 
determined. Thus, four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek 
Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni and one Shi "a made 
2 1 
up the mutasarraf iya's advisory council. 
The governorate was subdivided into seven districts in 
1864, previously six, by subdividing Kisrwan into Kisrwan 
proper and the district of Batroun. Each was administered 
by a qa'im maqam chosen from among the largest religious 
group. And each qa'im magam was assisted by a regional 
administrative council, composed of three to six members 
20. Leila M.T. Meo, op-cit., p. 23. 
21. Kamal S. Salibi, The History of Modern Lebanon, New 
York, 1965, pp. 71-72. 
representing the different elementE of the population in 
the district. The districts were in turn subdivided into 
nahies or cantons, and each was administered by moudi r 
(director). Each village in canton was administered by a 
Shaykh, named by the Governor General upon the 
2 2 
recommendation of the villagers. The statute of 1861 and 
1864 succeeded in putting an end to the widespread 
confessional unrest in the Mount Lebanon. Only slight 
changes were made in the statute between 1864 and the 
23 
outbreak of world war I. 
Confessional ism during the French Mandate: 
O A 
Following the imposition of the Mandate over Syria 
and Lebanon in 1920, France started to constitute various 
political institutions on confessional basis. The 
establishment of Greater Lebanon on 1 September .1920 by 
General Gouraud, with the inclusion of the fertile Bekka 
plain and the regions around the coastal cities of Sidon, 
Tyre, Tripoli and Beirut further complicated the 
22. Leila M.T. Meo, op.cit., pp. 34-35. 
23. Hess and Bodman, op.cit., p. 14. 
24. The trusteeship arrangements under the auspices of the 
League of Nations which enabled Britain and France at 
the end of World War I to legitimize their occupation 
of several Middle Eastern countries. The territories 
of Syria and Lebanon fell under the French Mandate. 
For detail see S.H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under 
French Mandate, London, 1958, Walid Khalidi, Conflict 
and Voilence in Lebanon; Confrontation in the Middle 
East, Cambridge, 1983, p.159, and P L Gabriel , In the 
Ashes; A Story of Lebanon, Whitmore Publishing Compy : 
Ardmore, 1978, pp. 43-45. 
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confessional situation. The area of the annexed territories 
was nearly double that of Mount Lebanon. The establishment 
of Greater Lebanon brought about a great demographic 
changes. The population of Sunni sect was multiplied 
approximately eight times and Shi-a strength was virtually 
quadrupled, while the Maronite population was increased by 
only one third. Consequently, the Lebanese Christians now 
slightly out numbered the Muslims. Furthermore, the Druze 
lost their former position as the dominant Muslim sect to 
the Sunnis, who now emerged as the main challengers to the 
Maronites' numerical preponderance and political 
predominance.2^ Whereas in the mutasarrafiya the Maronites 
had formed an overwhelming majority (59 percent of the total 
population) in Greater Lebanon they became the largest 
26 
single community (29 percent of the total population). 
In 1920 the advisory council was revived. The advisory 
council was composed of seventeen members who were selected 
to represent their respective religious sects. In 1922, the 
advisory council was replaced by an elected representative 
council, and in the new council too the seats were 
distributed along sectarian lines. It had thirty members of 
whom ten were Maronites, six Sunni, five Shi "a, two Druze, 
two Greek Catholic, four Greek Orthodox and one for the 
27 
remaining minorities. 
25. Leila M T Meo, op. cit., p. 47. 
26. John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in 
Lebanon : Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970, Leiden, 1974, pp.29-30 
27. Ibid., p. 15. 
On 24 May 1926 the Lebanese Constitution came into 
operation as mentioned earlier, according to Article 95 
(Still in force today) of this constitution which reads: 
"As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and 
amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public 
employment and in the composition of the ministry, provided 
such measures will not harm the general welfare of the 
state."^'^ A bicameral legislature was set up on the basis 
of proportional sectarian representation and the entire 
administration reorganized so as to conform to the 
provisions of Article 95. The French also started 
encouraging the practice of reserving the powerful 
29 presidency and the army command for Maronites. In 1932, 
the French mandatory authorities conducted a census on the 
30 insistence of Mohammad al-Jisr, who staked his claim to 
the presidency. It showed an almost completely even 
distribution of Christians and Muslims among the resident 
population, but in order to convince al-Jisr that Christians 
were still a majority added "resident abroad." The Sunnis 
28. F.M.A. Arab World File, 3 December 1980 No. 1756. 
29. Jawaid Iqbal, Origin and Dimentions of the Civil War; 
1975-76, Unpublished M. Phil Dissertation, J.N.U., New-
Delhi, 1984, p. 16. 
30. Muhammad al-Jisr a prominent Sunni man of learning from 
Tripoli advocated complete politcal independence of 
Lebanon from Syria. Despite the almost total Sunni 
boycott of the constitutional consultations, Muhammad 
al-Jisr, did take part in drafting the constitution. 
He had also defied the Sunni boycott of the Lebanese 
state as early as 1926 by agreeing to serve until 1932 
as speaker of parliament. 
2 1 
then staked their clairti to the premiership and in 193/ the 
3 1 first Sunni Premier was selected. Since then, this 
practice of allocating the presidency and premiership to the 
Maronites and Sunni Muslims respectively, has continued till 
this day. 
CONFESSIQNALISM AFTER INDEPENDENCE: 
Lenanon became independent in 1943. The leaders of 
independent Lebanon decided to retain the constitution of 
1926. The confessional system was further strengthened in 
an unwritten National Pact agreed upon by the 
representatives of the combined Muslim and Christian 
communities in 1943. This covenant consist of 
correspondence between the leading Sunni and Maronite 
politicians of the day, Riad al-Sulh and Bishara al-Khuri. 
It was agreed upon that the President of the Republic was to 
be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, 
the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi"a Muslim, the 
deputy speaker a Greek Orthodox, the defence minister a 
Druze, and the Commander of the military a Maronite 
Christian. Furthermore, seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
were divided among Christians and Muslims in a 6 to 5 ratio 
based on the official census of 1932."^^ It also stipulated 
that neither community should ally itself with the external 
31. S.P. David and S.C. Audrey , The Politics of Pluralism: 
A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana , New York, 
1975, p. 42. 
32. Leila. M.T. Meo, op.cit., pp.82-83. 
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forces, meaning that the Christians should not seek to 
restore European protection and the Muslims should give up 
their goal of reattaching the Muslim parts of the Greater 
Lebanon back to Syria. 
The principle of fixed proportional sectarian 
representation applied not only to the highest offices but 
also was extended throughout the political system. Posts in 
the civil service, the judiciary, the military, and seats in 
the parliament itself were allocated according to the 
sectarian distributions reported in the 1932 census. On 
that basis, the ninety-nine-member Chamber of Deputies 
allocated fifty-four seats to Christians of all denomination 
and forty-five to non-Christians (Mulims broadly divided 
into Shi"a and Sunni and Druze). Since neither the 
Christian nor non-Christian sides were doctrinally 
homogeneous, each major sect was also jealous of its proper 
33 
representation. 
Allocation of seats in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies 
According to Religious Sects. 
Christians (54) 
Maronites 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 
Armenian Orthodox 
Minorities 
Source: Michael 
20 
11 
6 
4 
3 
Non-Christians (45) 
Sunni Muslims 20 
Shi ""a Muslims 19 
Druze 6 
C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: 
Political Modernization in Lebanon, New York, 1968, 
p.23. 
33. Michael C. Hudson. Arab Politics: The search for 
Legitimacy, London, 1977, p. 266. 
0 • 
Poeitiona within the state bureaucracy were allocated 
along similar lines, with sect taking priority over merit as 
a criterion of employment from the highest to the lowest 
levels.^^ After 1958, government appointments to 
administrative positions were to be on the basis of parity, 
6 to 6. In fact, Maronites and Sunnis have been represented 
, proportionally, on the top levels of administration, in 
greater numbers than have members of the other sects. In 
1955, for example, with 30 percent of the population, and 
holding 30 per cent of the seats in Parliament, the 
Maronites held 40 per cent of the top positions; the Sunnis 
with 20 per cent of the population and 20.45 percent of the 
membership in Parliament, held 27 percent of the top 
35 
administrative positions. However, the most sensitive and 
influential of the high posts, in addition to that of the 
president himself, notably in the armed forces, were also 
reserved for Christians. 
Confessional ism served a number of conflict-management 
functions which have been proposed by Eric Nordlinger as 
vital for deeply divided societies. It facilitated what he 
calls "purposive depoliticization." Nordlinger argues that 
a potentially uncontrollable issue is removed from the day-
to-day political arena. It accomplished this end by 
34. Ibid., p. 286. 
35. Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon' New 
York, 1967, p. 49. 
36. Michael C. Hudson, op.cit., 1977, pp. 286-287. 
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eneuring to all the sects that the normal competition for 
power and influence would not lead to unacceptable 
domination by any one of them. This mutual security 
condition was implemented through the fixed proportionally 
mechanism that pertained to all structures in the system and 
through the implicit mutual veto which any major sect could 
resort to in extreme crisis. It encouraged leaders of the 
various sects to compromise in order to maintain the 
stability which confers prosperity and various other 
political "goods" on all the sects. The structure of 
confessional ism also promoted, for better or worse, another 
of Nordlinger's conditions, the maintenance of a stable 
coalition. In the Lebanese case, however, the 
confessionalist electoral laws by and large favoured the 
traditional leaders, whose family status, wealth, and claims 
to sectrian leadership made them indispensable for the 
building of a winning list. Candidates who worked against 
or outside the system found that they lacked the patronage, 
the influence (wasitas) to compete with the cross-sectarian 
elite. No political party, regardless of ideology, was able 
to challenge this establishment. Even the biggest and best 
organized, the right-wing Kata'ib (or Phalanges), could win 
only nine seats in the ninety-nine-man Chamber in 1968, and 
seven in 1972, and this party itself was rooted in the 
Maronite community. In fact, the one significant party most 
clearly oppossed to confessional ism, the progressive 
Socialist party, derived substantial influence from the 
•i; 
Druse community and its leader, Kamal Junablat, whose 
ideology notwithstanding- was very much a traditional 
ZaJJjn.-^^ 
The principal actors in the Lebanese liberal republic, 
therefore, were notable, each with a parochial, 
particularist constituency. Their support bases were 
relatively secure by virtue of the primordial character of 
allegience and the socioeconomic leverage they could exert 
over their clienteles. Consequently, the Lebanese political 
process consisted mainly of the competition within the elite 
3 8 for relative prestige and material advantage. 
The Sunni-Maronite partnership in the formulation of 
the Covenant gave rise to a situation in which the leaders 
of the two community at the highest level and with few 
exceptions looked upon the entire Lebanese scence through a 
bisectarian prism. This prism tended by the same token to 
be exclusivist and somehow able to block from view the 
existence of other sects. Christian and Muslim alike. It 
took the stunnigly charismatic personality of Imam Musa al-
Sadr to bring the existence of the Shi-a community to the 
attention of the Sunni- Maronite oligarchy just as it was 
the no less extraordinary personality of the older Kamal 
Junablat that brought the existence of the Druze community 
37. Ibid., p. 287. 
38. Ibid., pp. 287-288. 
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of their attention too 39 
The bisectarian prism tended not only to relegate to 
irrelevance the concerns and interests of the other sects, 
but also to cause the Sunni and Maronite leaders at the 
highest levels to be obsessively involved with one another. 
The fact that every senior Sunni politician aspired to the 
premiership, while every senior Maronite politician aspired 
to the presidency, fueled this reciprocal obsession. The 
Maronite president, with a guaranteed six-year term, had the 
option of forcing the resignation of any Sunni incumbent 
prime minister and replacing him with his rival. The 
propensity of Sunni aspirants to gueue up for the 
premiership under cut the more stalwart Sunni leaders. The 
Sunni politicians could and did retaliate by dipping into 
the standing gueue of Maronite presidential aspirants to 
groom a future partner in office. 
To some extent, all this was robust politics. 
Nevertheless, the stronger the attempt by the president to 
create a large pool of Sunni aspirants, the deeper the rift 
between him and key Sunni oligarchs became and the greater 
the erosion of the credibility of the Sunni representatives 
at the centre of power. Given the symbolic role of the 
Sunni partner in the Covenant, this bisectarian twist of the 
system only contributed to the alienation of the Muslim 
39. Walid Khalidi, "Lebanon: Yesterday and Tomorrow,* Middle 
East Journal, Vol.43, No. 3, (Summer, 1989), p. 380. 
40. Ibid., p. 380. 
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sects from the system, from the Maronite, and from one 
another. It also further reduced their inhibitions to seek 
4 1 
recourse outside the system and the country. 
Even when relations between the president and the 
senior prime minster were initially cordial, the logic of 
the situation asserted itself sooner rather than later. It 
did so the more readily because of a corollary phenomenon: 
good administraion and decision-making demanded that there 
be a clear hierarchy between president and prime minster, 
but again the symbolic nature of the premiership required, 
or was perceived by the Sunni incumbent to require, that he 
act as an equal in a historic partnership. 
The frustration that this generated on both sides led 
either to the appointment of pliant prime ministers only too 
happy to wear their titles or to a deadlock between 
president and strong prime ministers. Such a deadlock 
prevented the kind of stable working relationship between 
the two leaders of the country that was needed to sustain a 
serious reform programme. The last opportunity for such a 
relationship to underpin serious reform was perhaps lost 
during the Shihab administration, thus dooming the Covenant 
43 
system to collapse. 
41. Ibid., p. 381. 
42. Ibid., p. 381. 
43. Ibid., p. 381. 
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CRITIQUE OF CONFEaaiONALISM; 
Some Lebanese intellectuals like the sociologists Haiim 
Barakat and Samih Farsoun have strongly criticised the 
confessionalist "solution," which they see as not a real 
solution at all. Like many strong medicines, 
confessionalism had some negative side effects. It was a 
peculiarly static solution, depending upon continued 
acceptance of the validity of the origional proportions. 
Although in an important way it neutralized sectarian 
competition, it also institutionalized sectarian structures 
and perpetuated sectarian identifications. The requirement 
of proportionality introduced additional administrative 
inefficiency, compared to a system of appointment by merit. 
Nor did the system appear to be responsive or structurally 
flexible in the face of modernization and its attendant 
governmental problems, the spread of new radical ideologies 
and the growth of new organizations and counter elites. In 
short, the confessional solution worked well when there 
was not very much for government to do. 
Another important scholar of Lebanese factional 
politics Michael.C. Hudson further elaborates the 
shortcomings of confessional ism in the Lebanese situation. 
According to him the Lebanese elite attempted to bridge the 
gap between its essentially traditional legitimacy bases and 
44. Halim Barakat, ""Social and Political Integration in 
Lebanon: A case of Social Mosaic,' Middle East Jouranl, 
Vol-27, No.3, (Summer, 1978), pp.301-318, and Samih 
Farsoun, "Students Protsts and the coming crisis in 
Lebanon, 'MERIP Reports, No.19, (August, 1973), pp.3-14. 
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the modern demands of nationalism ana modernism through its 
efficacy in achieving minimal goals. But one of the 
effects of rapid modernization is an expansion of popular 
expectations about government performance. Based as it was 
on particularist and parochial values, the system 
increasingly came under attack as the demands of the younger 
and the disadvantaged sectors for a modern state, for more 
democracy, for more social justice, and for more responsible 
fulfilment of Lebanon's responsibilities to the Arab world 
also increased. Modernization has brought unexampled 
aggregate prosperity, but it has also added a number of new 
complications to the system's legitimacy formula. Michael 
Wall in his article in The Economist has observed that the 
demographic growth since 1932 has led most knowlegeable 
observers to conclude that non-Christians out number 
Christians because of suspected higher, Muslim birth rates 
and higher Christian emigration; furthermore, the large 
resident populations of mostly Muslim labourers from Syria 
and refugees from Palestine were thought to number perhaps 
800,000 compared to the 2 million or more resident 
Lebanese. These people were not citizens, but they 
exerted political influence, particularly the Palestinians, 
whose national revival in the middle 1960s, created the most 
45. Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic; Political 
Modernization in Lebanon, New York, 1968, Chaper.3. 
46. Michael Wall, "The Tightrope Country; A Survey of 
Lebanon,' The Economist, January 26, 1974, as cited 
Michael. C. Hudson Arab Politics: The search For 
Legitimacy, London, 19 7 7 p.288. 
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eenouE etraine on internal political and national security. 
Another potentially disruptive aspect of the 
demographic challenge was that the Muslim Shi~a community, 
according to some observers, may now have surpassed both the 
Maronites and the Sunnis as the largest single sect. The 
National Pact had been drawn up by a Sunni and a Maronite 
and served basically as an entente between these 
communities, and to some extent it divided Lebanon into two 
spheres of influence. By contrast, the Shi"a were the 
poorest and most deprived of all the main sects: their 
region in the hill country of the south and in parts of the 
Bekka was the least developed in the country. Until the 
last few years it ws largely ignored by the government, 
except for some "pork barrel" projects which the local Shi-a 
Za'ims extracted to distribute as patronage. Shi~a began 
migrating in large numbers into the Beirut areas, driven out 
in part by Israeli reprisal attacks on Palestinians 
guerrilla bases and refugee camps in the south. Their 
increasingly serious plight and their claim under the 
principle of proportionality to a far bigger share of power 
gave the Shi'as a sense of sectarian identity and activism 
hitherto absent. A dynamic imam, Musa al-Sadr, challenged 
one of the traditional establishment leaders and proved to 
have strong popularity and influence, showing the 
characteristic independence from worldly governmental 
authority that Shi'a have historically displayed. 
47. Ibid., p. 14. 
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The Lebanese system was not entirely unresponsive to 
pp^ gsyJ.-/5.5 FwF i^ furtnging tn« prapartiunaiity rormuia. An 
important outcome of the 19B6 civil war was a move to 
upgrade the non-Christian quota of high civil service 
commission to full equality. The influence of the Sunni 
and Druze communities as strenthened by the creation of 
community councils under Lebanese law in 1955 and 1952, 
respectively, and in 1959 a Higher Council was estabiisnea 
to ensure that growing Shi ""a demands would be articulated 
within the system. At the highest level, however, the 
Maronites maintained their occupancy of the presidency- by 
tradition, not the constitution- and retained the key 
military, security, and foreign policy posts. The deepening 
troubles of the early 1970s brought increasing demands, 
largely on the part of the left, for an end to 
confessional ism entirely, or failing that, the election of 
a non-Maronite president and the upgrading of the power of 
the Sunni and Shi'a top offices. 
Another challange of modernization as against Lebanon's 
legitimacy formula was growing class- conciousness and 
unrest. Outside Mount Lebanon, where there was a tradition 
of small landholders and independent farmers, the tenant 
farmers and day labourers were being increasignly squeezed 
by an archaic quasi-feudal order and agricultural 
mechanization, this pushed off the land accounts in part for 
48. Michael C. Hudson, op.cit., 1977, p. 289. 
3 
the heavy migration to Beirut. Many of those who remained 
were largely integrataa inta tn« ayatem, as indiested oy 
very high voter turnouts in the electoral contest between 
traditional rural bosses. But in recent years a sizeable 
protest vote for non-establishment candidates has developed; 
Communists and radical socialist-nationalist parties have 
found support from this constituency. The industrial 
proletariat and the urban unemployed constituted another 
sector which has traditionally mustered only marginal 
influence. Included here were large numbers of Syrian, 
Kurdish, and Palestinian labourers who were formally 
execluded from the political system. The laaour movement, 
while stronger and older in Lebanon then in most Arab 
countries, still had not developed substantial independence, 
although a federation of Communist-supported unions did 
exist. Like their rural counterparts, much of the urban 
labour force appeared to have been integrated into the 
traditional system of local notables who dispense jobs, 
security, and other assistance. A landmark social security 
bill passed during the regime of General Fu'ad Shihab (1958-
64) had began to alleviate some of the problems of some of 
the labourers. But there was also labour unrest, and in the 
middle 1960s the coalition of left-wing groups under the 
nominal leadership of Junablat was able to mobilize 
substantial labour support. Up to the eve of the civil war, 
observers continued to doubt whether the state's 
administrative and political structures were sufficient to 
35 
handle the growing demands of the urban masses. 49 
The student population of Lebanon, always politically 
active, also became a volatile force on the local political 
scene in the early 1970s lending its weight generally to 
the progressive movements. A major intellectual centre of 
the entire area, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, 
Lebanon found its traditional legitimacy constantly under 
bitter attack from student groups in universities and 
increasingly in the high schools. Here the radical critique 
of the Lebanese system as oligarchic, repressive, 
irresponsible, and deliquent in its obligations to "the 
people" and "the Arab nation" was forcibly articulated. 
Thus, from many quarters, the confessional structure, that 
is, the elitist-pluralist legitimacy formula of Lebanon came 
under attack. 
As the ruinous Civil War of 1975-76 unfolded, it was 
poignant to recall how close Lebanon's politicians had come 
towards serious reforms more than three decade earlier. The 
Late General Shihab, the army commander who had resolved the 
1958 crisis, recognized explicitly the need for political 
and administrative modernization. During his regime (1958-
64), important achievements were made in the fields of 
social security, civil service reform, agricultural 
development, and planning. Among his staunchest supporters 
49. Ibid., p. 290. 
50. Ibid., p. 290. 
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Kamal Junbalat's Progressive Socialist party, which was the 
system's only tenuous link with the qrowinq non-
egr-.^bilShmsnT-, Isft, and the Kata'ib party (Phalanges) of 
Pierre Gemayel, the best organized group representing the 
Maronite community. At that time, as John Entelis has shown, 
an important part of the Kata'ib leadership was committed 
to modernizing the Lebanese state in hopes of forestalling 
further social problems, which would in time tnreaten 
Lebanon's national cohesion. Modernization of the state was 
something which inmportant components of conservative 
Maronite and progressive non-Maronite opinion could agree 
about, even though their respective national identity 
orientations remained fundamentally different; and for a 
time Shihab was able to exploit this parallelism. It 
constituted the system's only hope, albeit a slim one, for 
escaping further turmoil. But Shihab was unable to effect 
lasting changes in the system, which, because of its 
immobilizing proportionalism and its contrived traditional 
elitism, proved to be immune to reform by evolutionary 
means. 
Abolition of confessional ism from Lebanon's political 
framework is a major issue. Most Lebanese leaders, at 
least outwardly, deplore the contemporary confessional 
nature of the state. And it is through the abolition of 
this political system that the Muslim community, now the 
51. Ibid., pp. 290-291. 
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majority in the country, aims to redress the existing 
distribution of power in the state and the concomitant 
special privileges which the Maronites have enjoyed. All 
Mulism leaders and parties broadly agree on the desirability 
of abolishing political confessionalism at all levels, 
including that affecting political and administrative 
appointments and parliamentary representation. This had led 
to consistant demands for reform of the electoral law, which 
provides for parliamentary elections to be held on a 
sectarian basis and regulates voting acordingly, and for 
change in Article 95 of the constitution, which provides a 
confessional basis for public appointments. Abolishing of 
only the political aspects of confessional ism would to a 
great extent meet the demands of Muslims for their personal 
and family affairs to be governed by religious rather than 
civil law. Ever since its formation m 1969, the National 
Movement, under the leadership of Kamal Junbalat, had also 
pressed and agitated in favour of a radical reform of the 
Lebanese political system. It had also called for 
amendments to the Lebanese Constitution and changes in the 
Electroal Law, which would secure the abolition of the 
principle of sectarian representation in public office, and 
in parliament, in favour of what it called "social" or 
"popular" representation. However, it should be noted 
52. Hussein Sirriyeh , "Lebaonon : Dimensions of Conflict,' 
Adelphi Papers , 243, (Autumn, 1989), p. 16. 
53. Kamal S. Salibl, Cross Roads to Civil War Lebanon 
1958-1976, London, 1976 
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that, within the Muelim community, the LNM (especially when 
led by the late Kamal Junbaiat, assassinated on 16th March, 
1977) has wanted a greater degree of secularization thant 
the traditional leadership. 
Some Christians say that they favour a secular state, 
but point out that if competence were the sole criterion for 
appointments to administrative positions, they, because of 
their greater education, would hold more positions than they 
do now. Christians will argue that Lebanese Muslims for 
religious and sectarian reasons would never accept to have 
matters of "personal status' involving marriage and 
inheritance placed under secular state control, a 
55 prerequisite for genuine secularizatin. At other times 
they argued that sectarianism needed to be 'eradicated from 
the hearts' before being removed from the Constitution and 
the law. Despite this latter attitude, Maronites have moved 
away from promoting harmonious confessional ism (as 
advocated in Suleiman Franjieh's Constitutional Document of 
14 February 1975) and now tend to call for the abolition of 
sectarianism as such. The Cabinet of National Unity's 
programme of 31 May 1984 envisaged a ""final* abolition of 
sectarianism, and the Tripartite Agreement of 28 December 
1985- concluded, under Syrian patronage, between the leaders 
of the (Maronite) Lebanese Force, the (Shi~a) Amal movement 
54. Hussein Sirriyeh , op.cit., p. 16. 
56. David C. Gordon, Lebanon; The Frarjmented Nation, 
London, 1980, p. 105": ' 
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and the (Druse) Procireesive Socialist Party- called for the 
complete abolition of confessionalism within less than ten 
years. There was Maronite participation in both endeavours. 
Moreover, President Gemayel's March 198B proposals suggested 
setting a specified period for drawing up plans to eliminate 
political sectarianism; however, the proposals as a whole, 
especially with regard to power- sharing, were rejected by 
Muslim leaders. While there may be a Christian trend 
towards accepting the abolition of sectarianism, the 
Maronite leader Elie Hobeiga, who signed the Tripartite 
Agreement, was nonetheless ousted by extremist elements who 
B6 disapproved, this move. 
The Document of National Understanding which emerged 
from the Ta'if negotiations hardly represented a radical 
departure from previous attempts to reform the Lebanese 
political system. Many of its features were anticipated by 
the Constitutional Document accepted by then- president 
Franjiyah in 1976 and the Tripartite Agreement of 1985, both 
of which were mediated by Syria. The accord, approved at 
Ta'if by 58 of the 62 deputies, represented the end of 
efforts to jettison the National Pact of 1943. Indeed, the 
Ta'if document implicitly ratifies the National Pact with 
its emphasis upon confessional compromise and intercommunal 
cooperation. Deconfessionalization is stated as an explicit 
goal in the agreement, but without a specified deadline or 
55. Hussein Sirriyeh, op.cit., pp. 16-17. 
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t iriietable. The accord effectively concedes the futility of 
any serious attempt to expunge political sectarianism in 
Lebanon, at leat for the foreseeable future. (It bears 
recalling that the unwritten pact of 1943 also was not 
intended to institutionalize political sectarianism). The 
accord leaves no doubt that, rhetorics aside, 
confessional ism is here to stay for some time to come. In 
all fairness, however, most of the deputies who 
participated in the negotiations empnasized that they saw 
the accord as part of a process, not a definitive 
settlement. 57 
There is a discernible fact contained in the 
negotiations and its outcome that the parties wanted to 
temporize the delegitimization of confessional ism. There 
was a lurking apprehension that getting rid of 
confessionalism all of a sudden would shock the communal 
fragile equilibrium of Lebanese society and would cause 
further disintegration of it. Moreover, the Christian call 
for the removal of "sectarianism' from the "hearts' has some 
validity, even if it was made disingenuously. The 
confessional institutions have in themseleves emerged out of 
Lebanon's already sectarianized political culture, and it is 
in deep-seated norms, values and attitudes that one has to 
look for change. Institutional change could partially mould 
57. Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon after Ta"if : Is the 
Civil War Over?' Middle East Jouranl, Vol. 45, No.3 
(Summer 1991) p. 461. 
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cultural values, throucjn a long process of political 
socialization, but whether leaders might be found who could 
stand above confessional affiliations and run such 
institutions remains to be seen 58 
Although, there is a profound difference in perception, 
confessional ism served the infant Lebanese state very well. 
It provided the basis for reconciliation of the largely 
autonomous sects while it legitimized, but limited, 
competition and rivalry. 
However, in early 1970's this system failed in part 
because it did not recognise that Muslims in Lebanon had 
become more numerous than Christians as a result of 
Christian migratin to the west and the higher fertility rate 
of the Muslims, especially Shi "a. On the basis of the most 
reasonable assumptions regarding rates of growth between 
1932-71, at the outbreak of the Lebanese conflict in 1975, 
the Christian community formed less than 43 percent of the 
total population, while Muslim community has risen to over 
67 percent. The Shi"a who had constituted 20 percent of 
the total population in 1932 and ranked third behind the 
Maronites and the Sunnis now constituted 28 percent of tne 
total population and is the largest single group in the 
59 
country. Thus, the leftist groups started movement for 
58. Hussein Sirriyeh, op.cit., p.17. 
59. Riad B. Tabbarah,^Background to the Lebanese Conflict,' 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol.20, 
No. 1-2 ( March-June, 1979), p.117. 
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the deletion or all conressional clauses from the 
aQn^^T-.i-tuti-pn ^nd t-ns (.mr-.iQn^i P.4;^t or iQa.^i. 
Fed up of prDiunqeci civil war, the &6 Deputiea of 
Lebanese Chamber assembled in Ta'if on 22 October 1989 to 
introduce some reforms in the Lebanese political system. 
They reached an agreement according to which Muslims and 
Christains will have equal representation in the Parliament. 
The executive powers of the President were transferred to 
the Cabinet, consisting of equal number of Muslims and 
Christians. However, the existing confessional 
distribution of the principal offices of state was to remain 
unchanged. This meant that the President would remain a 
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker 
of Parliament a Shi "a Muslim. 
Nontheless Confessional system failed m part because 
it is not entirely home-grown product. From its earliest 
manifestations upto independence it was helped and 
encouraged by foreign nations. It did not evolve out of 
consensus among the Christians and Muslims. Rather it was 
imposed upon Lebanon to serve the imperial interests of the 
French during the period of the mandate. Although the 
National Pact of 1943 adopted confessional system but 
instead of regulating conflict and promoting inter-sectarlan 
cooperation it only helped in aggravating sectarian discord 
which ultimately plunged the country into civil war in 1975. 
60. Strategic Survey 1989-90,pp. 99-100. 
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Besides, this system failed because it did not 
recognise that Muslims in Lebanon had outnumbered the 
Christians as a result of latter's migration to the west and 
the higher fertility rate of the Muslims. But Christians 
were not ready to give up their political hegemony. 
Although, Confessionalism is being criticised, yet, it 
is an ideal political formula for Lebanon, a country 
composed of many religious communities, each with a keen 
sense of its peculiar historical and social identity and 
interests. That sectarian loyalties in Lebanon are strong 
beyong dispute, and it is hardly imaginable that a political 
system which did not take these loyalties into 
consideration could be successfully established in the 
country within the framework of democracy. 
D r ~M [7^ 
't t 
THE DRUZE COMMUNITY 
ORIGINS; 
Although the Druze constitute no more than 7 percent of 
the population of Lebanon, they have always played a 
prominent role in Lebanese history and contemporary 
politics, a role that has exceeded the community's numerical 
significance.'^ When the Druze settled in the Lebanon 
mountains there were no Maronites. The latter moved there in 
stages after being persecuted by the Mamlukes. Historians 
say that the Druze at first saw the Maronites as a 
persecuted minority like themselves and welcomed them. The 
Druze ruled Mount Lebanon jointly with the Maronites prior 
to the creation of Modern Lebanon. The community has 
preserved its cultural separateness by being closely knit 
socially. In 1031, the Druze community was closed to 
outsiders and the teachings of Druzism have always remained 
a secret, sometimes not revealed to its own members. 
The sect originated in Egypt in the beginning of the 
eleventh century during the reign of the sixth Fatimid 
Caliph, al Hakim (996-1021). The Fatimids (909-1171) 
claimed descent from Fatimah and belonged to the Isma-ili 
branch of the Shi-a, the branch that emphasized the imamate 
1. Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic; Political 
Modernization in Lebanon, Washington D.C. 1985, p. 32. 
2. David Butter, ""Are the mountain warriors losing out?' 
The Middle East, (June, 1982), p. 20. 
3. Michael C. Hudson, op. cit., p. 32. 
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of Ismail (d 760), seventh successor of Caliph All. The 
ultra Shi'a went as far as exalting All and his successors 
above prophet Muhammad- the imamate above prophecy-, whence 
the leap to endowing the imam with divine attributes becames 
rather easy. The step bridged the gap between finite 
humanity and infinite divinity. Al-Hakim took that final 
step (1016-17) and found al-Darazi a ready and convincing 
spokesman. 
Druze carried to an extreme the Isma'ili doctrine 
according to which each of the attributes, or component 
principles, of God was made manifest to mankind in the 
personality of a Prophet or imam. The eleventh-century 
leader, Darazi, proclaimed that the Fatimid Caliphs Hakim 
(996-1021), was the manifestation of God in his unity. His 
followers, known as Druze, address prayers to Hakim and him 
•"Our Lord', as well as looking forward to his reappearance. 
This is generally considered to make them non-Muslims, since 
the cardinal sin In Islam is to attribute any kind of 
plurality to God or to place any person or thing on a level 
with Him. The Druze do, however, observe some Muslim 
4. P.K. Hitti, A Short History of Lebanon, New York, 1965, 
pp. 96-97. 
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festivals and some recognizable Islamic Laws. 
According to the Isma-ili Shi'a faith then officially 
received in Egypt, al-Hakim, as imam , was the divinely 
appointed and authoritative guardian of Islam, holding a 
position among men which answered to that of the cosmic 
principle al-'aql al-fa'al, the active intellect, and 
unquestionable head of the Isma-ili religious hierarchy. 
Al-Hakim proved an eccentric ruler both in his personal life 
and in his religious policy, which flouted alternately the 
feelings of Isma-ili and Sunni alike. In his last years he 
seems to have wished to be regarded as a divine figure, 
above any rank which official Isma-ilism could accord him. 
A number of Isma'ilis were in fact inclined so to regard him 
and, evidently with hia private permission, set about 
organizing a following in the expectations of a public 
acknowledgement of the position. 
The career of al-Hakim ended as mysteriously as it had 
began. One dark night in February 1021, as he rode on a 
Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power; The Politics of 
Islam, London , 1982, p. 49. Kamal Junbalat has written 
a number of articles and pamphlets on the Druze faith 
and he is considered as one of its major interpreters-
a sort of a 'Mujtahid'. There are no good works on the 
Druze religion, partly because of the secretive nature 
of Druze beliefs and religious practices. Aside from 
Philip Hitti's Origins of the Druze People and 
Religion. New York, 1966, there is the rather abstract 
work by Sami Nasib Makarem, The Druze Faith, Delmar 
1974, and a more general work by Nejla M. Abu-Izzeddin, 
The Druze: A New Study of Their History, Faith and 
Society, Leiden, 1984. 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.11, London,1965 p. 631. 
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donkey to his observatory outside of his capital, he was 
Bet upon and......dieappeaced. He went hia diaeiplee 
asserted, into a state of occulation, whence he would return 
triumphant at the apportune time. Both Sunni and Shi'a will 
then be crushed, his religion will prevail and justice will 
fill the world. Millennial expectations, under a Mahdi 
("guided one"), were not new with the Shi'a. In their 
origination and development they correspond to Judaco-
Christian Messianic expectations. 
The sect owes its name to al-Darazi ("tailor"), a Turk 
from Bukhara who served as tailor in the court of al-
p 9 
Hakim. They call themselves Muwahhidun, "unitarians". The 
new cult found few adherents in Egypt. But in Syria (to 
which al-Darazi fled from the anger of a Cairo mob when he 
announced his doctrine ) the new message struck home in the 
area at the foot of Mount Hermon. It is here that the 
movement can be said to have been born. And Wadi al-Taym 
was the only district where Druzism struck permanent roots. 
It was introduced there by al-Darazi, who in 1019 fell in 
battle, probably against rivals one of whom might have been 
his successor in missionary activities. This was a Persian 
furrier from Khurasan named Hamzah. What predisposed the 
7. P.K. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
8. Ibid., p. 96. 
9. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, op. cit., p. 631. 
10. Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, Washington D.C. 
1961, pp. 10-11. 
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people at Wadi al-Taym to accept and retain the new faith 
may be only aonjeatuKi^ii, ppwlj^ sbiy thay were alrejady Ship's 
if not Isma'ilis, and as peasants must have suffered 
economic disabilities and felt frustrated because of the 
delay in the appearance of the expected Mahdi to usher for 
them a new era of prosperity. 
Hamza became the brain of the movement. He worked out 
its dogmas,expounded its theology and gave esoteric meaning 
to its formulation. Hamza cut the nascent creed entirely 
loose from its mother Islam. The new moral code he 
introduced was simple and free of ritualism. It comprised 
seven precepts: devotion to truth (especially when dealing 
with fellow believers), concern for one another's safety, 
renunciation of all old faiths, detachment from those living 
in error, recognition of the existence of the divine 
prinicple in humanity, adherence to the works of Our Lord 
(al-Hakim) and absolute resignation to his will as 
1 7 
manifested through his ministers. 
Hamza also met a violent death, shortly after al-Drazi, 
and his work was continued by al-Muqtana Baha-al-Din 
(dl042). Judged by his epistles Baha-al-Din was of 
Christian Syrian origin. Before the end of his life Baha-
al-Din must have come to the conclusion that the world was 
not yet ready for the rich promises held by the new 
11. P.K. Hitti, Op. cit., p. 98. 
12. Ibid., pp. 98-101. 
relicuon- Since then the "door has been closed" in the face 
of those seeking entrance or exit. The sacred books have 
become secret books. They are kept in manuscript form. 
Only the few initiate, Uqqal ("intelligent ones"), have 
access to them. The Uggal follow a rigorous, 
puritanical code. They abstain from drink and smoke, refrain 
from abusive language, shun unlawful gain and conduct 
themselves with dignity and decorum. They can be outwardly 
distinguished by heavy white turbans, coarse wollen abas and 
white untrimmed beards. Qualified women are admissible to 
the religious hierarchy. The bulk of the community have 
remained Juhhal ("ignorant",uninitiated). 
Druze use no mosques, pay no legal alms (Zakah), 
observe no Ramadan fast, offer no five daily ceremonial 
prayers and undertake no pilgrimages to Mecca. They have 
their own shrine to which local pilgrimages are made. A 
shrine commemorating the burial place of Abdulla al-Tanukhi 
(d 1480) in Abayh (al-Shuf) is visited annually by 
barefooted hundreds, mostly women, from the neighbourhood. 
Al-Sayyid ("our lord"), as he is popularly known, was the 
last great commentator on Baha al-Din. Druze practice 
monogamy like their Christian neighbours, but divorce is 
13. Druze intellectuals today are calling for some of the 
secrecy surrounding the religion to be lifted. There 
are two reasons for this. One is to let the children 
know what their religion is all about, and the second 
to show the non-Druze that there is nothing suspicious 
about it, that it is nothing more than deep philosophy. 
14. P.K. Hitti, op. cit., p. 101. 
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easy. Religious gatherings are held on thursday evenings in 
mcunapieuuua amali buildings (Khaiwda/ "eecluaed paicsp")^ 
usually on hilltops, wnere scriptures are read and 
15 
expounded and problems of communal interest are discussed. 
In their religious organization the Druze have no clear 
distinction between clergy and the laity. The entire Druze 
population is divided into two categories, those initiated 
into the secrects of the faith (uggal) and those not 
initiated (juhhal ) . The latter, observers have reported, 
known hardly anything about the articles of faith in their 
religion, but they belong to the Druze religious community 
1 6 
all the same and identify as Druze. 
The 'Uqqal' all those men and women who have received 
some information regarding the tenets of their religion and 
who are allowed to sit within the halls for worship, are 
also divided into two categories- the general and the 
special classes. The former are those who have passed the 
simple test of trust and can be permitted to know some 
elementary facts of religion. The special class may be 
described as those well founded in the knowledge of the 
mysteries of their religion. Except for some ostentatious 
signs of piety and asceticism, the 'Uqqal' had no social or 
15. Ibid., p. 102 and see Beaumont, Peter and others. The 
Middle East: A geographical Study, New York, 1978, p. 
372. 
16. Iliya F. Harick, Politics and Change in a Traditional 
Society Lebanon, 1711-1845, Princeton, 1958, p. 25. 
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political qualities whicn separated them from the rest of 
the population. They themselves did not think of themselves 
as clerics; they did not charge fees for the performance of 
religious ceremonies, they lived like other men, and like 
the rest, they went to war and enjoyed the reputation of 
being good fighters. 
Education among the Druze, religious men as well as lay 
population, was almost nonexistent. The only learning they 
had in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, reported 
a nienteenth-century writer who lived among them, was that 
of the stars and talisman. In case one aspired to become a 
judge, he added, one studied the Shari~ah. But how many 
among them could become judges'? During the Shihabi rule the 
Durze government had only one judge at a time, who handled 
cases of a civil nature. In matters of personal status, 
the Shaykh al-Aql was in charge. Volney, who became well 
acquainted with their way of life, wrote that Druze 
children "are neither taught to read the Psalms, as among 
the Maronites, nor the Quran, like the Mahometans; hardly do 
the Shaykhs know how to write a letter. We know of no 
schools of any sort for children in the Druze community 
except for a short-lived school established in 1849 at al 
Mukhtarah.^^ 
17. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
18. Ibid., p. 26. 
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AE with the Maronites, the Druze society was divided 
economically into three classes: tenants, property owners, 
and muqati-jis (hereditary chiefs). We do not have a very 
clear record of the proportion of tenants to landowners in 
Mount Lebanon, and only irc^ ugh estimates or guesses are 
possible in this respect. Volney indicated a high 
percentage of property owners, but unfortunately he did not 
find it necessary to distinguish between tenants and 
propertied peasants; he believed there was not much 
difference between the two groups since tenants rented the 
land and it became their responsibility. Shaykh Shayban al 
Khazin, at approximately the same time as Volney, seems to 
confirm the latter's account, at least in so far as Maronite 
Kisrwan was concerned. According to this account, 
apparently the larger part of the land belonged to small 
peasnats. One also gets the impression from chronicles and 
other records that property ownership was widespread among 
the Maronites from Kisrwan to Jibbat Bsharri, as well as 
19 
among the Druze population. 
As for the muqati"ji class, both Druze and Maronite, 
only a few remained the owners of great estates by the first 
part of the nineteenth century, among whom the Junbalats 
were the largest landowners. Th muqati "jis gradually 
alienated a large proportion of their land through sales and 
donations as waqfs ( mortmain). Their property itself was 
19. Ibid., p. 27. 
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parceled in small plots as a result of increase in their 
numbers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, especially in the case of the Maronite 
rouqciti ' j is . 
Druze had managed their internal affairs as a virtually 
autonomous community and developed a peculiar feudal system 
from the time they were first established in Lebanon. 
Ordinarily Islamic feudalism was based on the non-hereditary 
iqta"- the revocable right to the revenue of a village or 
district, granted by a sovereign to a civil or military 
officers as part of his salary. Under such a system it was 
difficult for local feudal aristocracies to develop, for the 
iqta' frequently changed hands, and remained throughout 
under the direct control of the central government. In the 
Druze mountains, the iqta" system did not regulary apply. 
Even during the Mamluk period, when Islamic feudalism was 
most strictly organized and centralized, the Druze, 
maintained their peculiar feudal traditions with the tacit 
recognition of the Mamluk government. The central 
government invested the leading Druze chief of his day with 
some formal authority, technically as an officer of the 
Sultan's provincial cavalry. But this modest position was 
far exceeded by the local power and prestige which such a 
chief enjoyed. As supreme emir, the paramount Druze chief 
headed a feudal system based on hereditary land tenure, and 
20. Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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was the overlord of a number of feudal families who 
controlled the various Druze districts. During the MamluK 
period the leading Druze emirs were the Buhturs, also called 
2 1 the Tanukhs, who were hereditary lords of the Gharb. They 
emerged as a dominant political force in Mount Lebanon with 
the 15th-century Tanukhid dynasty, although they were still 
technically vassals of the Mamluke Empire. The power of the 
Druze feudal aristocracy was consolidated during the first 
22 
150 years of Ottoman rule. However, the Buhturs lost 
their supremacy and were replaced in the paramount Druze 
cheiftainship by their kinsmen the Ma~ns, lords of the 
Shuf.^^ 
The Ottomans did not attempt to change the Druze 
political status. Like their Mamluk predecessors, they 
permitted the Druze to maintain their special feudal 
traditions and to manage their internal affairs as they 
pleased. As mentioned earlier, under the Ottomans, however, 
the Ma'ns came to enjoy a power and prestige which the 
Buhturs, under the Mamluks, had never known. The Ma'nis 
extended their domain, which was originally confined to al-
Shuf, both in south Lebanon and toward the north. As a 
result of Ma'ni expansion in the north, a bitter conflict 
21. Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, London, 
1965, pp 4-5. 
22. David Butter, op. cit., p. 20. 
23. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1965, p. 5. 
24. Ibid., p. 5. 
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developed between the Turkoman chiefs of that region and 
Fahkr al-Din (1585-1635). Fakhr al Din's first success was 
in Kisrwan, which he annexed and bestowed upon his Maronite 
advisor, Abu Nadir al Khazin, in 1616. Thus the Khazins 
became the first Maronite house to achieve mugati'j i 
status... In the south, Fakhr al-Din's early campaigns took 
the lands of the Sanjak of Sidon which are known as the 
iqlims (districts) of al Kharrub, Tuffah,Jazzin, and the 
Jabal al Rayhan. Thus, the Druze political ascendancy was 
established throughout the country. 
Hegemony of the Druze in Lebanon, established in the 
early seventeenth century, remained unchallenged for a long 
time. Although Maronite notables frequently rose to 
postions of influence as the assistants and advisors of the 
emirs, it was the Druze feudal chiefs who remained the 
mainstay of the Lebanese Emirate. In time, however, Druze 
power began to decline. By the end of mid-eighteenth 
century the growth of the Maronite community in numbers and 
social importance had become a matter of political 
consequnce. The Druze ranks, on the other hand, had been 
steadily weakened by internal divisions which reflected 
power rivalries among the Druze feudal families, and which 
the Shihab emirs hastened to exploit. 
25. Iliya F. Harik, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
26. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1965, pp. 5-5. 
Throughout the seventeenth century, while the ma'ns 
ruled Lebanon, the Ottomans were able to keep the country 
divided under control by discreetly encouraging the rift 
between the rival Druze factions. This the Ottomans 
continued to do after succession of the Shihabe. But the 
new emirs of Lebanon, more capable on the whole than their 
predecessors, were better able to deal with the Yemenite 
opposition. Under Bashir I (1697-1707), the internal 
situation in the country was relatively peaceful, and the 
emir was able to extend his influence southwards over Jabal 
Amil and northern Palestine. This extension of Shihab power 
disturbed the Ottoman Pasha of Sidon. But when Haydar 
Shihab (1707-1732), cousin and successor of Bashir I, 
stressed his authority over Jabal Amil in 1708 by removing 
the local governor appointed from Sidon and replacing him by 
one of his own men, the Pasha was infuriated. In 
retaliation, he nominated Yusuf Alam al-Din, the head of 
the Yemenite party, as emir of Lebanon, and sent him with 
Ottoman troops from Sidon to expel Haydar from Dayr al-
Qaroar, his capital. The town was occupied in 1709, and 
Haydar was forced to escape. But the triumph of Yusuf al-
Din was short-lived. Smarting at their defeat, the Qaysite 
Druze soon rose to strike back, rallying their forces around 
the young Shihab Emir. The yemenites reacted by attacking 
the Qaysite forces assembled at the village of Ayn Dara in 
1711. But the yemenite attack was a complete failure. The 
yemenite forces were utterly routed in a fierce battle. 
5 i 
their leaders the Alam al-Dln were slaughtered to a man, and 
the yemenite power in Lebanon was completely crushed. 
Yemenite Druze who survived the battle were expelled from 
Lebanon and forced to seek refuge in the Hawran, beyond the 
Anti-Lebanon, where a large Druze community thrives to this 
day.27 
The defeat of the Yemenites at Ayn Dara was an event 
of great importance in Lebanese history. It firmly 
established the power of the Shihabs, and temporarily ended 
the dissensions among the Druze. The expulsion of yemenites 
from the country was to be of serious consequence in the 
long run, for it reduced the size of the Druze community and 
increased the relative numerical strength of the Maronites. 
But for the moment the balance of sectarian power remained 
unchanged. In fact, the immediate effect of the resounding 
Qaysite victory was to bolster up the Druze political 
ascendancy, as the Qaysite Druze rallied around Haydar 
Shihab to divide the spoil of battle.^^ 
THE SHIHABIS; 
By the late eighteenth century the Yazbaki-Junbalati 
partisanship, started among the Druze, had come to involve 
the whole Lebanese Emirate. But the fact that the Druze 
could still impose their party divisions on the rest of the 
country was poor compensation for their steady, and now 
27. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
28. Ibid., p. 8. 
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evident, loee of power. When Emir Mulhim retired, the Druze 
were already a minority in their own diatricta. ThS 
Maronites, on the other hand, were becoming noticeably 
stronger. Impressed by the unmistakable shift in the 
sectarian balance, Mulhim, who was himself a devout Muslim, 
permitted and possibly encouraged his children to embrace 
Christianity after his retirement. Meanwhile, the struggle 
between Yazbakis and Junbalatis further weakend the Druze 
postion; and as the years went by other Shihab and Abu'l-
Lam emirs followed the example of Mulhim's sons and became 
Christians. In 1770, when Emir Mansur, relinquished the 
Emirate, the Maronite Emir Yusuf, eldest son of Mulhim, 
succeeded him, and the rule of the Christian Shihabs 
29 began. 
Thus, the Maronite-Druze balance of power in the 
eighteenth century underwent a serious change, as the 
Maronites replaced the Druze in political predominance. The 
conversion of Emir Mulhim's sons to Christianity in 1756, 
and the succession of the Maronite Yusuf Shihab in 1770 
finally set the seal to the Druze decline. But although the 
Maronites were now recognizably the dominant group, the 
Druze remained a powerful force with which the Shihabs had 
to reckon. The Maronite Shihabs, in fact, were so concerned 
about keeping Druze goodwill that they refrained from 
publicly admitting their Christianity, and for a long time 
29. Ibid., p. 11-12. 
continued to profess Druzism. 
Bashir Shihab II the emir of Mount Lebanon from 1789 to 
1840 and a Sunni by birth but a Christian convert, infringed 
upon the hereditary privileges of Druze feudal families and 
in some cases, such as the Junbalats, the Imads and the Abu-
3 1 Nakads, dispossessed them outright. He followed a policy 
of favouritism toward the Christian majority and at times, 
instigated them against the Druze. By confiscations and 
forced sales Bashir II had robbed the Druze feudal class of 
vast lands, and these lands had come in time to be 
redistributed among the rising class of well-to-do 
32 Christian villagers and townsmen. Besides, he absorbed 
under his Emirate those prerogatives which were 
traditionally enjoyed by Druze chiefs in their districts: 
they collected taxes for the governement at a profit, 
maintained peace and order and, most important, exercised 
judicial authority of the first instance over all civil and 
33 
criminal cases involving penalties short of death. 
Moreover, Bashir destroyed the cohesiveness of the 
Druze community by destroying the feudal families. In 
destroying this class, Shihab effectively dissolved the 
30. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
31. Leila M.T. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation , 
Bloomington, 1965, p. 13. 
32. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1965, p. 47. 
33. Ibid., p. 48. 
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community into autonomous villages. Thus, in each 
confrontation of Christians and Druze, the entire Maronite 
community could be brought to bear against a single Druze 
village, this put the Druze to great disadvantage in such 
instances as the disarmament of 1835. 
Syria and Lebanon were occupied by the Egyptian armies 
35 
of Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad All's son, in 1831-1832. 
Ibrahim Pasha forcibly disarm Druze and robbed of their 
choice youth, who were taken away from their homes and 
fields to fight in distant wars. When their grievances 
against Egyptians rule finally drow them to revolt, Ibrahim 
Pasha had suppressed their rising and sent the foremost 
Druze leaders into exile. No wonder that many Druze 
families at the time were broken up and dispersed, and that 
the community on the whole became weak and impoverished. 
Christians who were as serfs in the 1920's of such Druze 
Shaykhs as the Abu Nakad and at the end of the Egyptian 
period as the chief moneylenders to the same shaykhs. The 
Egyptian occupatin had allowed them to steal a march 
economically on the Druze, and they had used it to full 
3 7 
advantage. Thus, the power and prestige of Druze further 
weakened under Emir Bashir II and Egyptian rule. 
34. William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1768-
1840, Harvard University, 1963, p. 133. 
35. Leila M.T. Meo, op. cit., p. 14. 
36. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1965, pp. 47-48. 
37. William R. Polk, op. cit., p. 137. 
But Emir Baehlr's alliance with the Egyptian army or 
occupation led ultimately to his downfall. Moves to 
conscript Dru2e into Egyptian army provoked major revolt m 
Syria in 1838-39, and in Lebanon the repressed Druze lords 
and the heavily exploited Maronite peasantry joined forces 
against the Egyptians and the emir. 
Druze leaders exiled in 1825 came back to reclaim their 
lands, much of which had been handed over to Maronites. 
These chiefs jointly presented their demands to Bashir III 
who succeeded to the Emirate after the fall of Bashir II. 
The emir, without having the ability of his predecessor 
tried to follow his policy in opposing the Druze chiefs and 
reducing their influence. He also followed the same policy 
with the Christian feudal families, notably the Khazins and 
Hubayshes of the Kisrwan, forcing these families to make 
39 
common cause with the Druze chiefs against him. Later in 
1841, Bashir III summoned the Druze chiefs to a meeting in 
Dayr al- Qaroar to consider the distribution of taxes and 
other questions of general interest. The chiefs answered 
the summons and arrived outside the town on 13 October, each 
accompanied by a large party of his own men and of other 
Druze horsemen from Wadi al-Taym and the Hawran.^ They 
attacked the town and forced Bashir III to take refuge in 
the old princely palace of Dayr al-Qamar. 
38. David Butter, op. cit., p. 20. 
39. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1965, p. 45. 
40. Ibid., p. 49. 
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"Umar Paaah was appointed Governer of Mount Lebanon 
after the fall of Bashir III. As Governer of Mount Lebanon, 
-Umar Pasha's main concern was to put an end to all thought 
of a Shihab restoration. Immediately upon establishing 
himself in the palace of Bayt al-Din, he began to rally 
around him all those elements in the country who were 
already opposed to the Shihabs, winning their support by 
showing them special favour. The Druze feudal chiefs who 
had been dispossessed by Bashir II and Bashir III were 
given back their old estates and reconfirmed in their 
traditional prerogatives. 41 
The pasha's, main interest was to establish his own 
authority in Lebanon and make the direct Ottoman rule of the 
country practicable. However, the Druze leaders felt that 
it was their own efforts that the Shihabs had been 
overthrown and the regime of direct Ottoman administration 
established, and they were therefore unwilling to receive 
dictation from the Turks. In the face of such Druze 
pretensions,"Umar Pasha turned for support to the Maronites, 
employing a number of them in his service as troops under 
their own leaders. This only alienated the Druze still 
A O 
further. A dual administration was duly imposed after 
European intervention, but division of the mountain between 
north (Maronite) and south (Druze) only exacerbated growing 
41. Ibid., p. 53 
42. Ibid., p. 59. 
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sectarian tensions, leading to the savage Druze-Maronite war 
of 1860, which left well over 10,000 people dead, most of 
them Christians.'^^ Thus Druze military power increased after 
the 1860 civil war. 
The outbreak of the world War I in 1914 brought 
stricter controls over the administrations of Turkey's 
eastern provinces. Lebanese autonomy was at first violated, 
then officially abolished in October, 1915, when 
Mutasarrifyya regime was replaced by direct Ottoman rule. 
At the close of the war in 1918, Lebanon was temporarily 
administered by the French military authorities, and in 1922 
it was confirmed by the League of Nations as a French 
4 4 
mandate. On 1 September, 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed 
the "independence" of Greater Lebanon. The state now 
included the areas for which Maronite spokesmen had been 
clamouring- the Bekka Valley in the east, Jabal Amil in the 
south, and the coastal areas including the towns of Tripoli, 
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre. The new boundaries also brought 
some changes in the demographic picture of the state. The 
Druze lost their former position as the dominant Muslim sect 
to the Sunnis, who emerged as the main challengers to the 
Maronites' numerical preponderance and political 
predominance. 
43. David Butter, op. cit., p. 20. 
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Some Druse noblemen and their followers were moved by 
the Arab natinalist-unionist spirit. But the community as a 
whole put one thing above everything else: the protection 
and preservation of its traditional institutions and 
feudal organization from outside interference. If the 
mandatory was ready to guarantee their inviolability, then 
they, the Druse, would cooperate with it as they had 
cooperated with their former protector, Britain. Their 
participation in the 1925-1926 rebellion was primarily an 
expression of solidarity with their kinfolk in Jabal Druze. 
With the back of the rebellion broken, the Lebanese Druze 
declared their allegiance to their legal government and 
settled down to a fruitfull participation in its 
institutions and to cooperate with the French. Lively 
competition between their two leading and rival families, 
the Arslans and the Junbalats, netted down them a greater 
share of political power than would have otherwise been 
4 8 theirs. At the time of independence, the Druze, 
represented by Emir Majid Arslan, were viewed as the 
47. In the summer of 1925 open revolt broke out in the 
autonomous Jabal Druze (within Syria) against French 
reform measures which had struck at the traditional 
institutions of the Druze. The revolt soon spread to 
other parts of Syria, taking on the aspect of an Arab 
nationalist liberation movement and in the spring of 
1926 it reached those districts of Lebanon that had 
been annexed in 1920 to form the larger state. But the 
rebellion was finally quelled in the early months of 
1927. For detail study of 1925-1926 rebellion see, 
Joyce Laverty Miller, 'The Syrian Revolt of 1925,' 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8 (1977), 
pp. 545-563. 
48. Leila M.T. Meo, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
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cruardian-community of Lebanon. Arslan, whose reputation of 
tough leadership and warrior-like physical appearancfc;, 
became Defence Minister in the first cabinet after 
independence. By virtue of the Druze historic role in the 
political formation of Lebanon and because of the Druze 
reputation of superior fighting skills, the post of the 
4 9 
army chief of staff was to be reserved to a Druze. 
KAMAL JUNBALAT; 
However, it was left to modern Lebanon's most 
charismatic leader, the late Kamal Junbalat, to bring the 
Druze back to prominence in a state where they are a 
relatively small minority. Unlike most of his peers, 
Junbalat had no direct exposure to politics prior to 
assuming the leadership of his clan. During the mandate 
period, his mother- the very able and remarkable (sitt) 
Nazira- provided whatever leadership the Junbalati House 
needed after the assassination of her husband in 1921, and 
thus paved the way for her son's leadership. This enabled 
Junbalat to succeed to his father's position without having 
to go through the tedious process of political maneuvering 
that marked the political careers of many Lebanese leaders, 
particularly those who did not inherit the political Zaamah 
of certain communities. Having no such concerns, Junbalat 
49. Farid al-Khazen, 'Kamal Jumblatt, the Uncrowned Druze 
Prince of the Left,* Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 24, 
No. 2, (April, 1988), p. 191. 
6 
devoted much of hia efforts to broaden hia non-Druze power 
base, promote his ideals and ultimately leave his imprint on 
50 
every aspect of Lebanese politics. 
Kamal Junbalat was a man of many identities, a feudal 
lord, a socialist, a poet, a Gandhian, a pro-Palestinian and 
an Arabist.^^ In the opinion of both friend and foe, Kamal 
Junbalat was perhaps Lebanon's most exceptional political 
figure. Indeed he was one of those leaders who could not be 
defeated politically, for he could always obtain 
unconditional support from Druze supporters whose loyalty to 
the Junbalat House was least influenced by Kamal Socialism, 
Arabism, or Lebanism. Such legitimacy, rooted in history 
and communal traditions, gave Junbalat little cause for 
concern about any shifts affecting his Druze power base. 
This also gave him significant margin of political 
CO 
maneuverability enjoyed by few Lebanese leaders. 
As early as 1949, Junbalat had founded under his 
leadership a political party which he called the Progressive 
Socialist Party (PSP) - a party which included some 
Christianc and Sunni and Shi ""a Muslims along with its main 
following of Junbalat Druze. The secular and progressive 
50. Ibid., p. 179. 
51. Gordon C. David, Lebanon; The Fragmented Nation, 
London, 1980, p. 156. 
52. Ibid., p. 178. 
63. In arable it is, al Hizb al-Ishtiraqi al-Taqaddumi. 
54. Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to the Civil War; Lebanon 
1956-1976, London, 1976, p. 12. 
rhetoric of his party (PSP) helped him to extend his 
leadership and appeal well outside his community. Yet, he 
always maintained a traditional "feudal" image among his 
constituency as the "lord of the Mukhtarah", a tittle he 
55 himself had accepted. 
In 1952, in alliance with Camille Chamoun, Raymond Iddi 
and others, Junbalat played a leading role in forcing the 
resignation of Bishara al-Khuri, the first president of 
independent Lebanon, and in securing the election of Chamoun 
to succeed him. Once Chamoun was in power, however, he lost 
patiance with the socialism of Kamal Junbalat and his 
ambitions to act as godfather to the new regime, and the two 
Shuf leaders drifted apart. Because the political following 
of the Camille Chamoun was numerically superior to that of 
Junbalat in the Shuf, it was difficult for Junbalat to win 
an election in the religiously mixed constituency against 
obstruction from Chamoun, particularly as the latter was now 
president. In 1957, when the second parliamentary election 
under Chamoun were held, Junbalat, who was already on bad 
terms with the President, had to fight his electoral 
campaign on his own, and lost his seat in parliament, to the 
wrath of the Junbalati Druze who now marked out Chamoun as a 
sworn enemy. In 1958, Junbalat and his Druze followers 
opted for Nasserist pan-Arabism, Joining the Muslim 
rebellion against Chamoun regime. After 1958, and more 
55. As~ad Abu Khaiil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political 
Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon*, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1985, p. 12. 
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pronouncedly after 1961, the powerful Druze leader emerged 
56 
as a leading supporter of Fuad Shihab. 
The electoral setback, however, was no major impediment 
to Junbalat's 'reintegration* in the system following the 
ending of the 1958 crisis and the election of General Shihab 
to the presidency. The reluctant truce that Junbalat 
declared with Shihab (and later with the Shihabist 
establishment) was in effect an "opposition from within'. 
Thus, as Junbalat held several cabinet posts in the 1960s, 
he never hesitated to criticise, and sometimes denounce , 
the policies of cabinets of which he was a member. In 
addition Shihab's working ralationship with Nasser deprived 
Junbalat as well as other Muslim leaders of pan-Arab 
political platforms usually used for internal political 
purposes. 
57 
After having been ""neutralized* in internal politics by 
58 Shihab's reformist policies, Junbalat's attention turned 
to regional problems, particularly the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Just as the 1967 war was a turning point for many 
56. Kama! S. Salibi, op. cit., 1976, pp. 12-13. 
57. Farid al- Khazin, op. cit. pp. 180-181. 
58. Among reforms enacted was an extension of the public 
school system, of rural electrification, of medical 
dispensaries, and effort were made to improve the 
system of social insurance. Moreover, a civil service 
board was appointed to raise administrative standereds, 
and accounting was made stricter. A secret ballot was 
introduced, and Parliament was enlarged to 99 members 
from 66, the purpose being partly to democratize and 
partly to weaken the power of the notables. 
7.) 
Arab leaders, it was a major Impetus for Junbalat's strong 
backing of armed struggle against Israel, and his advocacy 
of unrestrained Palestinian military activities in Lebanon. 
Following Nasser's death, Junbalat espoused a position in 
line with that of Damascus and developed a close 
relationship with the PLO and several other Arab leftist 
groups. 
59 
The 1967 defeat radicalized Arab politics to an 
unprecedented scale. And PLO became the single most 
important rhetorical issue in Junbalat's political 
pronouncement. One statement of his programme was made by 
him in May 1969, a month of confrontation between the Army 
and the Palestinians, when he laid down conditions for his 
party's participation in the Government. His views then 
were similar to those he expressed during the Civil War, in 
January 1976. Among his conditions in 1969 were: full 
freedom to be given to the Palestinian commandos to operate 
across the Lebanese border; the istitution of obligatory 
military service; the implementation of a number of social 
reform including the creation of a Credit Bank for 
Agriculture and Industry and the elaboration of a plan for 
development, and the abolition of political confessional ism 
in the electoral system and in other spheres of the Lebanese 
system. His role in the prolongation of the ministerial 
59. Farid al- Khazen, op. cit., p. 181. 
60. Ibid., p. 181. 
61. David C. Gordon, op. cit., p. 158. 
/ i 
crieie in 1969, which was ended with the signing of the 
Cairo Agreement, inaugurated a new pattern of aggressive 
leftist politics. One concrete action was Junbalat's 
controversial decision to legalize a number of radical and 
anti-system parties. He did that in his capacity as the 
Minister of the Interior in the first cabinet formed after 
the 1969 crisis- a portfolio he requested as a condition 
for joining the cabinet. But despite such actions, Junbalat 
was willing to support the candidacy of a 'non-progressive' 
leader like Frangiyeh in the presidential elections of 
1970^^ rather than that of the Shihabist candidate, Elias 
Sarkis, with whom he was more in agreement politically and 
63 ideologically. 
The formation of National Movement or Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM) in 1969 under the leadership of Kamal 
Junbalat further enhanced his prestige. Lebanese National 
Movement brought together a large coalition of anti-
confessional parties which included Arab nationalists and 
Marxists. These parties and organizations formulated a 
common programme. LNM under the leadership of Kamal 
Junbalat, had pressed and agitated in favour of a radical 
reform of the Lebanese political system. It had called for 
62. It is believed that PSP deputies split vote equally 
between Sarkir and Franjiyeh. This had a decisive 
impact on the outcome of the elections, since Frangiyeh 
won by a majority of one vote. 
63. Farid al-Khazen, op. cit., p. 181. 
64. B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, London, 
1985,p. 115. 
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amendments to the Lebanese Consititut ion and changes in the 
Electoral Law, which would secure the abolition of the 
principle of sectarian representation in public office, and 
in parliament, in favour of what it called "social" or 
"popular" representation. Most of all, it had attacked the 
"National Covenant," which the conservatives maintained was 
the ideal formula for Lebanon- a country composed of many 
religious communites, each with a keen sense of its peculiar 
65 historical and social identity and interests. 
The 1970s were the heyday of Junbalat, the 
-socialist'. He skillfully seized the opportunity to 
expand his power base and push not merely for reforms, but 
more important, for system change. In addition to his image 
as the pan-Arab leader of the radical left, Junbalat was 
also the recipient of the Lenin Medal for Peace in 1972. A 
year later, he became the Secretary General of a leftist 
pro-PLO umbrella organization with members drawn from 
several Arab countries, known as the Arab Front for the 
Support of the Palestinian Revolution. Junbalat power 
reached a peak level with the formation of the first "pro-
leftist' cabinet headed by Rashid al-Sulh, whc was Junbalat 
protege and nominee for the post. The Sulh cabinet, in 
which the Phalangists and the Junbalatis were equally 
65. Kamal S. Salibi, op. cit., 1976, p. 82. 
66. In 1975, following the Ayn al-Rummaneh incident the 
Front, at a meeting in Beirut, called for the 
"isolation of the Phalangist party in Lebanese politics 
(as well as in the Arab World). 
7) 
represented, disintegrated with the outbreak of war in 
1975.^^ 
The power of Junbalat on the eve of the war was not 
only due to his leadership of the left or his close 
alliance with the PLO. It was due to his most significant 
political achievement that was his control over the pan-
Arab street, particularly in Beirut. In this way he was 
able to undermine the power base of traditional Sunni 
Zu-ama'. In fact, Junbalat's nomination of Rashid Sulh-who 
was not regarded as a major Sunni Zaim-was opposed by 
leaders like Salam and Karami. Junbalat pan-Arab, leftist, 
and pro-Palestinian political platform left little room for 
his rival to maneuver. For a brief but crucial time, 
Junbalat became Lebanon's Nasser in the eyes of the Muslim 
"street". Likewise, Junbalat's championing of social causes 
made him the outspoken defender of the underprivileged 
communities. And in the 1970 s, he gained the support of an 
important segment of a politically active Christian 
g g 
intelligentsia. 
The Civil War was a tempting ground for Junbalat's 
abuse of power. But this cost him a great deal. In the 
first place, it undercut his credibility and popularity 
among both Christian and Muslim sympathizers. His famous 
call for the "isolation' and banning of the Kata'ib party, 
67. Farid al-Khazen, op. cit., p. 181. 
68. Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
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issued in the name of the Arab Front for the Support of the 
Palestinian Revolution, following a meeting held in Beirut, 
was an early warning to many somewhat neutral Christian 
sympathizers regarding Junbalat's ultimate intensions. 
Moreover, his conistent defiance of some prominent Sunni 
leaders generated greater unity among the Sunnis in the face 
of the rapid rise of radical leftist groups over which the 
traditional Sunni leadership had little control. The 
ultimate price that Junbalat had to pay-his life-occured 
when, in the midst of the war, he revealed his true 
objectives to the wrong person: to Syrian President Assad. 
Junbalat made it clear that the war was more than a conflict 
over some vague issues of domestic reform; his was against 
the realities of historical change. But this, too, was how 
Assad viewed the war: as being his own against internal and 
external enemies, especially when the latter were led by the 
PLO.^3 
As fighting intensified and as the country entered the 
first phase of its de facto partition, the outcome of the 
war concerned the already divided Lebanese less than the new 
antagonistic patrons of post-war Lebanon: Syria and the PLO. 
As a result, Junbalat's own designs for Lebanon had to be 
reconciled with one of these two parties. For various 
tactical reason, Junbalat opted for a political and military 
alliance with the PLO. This was solidified by Junbalat's 
69. Ibid., p. 182 
rejection of the Syrian-sponsored 1976 Constitutional 
Document^^ and by subsquent PLO-leftist military assaults, 
particularly in the Mountain. Not surprisingly, Damascus 
intervened in full force against the Junbalat-PLO forces and 
defeated it. On 16 March 1977, Junbalat was assassinated in 
broad daylight near Mukhtara-not far from a Syrian 
checkpoint. 
WALID JUNBALAT; 
As for the present political leadership, Walid 
Junbalat, the son of Kamal Junbalat appears to be the sole 
leader of the Druze community in Lebanon. Although Walid 
Junbalat enjoys enormous popularity and influence within his 
sect, he could not maintain the broad-based support of his 
father Kamal, which extended far outside the narrow 
boundaries of the Druze community... Walid, on the other 
hand, has emerged as the leader of his own sect who is more 
72 
concerned with the affairs of his community. Although at 
70. The Constitutional Document did indeed institutionalize 
the Unwritten sectarian arrangement of the National 
Pact: the presidency of the republic would be reserved 
to a Maronite, that of the Council of Ministers to a 
Sunni, and that of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shi'a. 
Under this arrangement, the Druze Community would be 
relegated to the position it had held within the 
confessional system. This meant that Junbalat 
political ambitions would remain curtailed by the 
workings of confessional politics, and that he would 
remain the prisoner of system in which he had little 
faith. This was certainly unacceptable. 
71. Farid al-Khazen, op. cit., p. 182. 
72. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., p. 31. 
29, he was the leader of the Lebanese National Movement, 
considered to be one of the most progressive leftist 
7 "^  
movement in the Arab world. But Walid's ineffective 
control over the LNM, led to the gradual dismantling of the 
National Movement, which was completed by the summer of 
1982, and its remnants have since been completely 
^ . . 7 4 
subordinated to the Syrian regime. 
Walid Junbalat's successful military offensive in the 
summer of 1983 against the Christain Lebanese Force in the 
Shuf and the "Aley region recouped the losses he had 
incurred from the attempts made by those Forces to share 
power with him in his feudal domain, in the wake of the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Junbalat's task was 
facilitated by the fact that the spiritual leaders of the 
Druze community had important links to Israel and that Syria 
played a crucial role in supporting militarily the Druze 
75 
militias in the region. The PSP behind which the Druze 
community rallied, emerged as the protector of the Druze 
heartland. In times of sectarian threat, the Lebanese 
communities resort to their history and take refuge in their 
confessional heritage. Under these circumstances, Walid has 
been elevated to the status of the traditional and only 
representative of the Druze community. 
73. Farid al-Khazin, op. cit., p. 184. 
74. Marius K. Deeb, 'Lebanon: Prospects for National 
Reconciliation in the Mid-1980's, The Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2, (Spring, 1984), p. 227. 
75. Ibid., p. 277. 
76. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit-, pp. 31-32. 
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The Lebanese Druze families, who are divided into 
Yazbakie and Junbaiatis are unsramouHiy jr-i^ iiying oeranq tne 
well organized Progressive Socialist Party, which has 
defended the Druze hearland against Phalangist advances. 
Furthermore, the Yr.zbaki branch has suffered numerous 
setbacks. First, it has lost its historical leader, Majid 
Arsalan, who himself found it difficult to challenge 
effectively the more charismatic and, of course, 
sofisticated appeal of Kamal Junbalat. Secondly, Majid's 
son Prince Faysal, committed a fatal mistake by closely 
associating himself with Bashir Gemayel and the Lebanese 
Forces before and after the Israeli invasion. Adding to 
this weakness of the Yazbaki branch is the lack of a Yazbaki 
Shaykh al-*"Agl (the highest Druze religious authority). The 
Yazbaki could not agree on a successor to the last one, who 
died years ago. The present Shaykh al-'aql, Muhammad Abu 
.77 Shaqra is a Junbalati who is completely subordinate to 
77. Shaykh Muhammad Abu-Shakra died on 24 October 1991. He 
was born in the village of Ammadour, a short distance 
to the south of al Mukhtara, the seat of power of the 
Junbalat family and receive his early education there. 
Shakra inherited from his father an involvement in 
Arab nationalist politics at a time when the region was 
passing through the turmoil of achieving independence 
from Ottoman Turkey and, later, from France and 
Britain. In 1949 he was elected one of the three Shykh 
al-aqls. In 1970, after the death of the last rival 
Shaykh al 'aql Shaykh Muhmmad was acknowledged to be 
the supreme spiritual leader of the community, and an 
act of the Lebanese Parliament stipulated that 
henceforth there would be only one Druze cleric bearing 
that title. The act further consolidated Shaykh 
Muhammad's fame and extended his influence into Syria 
and Israel, making him the only universally recognized 
Shaykh al- Aqi among the 1.1 million Druze in West 
Asia. An important reform initiated by him was^ 
modernization of the Druze judiciary, which ha^^^^^AaAE,/\7^.-.^ 
hereditary. Another was the setting up of ,«ff^"^  e lected ~ 'T%, 
council of elders, the Majlis al-Mazhabi. ff'v' 
1(7.. ACC No. 
' ^ , • 
the Junbalati political leadership 
the position of Walid Junbalat. 
78 
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This also enchanced 
Moreover, there exists within the Druze religious 
tradition a pecularity that has facilitated the unchallenged 
leadership of Walid Junbalat. Why was he not opposed, for 
example, by the Druze religious establishment? It is very 
clear today that Druze religious leaders (al-mashayikh) have 
seldom played the role that has been assumed by Sunni and 
Shi"a religious leaders. The reasons for this unique 
phenomenon within the Lebanese context lie in the very 
doctrines of Druzism. According to the tenets of the Druze 
sect, there exists no mediator between one's belief and God. 
A Druze believer, has to practice his religion in a highly 
secretive and personal manner that leaves no room for a 
prestigious religious establishment to intervene on behalf 
of God's will. Secondly, Druzism is by its very nature 
secretive due to a history of fierce religious persecution. 
This has led the Druze to reveal very little of their 
religion: "Nine tenth of one's religion is to be found in 
the taqiyah (the part of religion never revealed to 
outsiders). "Al-istitar bi-al-ma'luf (concealment by what is 
familiar) is a major Druze doctrine that explains the Druze 
attitude towards any political authority. According to thia 
doctrine, a Druze conceals his genuine religious position in 
order to avoid oppression. Thus Druzism is distinctively a 
78. As'ad Abu Khalii, op. cit., p. 33. 
monastic religion, whereby a true believer is supposed to 
adhere to the demands of al--aql (the Universal Mine) alone. 
This has placed Druze political leaders in an unchallenged 
position. Whether doctrine dictates that Druze should 
follow their own minds or not, the Druze masses are going to 
seek guidance anyway. The tradition of family loyalty is 
far stronger than any philosophical teaching. Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, the primary concern for the Druze 
community has historically been survival and religious 
79 
autonomy, regardless of the kind of state it lives under. 
The leadership of Walid Junbalat is a typical Lebanese 
traditional family leadership. The leader's legitimacy is 
primarily derived from the sectarian conciousness of his 
community. He also enjoys the support of the Druze 
bourgeoisie, who have prospered during the Civil War by 
establishing a strong industrial base in Shuwayfat. This 
new bourgeoisie has a stake in maintaining this important 
geographical base in order to supply customers in the area 
of 'Aley and the Shuf' and to have direct access to the sea 
and its illegal existing and prospective ports. This group 
funds the PSP according to an established illegal tax 
system. The fighters of the PSP come from the lower 
classes, who are suffering extensive unemployment as a 
result of the war. The leadership of the PSP includes 
ft n 
members from middle-class families. 
79. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
80. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
Both the Junbalati and Yazbaki factions of the Druze 
have demanded a larger share of power in the political 
establishment. The Druse in Lebanon rank numerically fifth 
if not sixth among the major sects, constituting around 
seven percent of the total Lebanese population. They 
justify their demand for the estalishment of a senate with 
its presidency given to a Druze on the grounds that the 
Druze played an important historical role in the creation of 
modern Lebanon, when the Druze Ma'nids and Shihabs ruled 
Mount Lebanon from the 17th to the mid-19th century. In 
practice they have tried to achieve their objectives by 
resorting to arms, and allying themselves with both Syria 
and Israel. As the Druze occupy the strategic mountains 
close to Beirut, they were able to shell the city and its 
suburbs, and paralyze the government as well as close the 
airport. There were widespread rumours in the summer of 
1983 that the Druze were entertaining the idea of 
establishing a Druze state in the regions they controlled, 
as a buffer state between Syria and Israel. The eviction of 
the Christian civilian population from Bhamdun and many 
villages of the Shuf and Aley region strenthened these 
rumours. Although the Yazbaki leadership remained basically 
in favour of the political establishment and "legitimacy" 
(al-Shar"iya), Junbalat leadership prevailed both militarily 
and politically. Walid Junbalat's stand in the Geneva talks 
on national reconciliation stems from his patron-client 
relationship with Syria. His Insistence on the abrogation 
81 
of the Lebanese-Israeli Accord of May 17, 1983, rings hollow 
in the ears of traditional leaders such as Saib Salam wnen 
it la clear that it le due partly to the Druze-Israeli 
connection that Junbalat was able to achieve his objectives 
8 1 in the Shuf mountains. 
However, Junbalat's fate is now tied to the Syrian 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad, and he cannot easily extricate 
himself from his Syrian partrons. In the first place, they 
are his neighbours in the Shuf and have considerable 
military and political capability against him. In the 
second, his father's fate must forever be a preoccupation. 
In the third, he must bear in mind the welfare of the 
Syrian Druze community as well as that of the Lebanese 
Druze. To make his task more difficult, he must be 
particularly careful in dealing with the Syrians because his 
father's legacy of opposition to them makes his own 
8 ? 
motivation suspect in their eyes. 
Secondly, it must be mentioned that there is developing 
within the PSP itself a faction that voices strong rejection 
of Walid's "feudal" leasdership. This faction cannot 
reconcile with traditional leadership of Junbalat with his 
progressive pronouncements. The faction seek to abolish the 
family leadership that arrogantly treats the Druze as mere 
followers. Ghalib Abu Muslih, who heads the faction, is 
said to be influenced by Marxist ideas. Abu Muslih's 
faction calls for the utilization of class analysis in order 
81. Marius K. Deeb, op. cit., p. 278. 
82. Ibid., p. 277. 
8.: 
to understand the class and family divisions within the 
Druze community. Its ultimate aim is to eliminate family 
leadership, particularly that of Walid Junbalat and his 
party. The group chose t operate within the organizational 
framework of the PSP in order to challege Walid from the 
very basis of his support. However, it had failed to spread 
outside ~Alay and appears to be out of touch with the rank 
and file of the Druze, who are overwhelmed by sectarian 
conciousness and traditional loyalty and allegiance to the 
PSP leader.®^ 
No doubt that the Druze community lost their former 
position as the dominant Muslim sect with the establishment 
of Greater Lebanon in 1920. And their political and 
economic power has been eroded over the few decades. But 
the Druze community who had played a crucial role in the 
making of Lebanon had continued to play an important role in 
spite of being less in numbers. This reflects their strong 
sense of cohesion as a community despite the fact that there 
were internal division amongst them either into the Arslans 
or the Junbalat. They might squable among themselves and 
take different sides in civil crisis, but they avoid open 
intra- confessional strife since they consider their loyalty 
to community much more important than allegiance to either 
Syrianism or Arabism. In the past , they had found strong 
leadership from Junbalati family, and have continued to do 
so in the recent history. The assassination of Junbalat in 
83. As~ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
8! 
IU77 inflicted a severe blow to Druze community who was 
their most powerful representative in the political arena. 
However, as mentioned above, Walid Junbalat who took 
over the leadership of the Junbalati house, after the death 
of his father, Kamal Junbalat, enjoys enormous popularity 
and influence within his sect. He could not maintain the 
broad based support of his father Kamal, which extended far 
outside the narrow boundaries of the Druze community. Walid 
on the other hand, has emerged as leader of his own sect who 
is more concerned with the affairs of his community. His 
successful military offensive in the summer 1983 against the 
Christian Lebanese Forces in the Shuf and the "Aley regions 
recouped the losses he had incurred from the attempts made 
by these Forces to share power with him in his feudal 
domain, in the wake of Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The 
death of Yazbaki leader Majld Arslan and ineffective 
leadership of his son Prince Faisal strengthened the 
position of Walid within Druze community. Moreover, 
failure of Yazbaki to elect their Shaykh al-Agl further 
added to the weakness of Yazbaki Druze. Thus, the Druze 
rallying behind the well organized Progressive Socialist 
Party, which has defended the Druze heartland against 
Phalangist advances. The Druze will continue to play 
important role in Lebanese politics due to their 
concentration in the strategic Shuf and 'Aley regions and 
being a close knit society. 
S-t 
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MARONITES 
ORIGINS: 
The oi-icfin of Maronites can be traced back to the 4th 
century Syrian hermit^, St Maron who started a religious 
movement in Horns, Hama and Aleppo. Originally the Maronites 
were Monophysites who held that Jesus was entirely Divine, 
one person with one nature. At the beginning of the Muslim 
invasion, the Ghassani Arabs of Syria, who were 
Monophysites, sided with the invading Muslims and against 
the authority of Byzantium. The Byzantines, in order to win 
back the support of the Ghassanis, offered the religious 
compromise of the so-called "Exposition of Faith" (ecthesis) 
of 538 A.D- Which had attempted to solve the logical 
difference by using words that would conceal them. The 
resulting compromise was that of Monothelitism, the doctrine 
that the will of Jesus was one with the Divine will. The 
Maronites, who were Monothelitists, were the result of that 
compromise between the Byzantines and the Syrian Monophysite 
Christians. Maronites were excommunicated by the Council of 
Constantinople of 680. 
1. Herald Voke, The Lebanese War, London, 1978, p.5. 
2. Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle 
East London, 1980, p.133. 
3. The Orthodox belief is that Jesus is one person with 
two natute, human and Divine. 
4. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, London, 1989, 
P.2B9. 
5. Hugh Wybrew, 'Eastern Christianity since 451' Stewart 
Sutherland and others (ed). The World's Religions, 
London, 1988, p.190. 
8h 
At the beginning of the Cruaadea, the Latin Church 
still viewed the Maronites as heretics. But the Maronites 
welcomed the Crusaders as allies in the struggle with Islam. 
And in 1182 they renounced monothelitism and recognized 
papal supremacy. But they retained their own liturgy and 
their own religious leader, the Haronite Patriarch of 
Antioch and of the whole Orient, whose residence is always 
in Lebanon. Contact with Rome was sporadic after the Muslim 
reconguest of the Holy Land, completed in 1291 with the 
capture of Acre. Moreover, there were several anti-Catholic 
movements among the Maronites during the three centuries 
which followed their union with Rome. These movements, 
though not ultimately successful, were widespread enough to 
give visiting piligrims and missionaries from Europe an 
unfavourable impression of the community's orthodoxy. A 
definitive consolidation of the Union, however, did no come 
until the 16th century, brought about largely through the 
work of the Jesuit John Eliano. In 1515 Pope Leo X sent to 
6. Marie-Christine Aulas, 'The Socio-Ideological 
Development of the Maronite community: The Emergence of 
the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces', Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.7, No.4, p.2. 
7. Hugh Wybrew,op.cit., p.191 and for a deep study of 
Maronite community, se Moosa Matti, The Maronites in 
History, New York, 1936. 
8. Herald Vocke, op.cit., p.5. 
9. Hugh Wyfarew, op.cit., p.191. 
10. Kamal S.Salibi, Maronite Historians of Mediaeval 
Lebanon, Beirute, 1959. 
11. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica,Vol.7, 15th Ediction, 
Chicago, 1987, p.867. 
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the then Maronite Patriarch, Sha'un Al-Hadathi, a bull 
confirming papal recognition of Maronite Orthodoxy and 
lauding those beleaguered Christians as examplary followers 
of the true faith who shone forth in the midst of infidels 
1 2 
and bastions of error, as roses among thorns. In 1584 Pope 
Gregory XIII founded the Maronite college in Rome, which 
flourished under Jesuit administration into the 20th century 
1 3 
and became a training centre for scholars and leaders. It 
was not until 1735, however, that the organizational 
sturucture of the Maronite rite as it stands today was 
established. In that year the convocation of the Synod at 
Luwayza (a monastry within the site of Beirut) corrected 
certain lingering irregularities in ecclesiastical 
practice 14 
As mentioned earlier the origin of Maronites can be 
traced back to the 4th century Syrian hermit, St Maron who 
started a religious movement in Horns, Hama and Aleppo. 
However, a monk from Antioch brought the Maronites to the 
15 high valleys of northern Lebanon in the .seventh century. 
They had a wide distribution in what are now Syria, northern 
Iraq and southern Turkey but with concentrations along the 
Orontes and at Aleppo and Urfa in the seventh century- They 
12. Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in Arab East, London, 
1979, p.48. 
13. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit., p.867. 
14. Robert Brenton Betts, op.cit., p.48. 
15. Herald Voke, op.cit., pp4-5. 
came into conflict with the Jacobites, then much stronger in 
the Orontes area, over the will of christ. An anonymous 
source reports that in 659 Maronites and Jacobites brought 
their religious disputes and argued their cases before 
Mu'awiya. Renewed fueds with the Jacobites, in the second 
half of the seventh century, resulted in the migration of 
bands of Maronites to North Lebanbon, destined to become the 
permanent home of Maronitism. The Muslim - Arab conquest 
further reinforced their migration when the Caliph, Umar 
'Abd al-Aziz (AD 717-720) introduced thoroughgoing 
1 8 discrimination against Christians. These harsh and 
inhospitable mountains of Lebanon to which Maronites 
migrated after Muslim,-Arab conquest helped them to fend off 
Muslim attempts at conquest and develop a nearly independent 
19 
society and state. Maronites established themselved first 
of all in the Batrun district, where the Patriarch Yahama 
Marun (d.c. 707) established his seat at Kafarhayy, and 
along the Qadisha (about Ali) valley, near which the 
earliest known Maronite Church was built at Ehden in AD749. 
16. Peter Beaumont and others. The Middle East: A 
Geographical Study, New York, p.374. 
17. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History, London, 1957, 
p.248. 
18. Peter. Beaumont and others, op.cit., p.374. Christians 
were considered inferior to Muslims, therefore, they 
exluded from the administration, prevented from 
building new Churches, and required to wear distinctive 
dress 
19. Bruce Borthwick, op.cit., p.133-
S'l 
The influx of persecuted Maronite Christians from Syria into 
the Lebanon Mountains continued in the ninth century. The 
settlement of Maronites spread in this core area, then 
regarded as something of a Maronite holyland, because it 
contained only a small indigenous population and, despite 
its defensibi1ity, because it possessed cultivable soils and 
numerous springs. In 1335 the Sunni Muslim Mamluks invaded 
the region and dominated it for two centuries. During this 
period conflict broke out between the Mamluks and the Shi'a 
population that then inhabited the Kisrwan which did not 
involve the Maronites, allow them to extend their territory 
into the areas from which the Shi'a were expelled. By the 
beginning of Ottoman occupation in 1516, the Maronites 
2 1 
represented the dominanat social group in the Kisrwan. The 
availability of cultivable soils, numerous springs, poorly 
exploited resources and the remnants of the forests also 
2 2 
attracted the Maronites to settle down in Kisrwan. 
Following the establishment of Emirate in 1590, 
Maronites began to move from northern Lebanon to southern 
Lebanon. Freedom and protection were extended to them by the 
feudal lords in the area, particularly in matters of 
personal safety and the exercise of religious activities. 
The Maronite Churches in particular started to grow and 
20 Peter Beaumont and others, op.cit., p.374. 
21. Marie-Christine Aulas, op.cit., p.3. 
22 Peter Beaumont and others, op.cit., p.374. 
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flouriah under- the auspices of the feudal lords. The monks 
and their orders cultivated the land of the feudal lords, 
reclaimed waste lands and purchased land of their own 
23 
wherever they could. In the late seventeenth century, many 
Maronites peasants moved further south, into the Shuf, to 
enter the service of Druze lords. The expansion of this 
energetic peasantry took place throughout Mount Lebanon in 
the eighteenth century. They were favoured by the Ma'n and 
Shihab emirs not only because their higher standerd of 
education made some of them useful to the emirs in their 
administration, but also because of their proven ability to 
turn waste land to profit by building terraces, cultivating 
cereals and producing silk, for which there was a rising 
demand abroad. The Maronites were also helped by their own 
2 5 
social customs. Maronites also spread into the coastal 
plains, al Bekka and Wadi-el-Taym-a process of colonization 
perhaps growing from the mountain's habit of finding 
2 fi 
seasonal work on the large estates of the lower land. 
Besides, this, the latent rivalry bet ween the Yaman and Qays 
23. Jawaid Iqbal, 'Sectarian Strife in the Lebanon: Its 
Historical Roots,' International Studies, Vol.27, No.4, 
1990, p.310. 
24. Marie-Christine Aulas, op.cit., p.4. 
25. The Maronite system of land holding was looser than 
that prevailing amongst other groups, especially the 
Druze whilst inheritance within the nuclear family, 
rather than the wider kin, and a ban marriage within 
the patrilinear group meant that they were not tied to 
one locality, like Muslim sharecroppers. 
26. Peter Beaumont and others, op.cit., p.374. 
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branches of the Druse community culminated in 1711 in the 
battle of 'Ayn Darah, which resulted in the Yamani Druse 
having to flee the area for the Hawran. This development of 
the Druze community was of considerable benefit to 
Maronites, more and more of whom were entering the services 
of the emirs and settling within the territory of the 
? 7 
emirate. The Maronites played an indirect role in building 
the emirate's central power-structure through their 
positions as muqatajin-hereditary chieftains in possessions 
of fiefs. These positions were originally limited to three 
families-the Khazins, Hubayshes and Dahdabs-who in 1711 
received from the emirs a tax concession covering a 
2 8 predominantly Maronite area. 
The late eighteenth and more especially, the nineteenth 
centuries saw the emergence of the Maronites on the 
political scene.In this the Church played a crucial role, 
seizing the opportunity offered by Emir Bashir II to be 
dealt in to the central power structure, and determining the 
direction of the violent events that scarred the epoch. The 
monks took the lead in voicing the demands of the population 
and in its ideological and military organization and 
2 9 
mobilization. The Maronite Church and its patriarchs 
27. The battle of 'Ayn Darah, which profoundly affected the 
Druze, the importance of the Maronites increased both 
demographical1y and in terms of influence. Their 
growing influence was clearly demostrated in 1770 by 
the conversion of the Shihabs to the Maronite faith. 
28. Marie-Christine Aulas, op.cit., p.4. 
29. Ibid., p.6. 
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played prominent role in shaping Lebanon's political hict.Qry 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and the 
establishment of a christian state in Lebanon in 1920 was 
30 largely the successful culmination of their efforts. 
THE MARONITE CHURCH: 
It was the church that preserved the community's faith, 
unity and identity, and gave voice to a Maronite ideology 
through the medium of the clergy's historiographic writings. 
As Meir zamir writes: 
The traditional historiography of the Maronite 
seems to have come into being as an expression of 
Maronite national pride. As a small, closely-knite 
community surrounded by enemies... the Maronites 
tended to be deeply interested in their own 
history, taking pride in having retained their 
identity through centuries of vicissitude. 
The clergy were the first to develop the idea of a 
Maronite state, claiming that Mount Lebanon had for 
centuries been an independent or autonomous Maronite 
32 homeland. The reign of Fakhr al-Din II was portrayed as 
30. Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, London, 
1985,p.6. 
31. Ibid., p.7. 
32. Under Fakhr al-Din II (1590-1635), whose reign marked 
the zenith of Druze power and the establishment of the 
first independent Greater Lebanon, Maronite - Druze 
links emereged and strenthened. In addition to the 
Emir's privileged relations with Maronite Khazins of 
the Kisrwan, who had granted him refuge earlier, the 
Maronite-Druze rapproachement was encouraged by him-
After striking up friendships with Maronite scholars 
during his sojourn in Tuscany (1611-1618) he appointed 
one of them Ibrahim Haklani, as his emissary to the 
Medici Court. He also encouraged Maronite settlement in 
Druze areas (the Matn and Shuf ) - The extension of Manid 
power to North Lebanon and the Kisrwan, enabling the 
Khazins to recover large areas of land settled by Shi'a 
in the closing years of Mamluk rule. 
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the high point in Lebanese history, when an independent 
polity covered the entire country. The autonomous existence 
of Maronite community and the indifference of emir in the 
affairs of Maronites were used as arguments intended to give 
historical depth to the demand for a separate Maronite 
entity. These arguments were later used by Lebanese 
Christians to counter the demands of Arab nationalists. 
Enshrined in the historiographic writings, all these ideas 
profoundly influenced the whole Maronite community. The 
Church dominated the educational system; generation after 
generation young Maronites were inculcated with these values 
and beliefs, which shaped their conception of themselves, 
33 their community and their surroundings. 
The Maronite Church's traditional organization and its 
poor economic status were not conducive to making it an 
independent and powerful social force in political scene. 
However, reform in the Chruch and the integration of the 
Maronite areas into the Emirate were favourable conditions 
for the growth of its prestige and power. Reorganization of 
Church brought about formal hierarchy and limited bribery in 
seeking religious positions. It also regulated and made the 
Church function more efficiently. These steps were aided by 
the education of the clergy at the Maronite college which 
33. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p.7. 
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Pope Gregory XIII opened in Rome in 1584. Integration of 
Maronite areas into the Emirate had put the Maronites on an 
egual footing with the rest of the population in the secular 
35 
system. 
At first, the reorganized Church remained poor and 
completely dependent upon the upper class 'for general 
support, for seats where they could carry on their religious 
work, and for the establishment and maintenance of new 
monastries. In return for these benefits, the notable clans 
exercised influence over the Church and secured most of the 
top offces for membership of their families. Thus we sea 
symbiotic relationship between Church and nobility and, in 
many cases, the Church was an institution through which the 
3 6 
nobility could exercise influence over the peasants. 
When the Khazins (Maronite lord of Kisrwan) wished to 
encourage Maronite peasants to migrate to their fiefdom, 
they accomplished this through Church. They also supplied 
the Church with protection and influence its policies by 
transferring much of their lands into mortmain (non-
transferable ecclesiastical possession). Non-Christian lords 
34. The Maronite clergy who returned to Lebanbon after 
their training at the Maronite College of Rome set up a 
number of schools. In 1624 Patriarch Yuhanna Makhlouf 
founded the first two institutions of higher education 
in Lebanon. In 1787 Patriarch Josheph Estephan founded 
the Ain Waraq School (Kisrwan), also for higher 
educatin. 
35. Odeh. J.B, Lebanon: Dynamics of conflict, London, 
1985,p.30. 
36. Ibid., p.30. 
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did not interfere with the Church but on various occasions 
donated land in the south of the Emirate for the building of 
monasteries. This was one means of attracting the much 
needed peasants to the south of the mountain. Return for 
their 'altruism' came in the form of revenues from taxes 
that the Church had to pay. Furthermore, Christian donor 
families regarded mortmains as investment and exercised 
property rights over them by having bishops elected from 
their families. A member of these clans once wrote to the 
Pope: 'The monastries are ours, founded by our fathers and 
grandfathers, and we will admit to them whomever we want to 
admit.... We remain obedient to the Holy see in all matters 
37 
religious. 
THE MARONITE ORDER OF MONKS: 
A significant development took place during the period 
which enhanced political and economic power of the clergy in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. Around 1700 the Maronite Order 
of Monks was founded as an autonomous organization within 
3 8 the Church. The Church and Maronite order of monks worked 
3Q for the general welfare of the people of the eantire sect. 
The order was formally under the bishop, but each monastery 
was in fact run by its abbot. Monks were recruited from 
37. Ibid., p.30. 
38. Ibid., p.30. 
39. Jamal Toubi, "Socia 1 Dynamics in War Torn Lebanon', 
Jerusalem Quarterly, No.17, (fall, 1980), p.89. 
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among the peasants and they lived a communal and ascetic 
life. Since they did not need much to live on, they were 
capable of working on the land and saving money to acquire 
more land. Seeing how efficient these monks were, the lords 
began donating more non-producing lands to them. With so 
much lands to cultivate, the monks encouraged Maronite 
peasants to congregate around and work for them. Thus the 
main economic force to emerge by the late eighteenth century 
was the Maronite Church. In the early stages of economic 
relations between the Church and the feudal lords, the 
interests of the two parties converged: the Church was then 
the weaker and dependent partner. However, as its economic 
strength grew, the Church was able to bear the cost of its 
own administration without the help of the feudal lords. 
This trend towards independence was further strenthened by 
4 1 the internal reorganization and reform of the Church. The 
Church started opposing feudalism not only to defend the 
rights of the peasants but also to defeat the feudal lords, 
whom it now perceived as its political rivals. 
Towards the end of the 18th century, the Maronite Order 
of Monks had become quite prosperous. Consequently, the 
Church and clergy started acting independently. And on many 
occasions the higher clergy defined the national attitude of 
40. Odeh J.B, op.cit., pp.30-31. 
41. Iliya F., Harik, Politics and Change in Traditional 
Society: Lebanon 1711-1845, Princeton, 1969, p.280. 
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the Maronite people with regard to where their interest lay. 
For instance, in response to the French expedition in the 
least led by Napoleon, Patriarch Tiyyan (1796-1807) aligned 
his community with the French. As a Catholic the Patriarch 
could see in the French successes the advancemei.t of the 
Maronite cause in Mt Lebanon and the East. Thus the 
Patriarch gave orders to a Maronite shaykh to lead Maronite 
men to help Napoleon at acre, although the Emir of the 
country had adopted a policy of neutrality with regard to 
Napoleon and the Ottoman Vali. In his attempt to ally his 
people with Napoleon, the Patriarch took an unusually 
leading role in forming and defining policy in the imarah 
(emirate). Traditionally this would have been a question in 
which the clergy had no voice at all. It was the prerogative 
of the Emir and the Muqati'jis to shape the attitude and 
define the policy of the country on such an issue. Thus, the 
step taken by Patriarch Tiyyan marked the beginning of a new 
political role for the clergy in Imarah politics. 44 
Another aspect of the pressure of economic facts on the 
political claims of the clergy was one which had to do with 
clerical property. The monks orders, which initially were 
conducive to the economic interests of the Mugati'j i s, later 
42. Iliya F. Harik, "The Maronite Church and Political 
Change in Lebanon: Leonard Binder (ed) Politics in 
Lebanon, New York, 1966, p.49. 
43. Ibid., p.50. 
44. Ibid., p.49. 
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on proved to be inimical to the mugat i ' j i s continued 
prerogatives. It was the practice in the imarah for the 
mugati'j i s to collect taxes from the peasants, keeping a 
certain amount of them for himself and turning the rest over 
to the Emir. The monastic orders threatened the middleman's 
role, and obtained a decree from the Emir to the effect that 
the officers of the order would collect their own taxes and 
turn them over to the Emir, doing away with the mugati'j i s 
45 
economic privileges. 
The Church also began to encourage the oppressed 
peasants to revolt against the feudal privileges of their 
lords. Because of the social and economic functions that the 
Church exercised in society through its daily contacts with 
the people, it was capable of weilding more influence among 
the people than the lords did. Interests of both clergy and 
peasants converged against the feudal system. The clergy 
were capable of leading the opposition due to their 
organization, education and the communal alternative to the 
feudal system which they could offer. Thus, Bishop Istfan 
with other clergy supported the ammiya (commoners') revolt 
of 1820 against the Bashir Shihab when he tried to levy more 
taxes on peasants. 
After the conflict between Bashir II and Shaykh Bashir 
Jumbalat in 1824, the Maronites gave their support to Emir 
45. Ibid., p.50. 
46. Odeh. J.B, Op.cit., p.31. 
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Bashir. Patriarch Hbaysh then assumed a position of great 
influence by virtue of Emir Bashir's need of him. The 
Patriarch mobilized his community in support of Emir Bashir, 
and in return the Maronites were favoured in Bashir's 
policies. But in 1840 the Egyptian guestion prejudiced this 
alliance and patriarch Hbaysh supported the revolt against 
Bashir and his Egyptian allies. After the rebels success 
and the downfall of Bashir, the Patriarch assumed the 
highest position of leadership in Lebanon. He was honoured 
by the Ottoman governement and was invited to send a 
delegation to join in deliberation with the rest of the 
chief of the land.Most significant at this time were the 
Patriarch's relations with the ruling house of Shihab. The 
ruling Emir, Bashir III, depended to a great extent on the 
Patriarch, and after him the Shihabis turned to the 
Patriarch for instructions on matters of policy regarding 
the affairs of the community in the civil war. with the 
Druze.'*^ 
During Bashir Ill's short rule, and afterward, the 
Patriarch assumed political leadership among the Maronites, 
brought them together in a meeting, and drew up a charter of 
unity among them. This charter laid down his community's 
47. In 1841 the European Powers (France,Great Britain, 
Russia, Prussia and Austria) forced Ibrahim Pasha to 
withdraw his troops. The Ottomans reestablished their 
authority and deposed Bashir II. 
48. Iliya F. Harik, op.cit., 1966, p.51. 
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political demands regarding the future of government in the 
country. It was in this charter that he threatened the iqta' 
(feudal) rights of the Druze muqati'jis and made a demand 
for a Maronite Emir of the Shihabi line to rule over 
Lebanon. When the 1841 civil war broke out between the Druze 
and the Maronites, the Patriarch assumed the role of the 
highest political personage in the country. He not only 
decided, directed, and financed the goals of the Maronite 
people, but his supremacy was even recognized by the Shihabi 
ruling family which turned to him for political and military 
instructiona. This period marked the pinnacle of clerical 
influence in Mt. Lebanon. Patriarch Hbaysh continued to lead 
the Maronites in their internal policy and in their 
relations with the Ottoman government through the first 
phase of the Civil War until his death in 1845. The Church 
involvement was extensive and deep and its consequences very 
49 serious. 
In the peasants rising of 1858 in Kisrwan the Patriarch 
Mas'ad did not openly side with the peasatits, he 
nevertheless did not heed khazin pressure. The Khazins hoped 
to use their traditional influence over the Church and to 
drawn the Patriarch to their support. But the Patriarch 
considered himself responsible for the peasant as as much 
for the Khazins, and he tried to bring about a compromise 
satisfactory to both sides. The Khazins, who were not 
49 Ibid., p.51 
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willing to recognize the change in conditions, considerec 
the Patriarch's partisan. The Patriarch's willingness to see 
a change occure in the peasants' condition and their 
relations with their lords encouraged the peasants in their 
uprising and made them look up to him for support. 
Thus, the Church contributed in a fundamental way to 
the breakdown of the iqta ' syst.em. By challenging the 
legitimate basis of government by a new political ideology, 
and by participation in political action aimed against the 
privileges of the ruling class, the Church struct at rhe 
very foundation of the iqta' political system. 
REGLEMENT ORGANIQUE: 
The civil war of 1860 was a traumatic event for the 
Lebanese Christians when within a few weeks over 10,000 
Christian in Lebanon were massacred and another 10,000 made 
homeless. The tragedy proved the need for an autonomous 
Maronite entity, which the Church had been seeking since 
1840... Out of the ruin of civil war the autonomous sanjak 
of Mount Lebanon emerged in place of the defunct Imarah and 
the short lived unsuccessful 'Double qaim-mugamia regime. 
50. Ibid., p.50. 
51. Ibid., p.52. 
52. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p.8. 
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53 The Reqlement Organique of 1861 and its modification 
in 1854 provided the legal basis for the Mutasarrifiya. It 
made Mount Lebanon an autonomous Ottoman province, ruled by 
a non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian governor; the area's 
special status was to be guaranteed by the European 
powers... The Mutasarrifiya put the final seal on the 
Christian character of Mount Lebanon. Its territory was 
limited to the predominantly Christian areas and the 
Maronites now became numerically, politically and 
economically dominant. However, the Reglement did not 
satisfy the Maronites and their Patriarch, their demand for 
complete autonomy under a Shihabi Maronite governor, nor did 
it formally recognised their supermamcy. They resented the 
appointment of an Ottoman governor, whom they chose to 
regard merely as Istambul's representative in the 
Mountain... The Maronites also opposed the reduction in 
territory from the start; it was one of the main reason the 
Church rejected the Reglement Organique. Maronites 
repeatedly called for the return of four regions which they 
regarded as integral parts of Lebanon: Tripoli and the 
53. The Reglement Organique of 1861 was drawn up by an 
international commission set up in Beirut in 1860 with 
representatives of the Ottoman government and of five 
European powers: France, England, Russia, Austria and 
Prussia. According to Reqlement the governor of Mount 
Lebanon would be assisted by a 12 members 
administrative council or maj1 is (four Maronites, three 
Druse, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one 
Sunni and one Shi'a). This distribution for seats 
reflected the confessional nature of the statute and 
the advantage it accorded to the Christian community. 
54. Meir Zamir, op.cit., pp.9-10. 
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district of 'Akkar in the north, the Bekka'a valley in the 
east; the districts of Hasbaya, Rashaya and Jubal 'Amel in 
the south; and in the west, the coastal towns of Tyre, Sidon 
and, most important of all, Beirut.... For the Maronites and 
their Church, the establishment of an economically viable 
"Grand Liban' (Greater Lebanon) was merely a precondition 
for the achievement of their goal of full political autonomy 
55 
and subsequent independence. 
Upon the outbreak of the First World War in August 
1914, the Lebanese Christians, in particular the Maronite, 
expected France to occupy Lebanon immediately and help them 
to realise their aspirations. During the two months between 
the outbreak of war in Europe and the Ottoman decision to 
enter the fray, Maronites openly expressed their support for 
France. The Maronite Church under Patriarch Hawayik had 
become a major political force embodying the aspirations of 
the Lebanese Christians; Hawayik's personal trials during 
war had strenthened his resolve to strive to turn Christians 
aspirations into fact. 56 
During the war the Lebanese emigrants groups took over 
the struggle for the Lebanese cause, as the inhabitants of 
Lebanon themselves were cut off from Europe. Syrian and 
Lebanese Christians emigrants in France comprised an 
important pressure group with some influence on French 
55. Ibid., pp. 10-15. 
56. Ibid., pp.34-37. 
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public opinion.^"^ But it was Maronites within Lebanon, under 
the leadership of the Patriarch and the Administrative 
Council, who ultimately determined the aims of the Lebanese 
National Movement.^^ With ,the end of the war the Maronites 
revived their efforts for a separate state with extended 
boundaries. They were afraid that, with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire in the wake of its defeat in the war, the 
Lebanon might well be incorporated into a pan-Arab Islamic 
State in which they would lose the autonomy they had enjoyed 
under the Ottomans. They wanted an independent Greater 
Lebanon under the French protection. They sought to 
influence the French government and public to support their 
cause. Between 1918 and 1920 both the Church and the 
Administrative Council steadfastly persued this objective; 
they despatched three Lebanese delegations to Paris, whose 
activities became the focus of the Lebanese Christian drive 
to secure a state of their own 60 
At a meeting on 13 April 1919, during a particular 
crucial time in the discussions over the western border of 
Germany, Clemenceau, the prime minister of France reached an 
understanding with Faisal in which he agreed to recognize 
57. Ibid., pp.47-48. 
58. Ibid., p.50. 
59. David R- Smock and Audry C. Smock, The Politics of 
Pluralism : A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, 
New York, 1975, p.42. 
60. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p.50. 
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Syria's independence 'in the form of a federations of local 
communities', in return for Faisal's approval of a French 
mandate over Syria. Thus, an autonomous Lebanon was to 
become a part of Syria under Faisal's rule. 
The Maronites reacted strongly against the new French 
policy of rapproachment with Faisal. In mid-June 1919 
Hawayik and his bishops gathered in Bkerki to deliberate on 
what measures to adopt in order to pressure to French 
government into changing its stand. During three days of 
talks Hawayik repeatedly emphasised that the Maronites had 
no choice but the continue to rely on France; only with 
French assistance could they attain their national goals. He 
informed Picot that if the complete independence of Greater 
Lebanon was guaranteed, the Maronites would leave it to 
France to determine the specific nature of future relations 
between Lebanon and Syria. 
During July, feeling were running high among the 
Maronites. They were disillusioned by the French policy 
shifts of the past few months, the visit of the American 
commission, the extremely negative stand taken by Faisal and 
the Muslims and the lack of support from the other sects 
convinced them that their goals were in danger of slipping 
6 3 
out of reach. In these circumstances Maronite Patriarch 
61 . Ibid., p.51. 
62. Ibid., p.63. 
63. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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Hawayik, travelled to Paris and Versailles to plead for the 
creation of a separate state for the Maronite under French 
supervision.^'^ The mission of the Patriarch proved to be the 
turning point in the course of events that ultimately led to 
the establishmnent of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920. 
Twelve years later late Shekib Arslan, and Arab nationalist 
and strong adversary of Hawayik, described the Patriarch as 
a leader "... who took in his hands the political destiny of 
55 (his) people'. 
With the establishment of the state of Greater Lebanon, 
the old practice of the interference of religious leaders 
and ecclesiastical bodies in Lebanon politics continued and 
became more competitive with the addition of two "new" 
actors; The Sunnis and the Shi'a. In the middle 1930's the 
Maronite Patriarch was at loggerheads with the French High 
Commissioner over the decision of the Commissioner to set up 
a monopoly for the cultivation of tobacco and the 
manufacturing of cigarettes. The primary reason for the 
strong opposition of the Patriarch was not the fact that the 
tobacco growers objected to the measure, although this must 
have influenced his decision, but rather that the decree 
abridged the rights of the various monastries which engaged 
in tobacco growing, thereby adversely affecting their 
64. Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political 
Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972. Durham, N.C, 1975, 
p.61. and Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The 
History of Lebanon Reconsidered, London, 1988, p.26. 
65. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p.70. 
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income. The failure of the Patriarch to achieve the repeal 
of this decree led him, perhaps out of spite, to side for a 
short time with the Muslim leaders of Syria and Lebanon in 
defiance of France and even to call for the termination of 
the mandate. 
ROLE OF THE CLERGY; 
Since 1943 interventions by religious leaders in 
Lebanese politics have multiplied rather than diminished. 
The frequency of intervention is directly related to the 
strong hierarchical organization of the communities, which 
means that the Christian communities can interfer more 
effectively in view of their structure and past experience. 
Of these communities, the Maronites are naturally the most 
effective because of their relative strength and strong 
hierarchical organization. 
In 1945 Monseigneur "Agl, delegate of the Maronite 
Partiarchate to the Lebanese emigrants in America, presented 
a note to the United Nations asking its intervention for the 
establishment of a national home for the Christians in 
Lebanon. Monseigneur ""Aql could not have spoken for the 
majority of the Christians in Lebanon since al-Diyar, which 
published the text of his note and was strongly critical of 
66. Yamak Zawiyya Labib, 'Party Politics in the Lebanese 
Political System', Politics in Lebanon, (ed) Leonard 
Binder, New York, p.150. 
67. Ibid., p.151. 
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its content, was published by a Greek Orthodox. But he did 
represent a definite point of view which sought its 
expression through religious media 68 
On August 5, 1947 the Maronite Archbishop Mubarak of 
Beirut presented to the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission on Palestine a memorandum in which he declared 
that "Lebanon as well as Palestine should remain permanent 
homes for the minorities" in the Arab world, and requested 
the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and a 
Christian state in Lebanon. 
The unfavourable attitude of Archbishop Mubarak towards 
the Arab national movement and his outspoken remarks in 
favour of Zionist state in Palestine provoked a great wave 
of popular discontent shortly after the content of his 
memorandum was known. Apart from some popular agitation, 
many editorials were published condemning the interference 
of the clergy in politics. Considering such action by the 
press as violating the constitutional rights of the Lebanese 
to voice their opinions freely on political matters, the 
Maronite Patriarch admitted the desirability of the 
participation of the clergy in politics on the ground that 
"they are citizens just like others." Many considered this 
statement as indirectly supporting the viewpoint of 
68. Ibid., p. 151 . 
69. S.H Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French 
Mandate, London, 1958, p.352. 
Archb i shop Mubarak. 
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On the eve of the elections of 1951, the Catholic 
hierarchy called the attention of their communicants to 
their duty " to participate in the elections and to elect 
only those candidates who have solemnly agreed to follow 
the directives of the ecclesiastical authorities." This 
incident is of great significance since it shows the extent 
of control that the religious institutions exercise in 
Lebanes politics. There is no record of how effective that 
directive was, but among the electorate who are tradition 
oriented, it is very likely that it carried much weight. 
A similar experience took place in 1953 shortly before 
the first election in which single member-constituency 
system rather than the list system was followed. On June 
21, 1953 the Episcopal Body of the Catholic Communities 
meeting in Bkerki, the Seat of the Maronite Patriarch, 
called on the electorate to beware of the teaching of 
Communists and racists as well as of the theories of those 
who do not respect the sanctity of the family. The 
electorate was asked to boycott parties that attempted to 
destroy the independence of the country and the unity of the 
people, and to defeat those extremists who under the 
pretext of abolishing sectarianism work for the 
70. Yamak. Zawiyya. Labib, op.cit., p.151. 
71. Ibid., p. 151-152. 
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eetabliahment of a secular state. The significance of this 
statement derives from the fact that it was made at a time 
when political parties were openly competincf for the first 
time for the support of the voters, and a new generation of 
politician was making its debut and challenging the vested 
interests of the traditional notables and their traditional 
supporters. Again , it is not possible to determine, at 
least statiscally, the exact influence of this statement on 
the voting behavior of the electorate. What we can say with 
some certainty is that it did influence many of those voters 
who lacked a strong party indentification but who were 
willing to vote for some specific party condidate. It might 
also have influenced those who feared Church action against 
them (for example, excommunication). Accordingly to 
declarations made to the press by Abdullah Saadeh, member of 
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and candidate for the 
Greeck Orthodox seat in al-Kura, the Maronite Archbishop in 
North Lebanon threatened his communicants in the area with 
excommunication if they voted for him. Perhaps many 
Christians were not willing to pay this terrible price for 
free elections. At any rate, candidate Saadeh was defeated 
at the polls.''^ 
The Maronite Patriarch, Mgr, Paul Meouchy, the 
religious head of all Maronites, did not guite see eye to 
eye, partly because tact to Chamoun was often a matter of 
72. Ibid., p. 152. 
in 
mood. Nor was Meouchy particularly enamoured of Chamoun's 
domestic and foreign policies. Thus, Meouchy had from the 
beginning taken the side of the opposition in the hostility 
of 1958. On April 20,1958, before the outbreak of 
hostilities, he was quoted in the Lebanese press as saying 
that Lebanon needed new man in office so that it could 
resolve its differences with its neighbours, and that it was 
not by dividing the Lebanese against each other that the 
country could be saved. It was, however, Meouchy's press 
conference on May 30, 1958, held after the regime had 
complained to the Arab League and the UN Security Council of 
Q.A.R. interference, which earned him the wrath of his own 
community and the praises of the opposition. He told 
representatives of the foreign press that the Lebanese 
crisis was a domestic one and should not have been taken to 
either the regional or the world organization, that 
President Abdul Nasser had given his reassurances for 
Lebanese independence, and that the only solution for the 
73 
crisis was for the President to take a trip abroad. 
Reproduced widely in the Lebanese press, Meouchy's 
statement to the foreign correspondents helped harden the 
attitude of the Opposition leadership against the Chamoun 
regime. But at the same time there was a general agreement 
that the Patriarch's intention was to strenthen the 
73. Leila M.T. Meo, Lebanon:Improbab1e Nation, Bloomington, 
1965, p.171 . 
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Christian Character of the Opposition front and to avoid a 
possible sectarian war, since on the popular level the 
Muslims were ranged on the side of the rebels, and the 
ChrisLlans on the side of the regime. Indeed, Meouchy's 
vigorous opposition to Chamoun was one of the most important 
single factors in preventing the 1958 Civil War from 
degenerating into the inter-sectarian conflict of 1975-76. 
Meouchy died in 1975 on the eve of the Civil War, he 
was succeeded by Antoine Khraish, an uncharacteristically 
self-effacing, low-keyed Patriarch. Throughout the 
fighting, Khraish seemed visibly affected by what was 
befalling the country and exerted himself tirelessly but 
ineffectively in behind the scenes attempts at sectarian 
reconciliation. In previous periods, Maronite Patriarchs 
played a cardinal role, openly or behind the scenes, in 
Lebanese politics. However, Khraish failed to achieve such 
political prominance, but when revealed, his opinions 
appeared moderate. On the other hand, the main Maronite 
monastic orders- the grassroots instiutions on which the 
Maronite Partiarchate and to some extent the Maronite 
Community are based-became unprecedentedly prominent at both 
the political and military levels under its president. 
Father Sharbel Kassis upto 1980, or Father Bulus Nu^man 
74. Ibid., p.172. 
75. Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: 
Confrontation in the Middle East, Washington. D.C, 
1979, p. 72. 
76. Ibid., p.72. 
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since then. Their Superior, Father Sharbel Kassia, a 
member of the quadripartite Lebanese Front was no dove. He 
belived in a purely "Lebanese Lebanon" and objected to its 
having "an Arab face." He spoke openly of the need to limit 
the number of Palestinians in the country. During the 
crisis, it was Kassis rather than the Patriarch who 
represented the Church in such forums as "The Maronite 
Summit" and the "Lebanese Front". Kassis supported the 
various .Christians militias with money and arms. This 
salience of the monastic orders may reflect a shift between 
its base and top in the interanl balance of power within the 
Maronite religious hierarchy. This shift could perhaps 
itself have been a function of the personality of the 
incumbent Patriarch or it could indicate a subtly prudential 
division of labour betwen the two. But it could also reflect 
the "last ditch" Maronite mood and be yet another 
manifestation of the intensity of the sectarian character 
78 that the conflict had assumed. 
AL-KATA'IB (THE PHALANGIST PARTY): 
Al-Kataib 79 al-Lubnaniya (The Lebanese Phalangist 
77. 
79, 
79, 
Deeb. K. Marius, "Llebanon: Prospects for National 
Reconciliation in the Mid-1980s' The Middle East 
Journal, vol. 38, No.2. (Spring, 1984) , p. 280. 
Walid Khalidi, op.cit., p.72. 
Arabic plural of Katibah, mea 
"squadron,' 'regiment, • battalion,' or 'phala 
According to LKP leaders the movement "was ca 
Kata'ib... which means military division, for 
founder wanted it to be a semi-mi 1itary organizatio 
order to instill discipline and organization 
Lebanese Youths'- For the sake of uniformity 
consitency Kata'ib will be used throughout as 
collective and therefore in the singular. 
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Party) was founded on 21 November 1936 by a group of young 
Lebanese, prominent among them Pierre Gemayel, Charles 
80 Helou, George Naccashe, Shafiq Nasif and Emih Yared. The 
founders were relatively young (they averaged slightly under 
thirty), French educated, middle class professionals (a 
pharmacist, lawyer, two journalists, and an engineer 
respectively). They had a strong commitment to an 
8 1 
independent and Western Oriented Lebanon. Pierre Gemayel, 
a sportsman and scouting enthusiast, had been influenced by 
visits to Italy and to Germany, where he had attended the 
1936 Olympic Game in Berlin, coming away deeply impressed by 
8 2 the order and organisr.tion imposed by National Socialism. 
He was also impressed by the Sokol movement of 
Czechoslovakia, a movement founded in 1862 and dedicated to 
the athletic, educational, and natinalistic development of 
Czechoslovak Youth. The influence of Europe's para-military 
youth organizations, however, was limited to mostly 
superficial adaptation-uniforms, salutes, parads, physical 
80. FMA: Arab World File, No.1426, 14 November 1979. I-
L103. 
81. Every one except Gemayel withdrew from the movement 
within three years after its formal establishement. 
Nasif a Beirut lawyer, was later instrumental in the 
creation of the Liberal Nationalist Party; Hilu, 
former journalist and editor of Le Jour (Beirut), was 
president of the republic, 1964-1970; Naccashe, co-
founder and chief editorialist of the prestigious 
French daily, L 'Orient (Beirut), remained a very close 
supporter of the LKP until his death in 1972; and 
Yared, the only non-Maronite of the group, heads a 
large engineering firm in Beirut and remained 
politically inactive. 
82. FMA: Arab World File, op. cit., I-L 103. 
115 
fitness, discipline- and did not involve a complete adoption 
of fascist or Nazi principles. The Kata'ib in fact, along 
with other authoritarian 'shirt* movements of the Arab east 
that had emerged in the 1920s and 1930s- blue and green 
shirts in Egypt, grey and white shirts in Syria, Khaki shirt 
in Iraq in response to local conditions and particularistic 
need: dissatisfaction with existing hierarchies of political 
and economic power. It was a reaction against the 
'cynicism' egoism and businessman's mentality of the 
professional "politicians"; the beginning of social 
awareness and a resentment of traditional elites who were 
dedicated to preserving their favoured postions usually 
achieved through open collaboration with the imperialist 
powers. More importantly it was the result of strictly Arab 
associations, the rise of Arab nationalist conciousness 
which sought to give meaningful identity to the Arab and 
his situation. This attempt was best reflected in the 
organization of indigenous elites dedicated to countering 
8 3 the rule of the colonial and mandatory powers. 
Besides, the founders of Kata'ib believed that Lebanon 
needed to be defended against the challenge of the Pan-
Syrian PPS, (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) founded m 
November 1932, as well as against Muslim leaders who at the 
"Conference of the Coast' on 10 March 1936, had issued a 
83. John P. Entelis, 'Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-
Kata'ib as a Case Study', Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol.9, No.3, (October, 1973), p. 325. 
11 
demand that parts of Lebanon be ""reintegrated* into Syria 84 
Hence the creation of the PPS by Antun Sa'adah on 16 
November 1932 was a motivating force in the rise of the 
Kata'ib. This highly organized and disciplined political 
party with a charismatic leadership and persuasive pan-
Syrian ideology attracted widespread support both in Syria 
and Lebanon. As its popularity increased it posed a direct 
challenge to Lebanese nationalists and their concept of an 
independent Lebanon. Similarly the demand by many Lebanese 
Muslim elites for the integration into the Syrian state of 
the predominatly Muslim areas which had been appended to 
Greater Lebanon in September 1920, aroused fear and anxiety 
among Lebanese Christians. The Kata'ib was thus created to 
insure the political and territorial status quo of Lebanon 
according to its 1920 borders and guarantee its viability 
g g 
in the post-independence period. 
The initial aim of the Kata'ib was to instill in 
Lebanese youth a sense of civil responsibility and a spirit 
of discipline. At the same time, its motto (God, country, 
family) and the slogan (Lebanon first) reflected a nascent 
national ism 87 The French policies marked by extreme 
84. Gordon David C , Lebanon: The Fragemented Nation' 
London, 1980,p. 150. 
85. See Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Saocial Nationalist 
Party: An ideological Analysis, Cambridge, 1956. 
86. John P. Entelis, op cit., pp. 325-326. 
87. F.M.A.: Arab World File, op. cit., I-l 103. 
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political and diplomatic ineptness, helped legitimize the 
Kata'ib in the eyes of the public as a genuine expression of 
Lebanese nationalist sentiment. The French favoured the 
pro-western orientation of the partly, but they soon 
realized that while Gemayel would cooperate with them, he 
would do so within limits. In the summer of 1937, the two 
clashed when a rumor spread that Tripoli was to be ceded to 
Syria. Consequently, the Kata'ib headquarters were seized 
8 8 
and the party was declared to be illegal. 
The seizure of headquarters strengthened the Kata'ib 
which had hitherto beeen regarded as nothing more than a 
Maronite civic and athletic organization. Its confrontation 
with several hundred well-armed Senegalese troops on the 
occasion of the movement's first anniversary on 21 November 
1937, in which two Phalangists were killed and eighty 
wounded which included Gemayel. This marked the movement's 
official entry into the independence struggle. It created a 
89 kind of mystique around Gemayel , and immeasurably 
strengthened the popularity and appeal of the Kata'ib 
movement. 
The Kata'ib in cooperation with Muslim Youth Movement, 
al-Najjadah took initiative against Mandatory power when 
French military authorities under the newly-designated 
88. Gordon David. C-, op. cit., p. 150. 
89. Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political 
Modernization in Lebanon , New York, 1968, p. 143. 
11 
De lecjue-Gneral, Jean Helleu, arreated the government of 
Bisharah al-kuri on 11 November 1943 90 The Kata'ib wa; 
officially recognized on 27 November 1943, five days after 
9 1 Lebanon had achieved its independence. The Party's primary 
preoccupation was to preserve the territorial integrity, and 
political sovereignty of an independent Lebanon. Thus 
Kata'ib became the defender of te.rritorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. At the time of 
the 1958 crisis, the Kata'ib sided with Camille Chamoun 
against the predominantly Muslim Nasserite leaders of 
insurrection. After the formation of the UAR (Syrian-
Egyptian union, 1 February 1958), the party criticised 
those in Lebanon who supported the principle of union and 
warned against "Nasser's designs' on the country. The 
phalangist militia were involved in armed clashes which went 
92 
on for five months. 
Gemayel, initially regarded the Palestinian commandos 
as a possible protection against the Communist, especially 
against the Ba~thists from Syria and therefore acquiesced 
to their presence in Lebanon. He changed his position as 
the PLO shifted to the left after 1967 and drifted 
ideologically speaking closer to the Lebanese Socialists and 
Nasserite Nationalists, as well as Marxists, all of whom 
90. John P. Entelis, op. cit., p. 326. 
91. Ibid., p. 326. 
92. FMA, Arab World File, No. 1431, 21 November 1979, I-L 104 
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were demanding a change in the situation in Lebanon. 
Whereas the Kata'ib wanted to maintain the status quo 
which ensures the political dominance of Christians. Thus, 
the Kata'ib fully supported the Lebanese army in 1969 and 
9 4 1973 in its confrontation with the Palestinians. It was 
Kata'ib which took initiative in unleashing Civil War in 
1975 when its member shot dead many Palestenian in Ayn al-
Rumanna. The Kata'ib opposes any amendment of the 
constitution, although it supported secularization of the 
state. Throughout war it was the Kata'ib which played the 
leading military role. The Kata'ib always believed in 
status quo in Lebanon to maintain Christian dominance. 
Maronites, who were brought to Mount Lebanon by John 
Maron in the seventh century are today the second largest 
sect. They emerged on the political scene of Lebanon at the 
close of eighteenth century and more exactly in the 
beginning of nineteenth century. In this process the Church 
played a crucial role. The Maronite Church and its Patriarch 
took an active part in shaping Lebanon"s political history 
and the establishment of a Christian state in Lebanon in 
1920. They were the first to develop the idea of a Maronite 
state, claiming that Mount Lebanon had for centuries been 
in 93. Kemal Karpat H.,(ed) Political and Social thought 
the Contemporary Middle East, New York, 1982, p. 79. 
94. Gordon David C , op. cit., p. 152. 
95. John Bulloch, Death of a Country, London, 1977, p. 33. 
and Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 
1958-1976, New York, 1976, p. 98. 
an independent or autonomous Maronite homeland. With the 
establishment of a state of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the old 
practice of the interference by the religious leaders and 
ecclesiastical bodies in Lebanese politics continued and 
became more competitive with the addition of two new actors: 
the Sunnis and the Shi "a. 
In 1945 Monseigneur" Agl, delegate of the Maronite 
Patriarchate to the Lebanese emigrants in America, presented 
a note to the United Nations reguesting its intervention for 
the establishment of a "national home' for the Chrishtins in 
Lebanon. On the eve of the elections of 1951, the Catholic 
hierarchy called the attention of their followers to their 
duty "to participate in the elections and to elect only 
those candidate who have solemnly agreed to follow the 
directive of ecclesiastical authorities." In 1953 Episcopal 
Body of the Catholic communities warned the electorates to 
beware of the communists and the racists. They were asked 
to boycott parties that attempted to destroy the 
independence of the country its unity, and to defeat those 
extremists who under the pretext of abolishing sectarianism 
worked for the establishment of a secular state. In 1958 
Maronite Patriarch oppossed the constitutional amendment to 
facilitate the re-election of President Chamoun. His 
action strenthened the Christian character of the opposition 
front and avoided a possible sectarian war. The Maronite 
Patriarch, Antoine Khraish failed to achieve the political 
12; 
prominance of his predecessor Meouchy during the civil war 
which started in 1975. However, the Maronite monastic 
orders became unprecedent1y prominent at both the political 
and military levels. And Father Sharbel Kassis spoke openly 
of the need to limit the number of Palestinians in Lebanon. 
He believed in a purely "Lebanese Lebanon" and objected to 
its having" an Arab face". Moreover, he supported the 
various Christian militias with money and arms. Thus, the 
Maronite religious leaders continued to play determined role 
in the Lebanese politics and influence the course of 
development there. 
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THE SUNNIS 
ORIGINS; 
The Sunnis^ probably constitute 26 percent of the 
Lebanese population. The majority of Sunni Muslims live in 
3 
three major cities: Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. However, 
some Sunnis live in villages in "Akkar, the Bekka, the Shuf, 
and the South.'^ Riyad Sulh, a pan-Arab Sunni leader,was a 
major party to 1943 National Pact, which provided the basis 
for Lebanon's independence from the French in 1943. The 
National Pact also established critical confessional 
distribution of power in the country and were awarded the 
second most important political post in the state hierarchy: 
the prime ministership. The sunnis are basically an urban 
community that profited from the pre-war economic 
prosperity. They have been regarded with suspicion by 
1. The Sunni Muslims are named after the Sunnah, 
(followers of Sunnah) or the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his immediate successors. They believe 
that Muhammad's successor, or caliphs, were either 
elected by the whole Muslim community or were nominated 
by their predessors. 
2. This figure is a 1983 confidential U.S. State 
Department estimate cited in Michael C. Hudson, 'The 
Breakdown of Democracy in Lebanon, Journal of 
International Affairs, (Winter, 1985), p.281, 
3. Yahya Armajani and M. Thomas Ricks, Middle East Past 
and Present, New Jersey, 1986, p.292. 
4. As'ad Abu Khalil, 'Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political 
Leadership in Present Day Lebanon', Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.7, No.4, 1985, p.35 
5. Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: 
Confrontation In the Middle East,Cambridge,1983, p.36. 
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Lebanese Shi"a for their perceived insenaitivities towards 
Shi'a grievances. The Sunnis, especially those of Beirut, 
were known to be well-off financially compared with other, 
poor communities, such as the Shi'a. Many could afford to 
own two houses, one in the city and another in the 
mountains for the summer. Today, where the Shi~a-Sunni 
conflict is at its peak in Lebanon, the Shi'as refer to the 
Sunni as argilah (water-pipe or hookah) to denate their past 
ease and relaxation of which the Shi'a have been deprived. 
Lebanon's Sunni community is of comparatively recent 
development. Mamluk persecution of the Shi ""as and 
Christians following the final expulsion of the Crusaders 
led to conversions in areas along the main lines of 
communication through the coastal plain and 'Akkar. Some 
Druze and Shi'a community in al-Bekka, Wadi al-Taym and Shuf 
also practised tagiya for such a long time during Sunni 
domination that they ceased to make the necessary mental 
reservation. However, the introduction of Turkoman and 
Kurdish nomads during the fourteenth century accounts for 
the Sunni predominance in 'Akkar as well as for some of the 
groups in al-Bekka. The Sunni element in al-Bekka was also 
increased by the voluntary sendentarization of some bedouin 
groups. Finally, the predominance of Sunni governments 
from 1291 to 1918 saw the establishment and reinforcement of 
loyal coreligionist administrators in the important coastal 
6. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., 1985, p.35 
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towns. These were augmented from the seventeenth century 
ownwards by numbers of Sunni merchants attracted by the 
rising prosperity of the Lebanese seaboard based on its 
western contracts. 
According to Yahya Armajani Sunni Muslims are the most 
Q 
prosperous community of Lebanon. They occupy most of the 
professions and trades. There is a large stratum of 
peasants and workers, a small middle class of merchants and 
professionals, as well as a small upper class who own large 
tracts of agricultural land and urban real estate and 
business. But as compared to Maronites Christians in 
general, the sunnis are an economically less-advanced 
subnational group who, rightly or wrongly, blame their 
current status on the policies of Lebanon's wetern-
oriented, predominantly Christian elite. Thus, as a rule 
7. Beaumont Peter and others. The Middle East; A 
Geographical Study, New York, 1978, p.375 
8. Yahya Armajani and M. Thomas Ricks, op.cit., p.291 
9. Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of Middle East, 
London, 1980. p.136. 
10. John P. Entetis, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Reemergence 
of Radical Christian Nationalism in Lebanon', Religion 
and Politics in the Middle East, Colorado, 1981, p.233. 
In a study carried out in 1976 on the economic status 
of the Lebanese social groups according to sectarian 
affiliation sustains what has been a socio-economic 
fact since the 1920s: Christians are wealthier, more 
educated, better clothed and housed, and in more 
prestigious occupations than the Muslims. Joseph Chamic 
writes: "with whatever reasonable criteria one chooses 
to utilize, the social and economic differentials 
between the religious groups are unmistakably clear: 
non-Catholic Christians and Catholic at the top, Druze 
around the middle, Sunnis near the bottom, and Shi'a at 
the very bottom". Joseph Chamie, 'The Lebanese Civil 
War: An Investigation into the Causes', WorId Affai rs, 
Vol. 139, No.3, (Winter, 1976-77), p.180. 
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Sunnis are not as well educated as Christians. 
In the modern Lebanese republic, as in the former 
Ottoman empire, the Lebanese Sunnis always regarded 
themselves, before anything else, as members of the world 
wide community of Sunni Muslims; and in their view this 
meant that they belonged to the largest and only orthodox 
religious community within Islam. In the Lebanese uplands, 
which were originally occupied by Maronites and Druzes, 
Sunni influence is not so strong. There are close links of 
kinship between them and many Sunni families in neighbouring 
12 Syria, especially in Damascus. They are divided into 
different clans. There is a religious oganization of the 
Sunnis under the leadership of the mufti of Lebanon. True 
to Sunni tradition, the religious leaders do not involve 
themselves in politics. However, they are not without 
13 influence. 
SUNNI MUSLIMS AND THE CREATION OF GREATER LEBANON; 
The Sunni very much resented to the creation of "Grand 
Liban" by the French because it accompanied the demise of an 
independent Arab Kingdom in Arabia, Iraq, and Greater Syria 
in which they were the overwhelming majority. Furthermore, 
they were cut off from their coreligioni sts in Syria and 
the rest of the Arab World, thereby becoming a minority 
11. Bruce Borthwick, op.cit., p.136. 
12. Herald Vocke, The Lebanese War, London 1978,p.6. 
13. Yahya Armajani and M. Thomas Ricks, op.cit., p.292. 
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gi'CiUp in the new Lebanese state. Also they were ruled by 
the French and the Maronites, both Christiana. This 
violated the traditional view of the Muslim jurists that 
government should be in the hands of Muslims. 
The incorporation of Sunnis in Lebanon involved a grave 
religious, cultural, political and economic crisis and a 
powerful emotional blow. For the first time in their 
history they were a minority in a Christian dominated state. 
The other factors contributing to their hostile attitude 
were considerations of religious beliefs and culture. 
However, the more immediate problems involved their position 
15 in the new state. Due to many reasons the Sunnis in 
Lebanon could never fully identify with the Lebanese state 
set up and guaranteed by a foreign Christian power. It was 
regarded as a challenge to their entity. Their religious 
and emotional crisis was compounded by the practical 
difficulties of defining their status in the state. Unlike 
the other sects in Lebanon, the Sunnis had never constituted 
a separate religious community. They were integral part of 
the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Now they feared that in state 
closely linked to Imperial France, which was known for its 
tendency to impose its culture and language on its 
14. Bruce Borthwick, op.cit., p.136. 
15. Some Sunni writers argued that Islam sees no separation 
between religion and state; it thus leaves little room 
for loyalty to a secular state, and certainly not to a 
Christian one. For Muslims, the role of the state is to 
implement and defend the Shari'a (religious law). 
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colonies, their own Arab Muslims culture would suffer 
discrimination. The missionary orders, in particular the 
French ones, would now have a free hand to persue their 
religious and educational activities. They might even try 
to convert Muslims to Christianity. The Sunnis thus became 
extremely vigilant in defendidng their culture and 
language. 16 
In fact the loss of their former political pre-eminance 
was an important reason for the negative sunni attitude 
towards the Lebanese state. As mentioned above, the Lebanese 
sunnis had held priviledged and influential positions 
alongside the Turks in the administration of the Ottoman 
Empire. And their feelings of supremacy were reinforced by 
religious belief. Notables such as Salam and Bayhum had not 
only played prominent roles in the administration of the 
vilayat of Beirut; as members of the Ottoman parliament, 
they had felt involved in the affairs of the entire empire. 
Now their activities were restricted to the limited area of 
Lebanon, and even here they were being pushed aside by the 
Christian bourgeosie whom they had regarded as their 
inferiors. Their sense of under-representation in the 
political institutions and administration of the Lebanese 
state was one of their main grievances throughout the 
mandate period and even in independent Lebanon. Hence it was 
among the traditional sunni notables of Beirut, Tripoli and 
16. Meir ZamJr, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, London, 
1985,pp. 126-127. 
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Sidon that the main opposition to the Lebanese state arose; 
it was they who determined the negative attitude of their 
community towards Lebanon during 1920's and early 1930's 17 
The sunni rejection of the Lebanese state also reflectd 
a concern over the economic consequences of separation from 
the rest of Syria, a concern that was shared by many 
Christians in the annexed areas. The coastal cities and the 
Bekka had close economic ties with the interior. Sunni 
merchants and financiers in Beirut and Tripoli, from whose 
ranks the community's poltical elite were largely drawn, 
were middlemen in the overseas trade of the interior. They 
feared that separation from the hinterland would seriously 
undermine their econmic interests. The economic factor helps 
explain why sunni attitudes in Beirut began to diverge from 
those in Tripoli during 1930's. True, some of these 
difficulties can be attributed to geography and demography: 
Beirut was farther removed from the rest of Syria, and the 
sunnis there constituted only a minority of the total 
population. But in the early years of the mandate the sunni 
notables in Beirut were just as opposed to the Lebanese 
state as their co-religionists in the north. It was only 
following the rapid economic growth of the town that they 
adopted a more moderate stand, while Tripoli, badly 
affected by its a n n e x a t i o n ^ Lebanon, remained a militant 
anti-Lebanese centre thro 
.on ^ 
t the mandate 18 
17. Ibid., p. 127. 
18. Ibid., pp. 127-128 
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The incjuality in taxation rate between Mount Lebanon 
and the annexed areas was another important source of 
discontent. Among the few steps that could indeed have been 
taken to weaken sunni opposition to annexation would have 
been to reduce tax rates to the low level enjoyed by the 
inhabitants of the Mountain. But the previous tax rates were 
kept in force, while the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon 
opposed every French attempt to cancel their privileges. It 
took nearly 20 years for the tax systems of the two regions 
to be unified. This inequality roused frequent protests 
from the Muslims of the annexed areas, who complained that 
they were being exploited by the Maronites in the Mountain 
to finance the national budget, disproportionate part of 
19 
which was spent in Mount Lebanon. 
The political attitude adopted by the Christian ruling 
classes towards the Sunnis further increased their fear of 
becoming an inferior minority in the state. Having been 
under Muslim domination for centuries, the Christians 
intended to take full advantage of the prominent positions 
they now enjoyed. They were never tired of repeating that 
Lebanon was their country, and they often adopted an 
offensive and even contemptuous attitude towards Musli.-ns. 
For example, provocative articles against the Muslims 
frequently appeared in Christian newspapers, and the 
anniversary of the battle of Maisalum, which represented a 
19. Ibid., p. 128. 
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humiliating defeat for the Muslims and the loss of their 
independence, was celebrated enthusiastically by some 
Christian. 20 
Moreover, Lebanese Christian, anxious to dissociate 
themselves from Arabism and its Islamic connections, were 
pleased to be told that their country was the legitimate 
heir to the Phoenician tradition. Christian writers like the 
poets Charles Corm (writing in French, d.l963) and Said Aql 
(writing in Arabic), tried hard to build up the 
Phoenicianist image of Lebanon 21 
Sunni resentment of the French mandate was a major 
cause for their opposition to the Lebanese state. After the 
events of 1920 they regarded France more than ever before as 
their enemy. The French mandate, they believed, was a form 
of foreign rule imposed by force and that Lebanon itself 
had became a permanent foothold for French domination over 
all of Syria. Thus they saw the French presence as a 
guarantee of Christian supremacy, and they feared that even 
if French eventually evacuated Syria, it would still remain 
in Lebanon and continue to use its influence in favour of 
the Christian. 22 
20. Ibid., p. 128. 
21. Kamal. S. Salibi, -The Lebanese Identity,' Religion and 
Politics in the Middle East (ed) Michael Curtis, 
Colorado, 1981, p. 223. 
22. Meir Zamir, op.cit., pp. 128-129. 
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For the above mentioned reasons sunni MuBlims living in 
Lebanon saw integration into Syria as the best way to avoid 
Marontte ambitions- .. rom late 1918 to mid 1920, they looked 
to Arab authorities in Damascus for help in avoiding a 
Christian-dominated state. Even after the French conquered 
Syria and created Greater Lebanon^ Damascus remained ths 
focal point of sunni oppositon. But by the 1940's sunni 
Muslims of Lebanon no longer looked to Syria; the 
willingness of Syrian leaders to compromise on Lebanon 
compelled the Lebanese sunnis to come to terms with an 
23 Independent Lebanon. 
Sunni opposition to annexation by the Maronites of 
Lebanon took several forms. Led by residents of Beirut and 
Tripoli, sunni flooded the League of Nations and French 
offices in Beirut and Paris with memorials, petitions, and 
telegrams. Demonstrations in the city streets occurred 
regularly. Increased mosque attendance, greater celebration 
of Islamic holidays, and other religious acts strenthened 
the spirit of communal solidarity. The sunnis" efforts to 
secede from Lebanon became more organized in 1923, as their 
leaders combined efforts to petition the French and send 
emissaries to Europe. They also paid greater attention to 
winning Greek Orthodox Christians to the secessionist point 
of view. 
23. Daniel Pipes, 'Damascus and the Claim to Lebanon,' 
ORBIS, (Winter, 1987), p.667. 
24. Ibid., p. 667. 
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The Dru2e revolt in Syria in 1925-27 fuelled Sunni 
impatience with their place in Lebanon. "From the end of 
1925 until the summer of 1926", writes Meir Zamir, a wave 
of intensive pro-Syrian activity, unprecedented since 1920, 
spread throughout the coastal area. Petitions were sent to 
the High Commission, the French government and the League of 
Nations, commercial strikes were organized, numerous 
meetings of notables and leaders were held and articles 
supporting union with Syria were published in the Muslim 
Press. Sunni leaders carried petitions to the French 
authorities calling for union with Damascus. They also 
organised into committees to orchestrate unionist 
> 
sentiments, to coordinate with the rebels in Syria, and to 
communicate with the Executive Committee of the Syro-
Palestine Congress. 
The prospect of a Franco-Syrian accord in 1936 inspired 
fresh activism among Lebanese Muslims. The Sunnis of Tripoli 
petitioned the League of Nations, requesting that their 
region, previously incorported into Lebanon "without their 
agreement or consent... be annexed to United Syria". At a 
conference of the Coast in March 1936, Muslim leaders from 
Lebanon and Syria met with members of the Syrian Social 
Nationlist Party to demand that the areas added to Lebanon 
in 1920 be returned to Syria. The eventual signing of a 
Franco-Syrian protocol in September 1936 provoked the 
25. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p. 182. 
26. Kamal S.Salibi,The Modern History of Lebanon , 1 965,p. 1 8 1 . 
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Eunni Mualime of Tripoli to riot and strike to demand 
incorporation in Syria. When the Lebanese president visited 
Tripoli four days after the signing, he was greeted by 
crowds of children and youths who shouted slogans in favour 
of unity with Syria. They refused to obey police orders and 
ended their welcome in a stone-throwing fracus with the 
police . 
In the beginning the Sunnis were reluctant to 
participate in the political process of Lebanon. An 
organized Sunni opposition was manifested in the summer of 
1921, when preparation were being made for the census as a 
first steps towards a general election . The Sunni refused 
to participate in the census on the grounds that they were 
being defined as citizens of 'Greater Lebanon", and that 
this could be interpreted as their recognition of the 
Lebanese state. In August a delegation of Sunni notables 
from Beirut,including Salam, Da'uq and Bayhum met with 
Gouraud to express their objections to the census and to 
French favouritism towards the Christians in the Lebanese 
administration. 28 The Sunnis also withdrew from the 
29 
constitutional consultations which began in early 1926 
27. Daniel Pipes, op.cit., pp. 668-669. 
28. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p.190. 
29. Sunni Muslims all over the Lebanon refused to take part 
in the Drafting of the Constitution. They made it 
clear to the French authorities that they did not 
support a Lebanese republic that was separate from and 
independent of Syria. Of the 210 representatives of 
the different communities to whom the Drafting 
Committee sent out copies of a questionnaire in order 
to ascertain their vvews, only 132 replied, and most of 
those who refused to reply were Sunni Mulims. 
13;) 
fearing that constitution for Lebanon will endowed a new 
30 permanency to the Lebanese polity. By middle thirties, the 
Sunnis did not participate in the political life of the 
state. Like the other communities, the Sunnis too had their 
participation in the judiciary, legislative, and 
administrative branches of the government, but this gave 
more satisfaction to the office holders than to the sect as 
a whole. It yearned for reattachment to predominantly Sunni 
Syria and for a return of the prestige it had enjoyed under 
3 1 the Ottomans. 
Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, with the rise to 
power of a young generation of Sunni leaders who had grown 
up under the new Lebanese political system, was the way 
opened to a modus vivendi between these leaders and their 
32 Christian counterparts. The sunnis were the first to 
accept the status quo, as economic success caushioned their 
33 political disappointment. As early as 1926, Muhammad al-
Jisr, a prominent Sunni man of learning from Tripoli, had 
defied the Sunni boycott of the Lebanese state by agreeing 
30. Daniel Pipes, op.cit., p. 668. 
31. Leila M.T. Meo,Lebanon: Improbable Nation, Bloomington, 
1965, p.74. 
32. Meir Zamir, op.cit., p. 127. 
33. Daniel Pipes, op.cit., p. 658. 
to serve until 1932 as speaker of parliament. In 1937, 
another Sunni from Tripoli, Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab, who had 
gained prominence in Beirut as an Arab nationalist 
jounalist, again defied the same Sunnis boycott by accepting 
3 5 the premiership of the Lebanese cabinet.-^ However, the 
effort of the Lebanese Sunni for the integration with Syria 
ended, when they reached an agreement on dividing power with 
the Christians in 1943. By the terms of their informal 
agreement, known as the National Pact, Lebanese Sunnis 
accepted separation from Syria on condition that the 
Christians turn their back on France and accept Lebanon's 
Arab identity. Few Sunnis actively sought union with Syria 
after 1943.^^ 
34. In 1932 the mandatory suspended the constitution, 
dissolved the Chamber and the Cabinet, and instituted 
an authoritarian regime , all because Shaykh Mohammad 
al-Jisr insisted on announcing his candidacy in the 
forthcoming presidential elections and stood a good 
chance of winning. Al-Jisr's chances of electrion at 
that time derived from the fact that the Chamber, whose 
duty it was to elect the President, was very much 
divided as to which of the probable Maronite candidates 
to elect. Should Edde announce his candidacy, he could 
not count on the votes of the supporters of al-Khoury, 
who was himself determined to become a candidate. 
There were also other Maronites with presidential 
ambitions, and when election day came one of the 
hopefuls was sure to emerge as the French-approved 
candidate. Factional rivalry and an unwillingness to 
elect the "official" candidate, for fear that he would 
become a tool in the hands of the mandatory, decided 
many a Christian deputy to support the candidacy of al-
Jisr. The dissolution of the Chamber, however, robbed 
them of this chance. 
35. Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, London, 1988, 
p.183. 
36. Daniel Pipes, op.cit., p.669. 
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THE SUNNI LEADERSHIP: 
The Sunni community suffers today from numerous 
problems and difficulties. It lacks the coherent political 
organisations (coherent in the Lebanese war's relative 
terms, of course) of the Druze, Shi'a and Maronites. It also 
lacks a charismatic leader behind whom Sunnis could rally. 
Furthermore, the regional particularist tendencies of the 
Sunnis appear to be greater than they are among other 
communities. The Sunnis have no political organisation that 
appeals to the members of the community wherever they are in 
Lebanon: What exist of Sunni-based political orgnisations 
are confined to individual districts, cities, often even to 
one hayy (neighbourhood). Thus it is impossible to examine 
the Sunni political leadership without introducing some 
geographic distinctions. Not only are the Sunnis today 
politically weak, but they are regarded by their Muslim 
coreligionists with much suspicion and dissatisfaction due 
to the Sunnis" stake in the Naional Pact. As a result of 
that deal, the Sunnis were recognized by the Maronite 
political leadership as an integral but inferior part of the 
Lebanese political system. The Shi'a, who were virtually 
ignored by the arrangement, blame the Sunnis for their 
arrogance and "collaboration".... As already mentioned, the 
Lebanese state under the French mandate co-opted the Sunni 
'ulama' by creating Par al-Ifta ' (the highest Sunni 
religious body) as part of the Lebanese bureaucracy. The 
13i 
Sunni Shaykha are thus civil servants who receive their 
salaries from the state itself. This accounts for the 
conservative role always played by the Sunni religious 
elite.^^ 
The political power^of the traditional Sunni 
leaders was based largely on ' ascriptive status' and not on 
traditional tribal or clan loyalties or on geographically 
concentrated rural constituencies enjoyed by other 
communities such as the Druze, Shi'a or Maronite leaders. 
The erosion of the political power of the traditional Sunni 
leaders was caused partly by these politicians' inability to 
satisfy the growing demands of their followers for job 
opportunities and political reforms and partly because of 
3 8 the strong reformist appeal of the National Movement and 
the Palestinian Resistance Movement. This was combined with 
a high level of personal estrangement among the leading 
members of the Lebanese oligarchy in general even before the 
Civil War of 1975. To forestall a further erosion of their 
37. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., pp. 35-36. Even the Sunni 
Muslims Brotherhood of Lebanon has been consistently 
pro-saudi. 
38. National Movement was a coalition of radical and 
leftist parties organized by Kamal Junbalat in 1969. 
The Movement pressed for the deconfessionalization of 
the system. The National Movement never went so far as 
to call for the overthrow of the regime. The 
Movement's "Programme for Political Reforms", was 
concerned with internal reforms that did not include 
radical changes. Kamal assassination in 1977 led to 
the gradual dismantling of the National Movement, which 
was completed by the summer of 19S2, and its remnants 
have since been completely subordinated to the Syrian 
regime. 
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political position the Sunni oligarchs concentrated on 
Chiristian - Mueiiro e^atAvian ai«dV;4g«s, blaming the ills of 
the political system on the Maronite 'monopoly' of power, 
{i^ ipniseqwentiy t.h^  tv-^AitiPnAl Sunni ieaderehip uae not in a 
position to cooperate with the Christians lest this 
cooperation lead to further defections of followers to the 
National Movement. Given the pivotal role of an effective 
working rapport between the Maronite president and the Sunni 
prime minister, this estrangement among the members of the 
Lebanese ruling elite was a crippling blow to the continued 
39 functioning of the government. 
The traditional Sunni leadership is weaker today than 
it was in the late seventies in the aftermath of the 
Lebanese civil war. Following that phase of the Civil war, 
the sunnis were disillusioned with the Palestinia Resistence 
Movement and its Lebanese leftist-led allies. The attitude 
adopted by the movements alienated the sunnis and other 
groups of the population in areas under PLO-Lebanese 
National Movement control. Furthermore, the scale of the war 
and the subsequent destruction of cities and villages were 
far beyond what Beirut's sunnis had anticipated. The 
traditional Sunni leadership exploited and benefited from 
these negative factors, and expressed deep interest in 
returning to the status quo ante. The famous Lebanese 
39. Edward E. Azar and others. The Emergence of a New 
Lebanon:Fantasy or Reality? New York, 1984, p. 122. 
ItI) 
leader Sa'ib Salam in Beirut and Rashid Karami'^° in Tripoli 
re-emerged as the spokesmen of their community.Al-
Tajamma'al-Islam ('the Islami Bloc'), a "club" which 
included all the prominent Sunni politicians. It assumed a 
greater role and, to a large extent, represented the popular 
mood and tendencies of the sunni community as a result of 
the drift in public orientation away from the Lebanese left 
and the Palestinian resistence movements. 
However, some Sunni regional leaders openly supported 
the Israeli invasion and Bashir Gemayel after 1982. Faruq 
Shihab al-Din, a key Sunni leader of the Bastah district of 
West Beirut, headed a large delegation from Beirut to 
congratulate Bashir upon his election. Likewise, Labib Abu 
Dhahr, a prominent bourgeois from Sidon, founded a small 
bloc to mobilize supporters of Israel in that city. But the 
provocative and oppressive practices of the Gemayel 
government soon shattered the hopes of "optimistic" Sunnis 
who sincerely expected the return of pre-war Lebanon. 42 
40. Rashid Karami was born in Miriata (North Lebanon) on 
30, December 1921. He came from a prominent Sunni 
family. His father had been mufti, member of 
parliament and , prime minister. He elected Deputy for 
Tripoli in 1951, a seat he kept in all subsequent 
elections. Justice minister in 1951-52, he then Joined 
the opposition which was to bring the downfall of 
President Bishara al-Kouri in 1952. Several times 
minister between 1953 and 1955, on 19 September 1955, 
at the age of 34, he became Lebanon's youngest prime 
minister, however, he resigned on 19 march 1956. He 
became prime minster many times till his death on 1 
June 1987. 
41. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p. 37 
42. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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There is a sizeable Sunni population in Beirut in its 
second and third electoral constituencies. The traditional 
Sunni leadership there include, among its most prominent 
members, the former Primer Minister: Sa,ib Salam, Tagiy al-
Din al Sulh, Rashid al-Sulh, Shafig al-Wazzan and Salim al-
Huss. The old Sunni political establishment lost much of 
its credibility as a result of its close "collaboration" 
with the Maronite leadership after the invasion, within a 
state that most Muslims rightly perceived as Phalangist 
domain. Shafiq al-Wazzan, for example, headed government 
under the presidencies of both Ilyas Sarkis and Amin 
Gemayel, despite their adopting policies unacceptable to 
Muslims. Both president, Sunnis argue, proved to be heavily 
inclined towards Maronite sectarianism. Sa'ib Salam also 
supported both administrations and personally lobbied for 
the parliament's passage of the May 17, 1983 agreement with 
Israel. Some Sunni traditional leaders, like ' CJthman al-Dana 
of Beirut and Sulayman al-Ali of 'Akkar openly' aligned 
themselves with the Lebanese Forces and Bashir Gemayel 
personally.'*^ Only one man among the group of former prime 
minister appears to enjoy the support of the Sunni community 
as an honest and strong leader who stood up to the 
"Christian fanatic" Sarkis. The Phalangists harsh attacks on 
43. Marius K. Deeb, ""Lebanon: Prospects for National 
Reconciliation in the Mid-1980's, The Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Spring, 1984), p. 273 
44. As-ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p. 38. 
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al-Huea as a fanatic Sunni boosted his Muslim credibility. 
However, al-Huss has not organized his followers into a 
political party with a military arm, a crucial condition for 
the institutionlization and mobilization, and consequently 
t^e continuity, of public support. Al -Huss is also one of 
the few Sunni leaders who has consistently maintained good 
relations with other Muslim organisations, particularly non-
45 
Sunni groups, as well as with Syria. 
The second important concentration of Sunni leaders is 
in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli. Rashid Karame, 
ex-prime minister, has been an important traditional leader 
in Tripoli who has been categorized as one of the aqtab , 
regained his power after law and order were re-established 
in Tripoli and various militias were disarmed. Although 
Karame was hemmed in by important rivals in the city. Deputy 
Abd al-Majid al-Rafi'i is one of them. He is the secretary 
General of the pro-Iraqi Arab Baath Sociolist Party, a 
physician by profession, who comes from one of the most 
prominent clans of the city, and who is the newphew of a 
former speakere of the House, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr. 
Two other regions with high concentrations of Sunnis 
are the city of Sidon and the Iqlim al-Kharrub, whose Sunnis 
45. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
46. Prominent Lebanese leaders who were able to bring 
deputies to parliament on the electoral lists or aa 
members of their parties or blocs known as political 
bosses or poles (aqtab) in Lebanon. 
47. Marius K. Deeb, op.cit., p.274. 
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conetitute one fifth of the total population of the Shuf 
Qada.^^Over the past few decades, the political leadership 
of Sidon has been dominated by a tug of war. The leadership 
of the Sunni community has been shared by two rivals, the 
al-Bizri family, and Ma'ruf Sa'd (and later his sons). The 
al-Bizris are a large landowning family who were able to 
have their representative. Nizih al-Bizri, elected to the 
parliament in the last election that of 1972.. Al-Bizri 
became less popular, since he lacked a political 
4 9 
organisation and a militia. With Israel's defeat of the 
PLO and the disbanding of the Lebanese National Movement, 
Bizri and other traditional leaders re-emerged as the 
dominant groups in the region. Their rival. Ma'ruf Sa'd 
was a popular and charismatic street leader who founded the 
Nasserite Popular Organization. The assassination of Sa'd 
48. Ibid., p.274. 
49. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.42. 
50. Marius K. Deeb, op.cit-, p.274. 
51. The Nasserite Popular Organization drew its inspiration 
from Nasserism which had held sway over the Arab after 
the Suez Crisis. Nasserism was the Political and 
social attitude of Arabs in many countries who 
regarded Gamal 'Abdul Nasser as the leader of all 
Arabs, and republican Egypt as the prototype of nation 
progressing towards national freedom and social 
justice. Nasserism was neither a well-defined 
indeology nor an organized movement; it was a general 
political-emotinal outlook, which took its inspiration 
from the personality, actions and utterances of the 
late Egyptian persident. It was for some years the 
most popular force in the Arab world. It developed 
against the background of disillusionment with other 
ideologies and the poor performance of previous Arab 
leaders. But it had, since 1961-62, acquired a more 
doctrinal appearnance. To its nationalism, anti-
Western neutralism and reformism, socialism was now 
added. For details of Nasserism See, Hrair R. 
Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir, London, 1972. 
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in 1375 ie conaiderad by many the Sarajevo of the Lebanese 
Civil War. The leadership of the Nasserite Popular 
Organization was then assumed by Ma'ruf's son Mustafa. 
Mustafa proved to be an able city leader, and gained the 
support of his community. He is most remembered for his 
leadership of the spectacular battle with the Syrian army in 
1975, which left a Syrian tank on top of a building in 
Sidon. Since Mustafa Sa'd was blinded in a January 1985 
car-bombing attack that also took the life of his daughter, 
his brother Usamah has assumed day-to-day leadership of the 
Popular Nasserite Organization. Mustafa has remained the 
overall leader. A militia grouping created by Sa'd played an 
important role in defeating the Lebanese Forces in the 
villages east of Sidon in April 1985. 
Another group of Sunni leaders are the traditional 
leaders of Akkar, notably, the feudal clan of al-Mir'abi. 
Sulayman al-Ali and Talal al-Mir'abi are the members of the 
clan who have seats in parliament and are most active 
politically. The leftist, peasant based movement which 
challenged their power in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
spent its force, and the recent emergence of Muslim 
fundamentalist groups in Akkar has not yet affected their 
power base. 
52. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.42. 
53. Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia; Struggle 
for the Soul of Lebanon, Austin, 1987, p,137. 
64. Marius K. Deeb, op.cit., p.274. 
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In all other regions, the Sunni community is either 
sro^ l^J. pp damindted by iirlanis of other sectis. Par a'AAmpla, tha 
small Sunni minority in Baalbek is under the influence of 
the militant Shi'a of the region, while that of Marjayun 
comes under the leadership of Kamil al-As'ad. The important 
Sunni minority of the southern Bekka is divided between an 
Israeli-occupied and a Syrian-controlled region, and the 
55 traditional Sunni clan of al-Qadiri is caught in between. 
The sunni political and religious leadership is, in 
many ways, a product of the larger Sunni community. The 
Sunni attitude towards the Lebanese Civil War has always 
been ambivalent. On the one hand, the Sunnis were part of 
the larger Muslim community that had been expressing its 
resentment with respect to the basic social and political 
and indeed sectarian - injustices in Lebanon. However, while 
the Sunni were critical of certain aspects of the political 
system, they were not against the system per se. In some 
areas, the Sunnis such as Beirut, profited from the 
prosperity of the Lebanese economy and were reluctant to 
demand radical changes in the system. The conservative Sunni 
attitude towards the political system can best be summed up 
by Sa'ib Salam's famour slogan: thawrah min fawg 
("revolution from above'), which contrasted sharply with 
55. Ibid., p. 275. 
56. The Sunnis always called for a musharakah (an 
equitable distribution of power between the Maronite 
president and the Sunni Prime Minister). 
us 
state of radicalisatlon that the Shi'a were experiencing 
under the influence of Lebanese and Palestinian Marxist and 
Ba'thiat political organizations. The Sunnis were aware that 
an increase in the Shi'a share of power in the govoernment 
would take place at their expenses. But, the Sunnis fear 
that the increased share of Shia'a in the government would 
take place at their expence was wrong as it became 
abundently clear from the Ta'if accord. Nevertheless, it 
is highly inaccurate and rather simplistic to attribute one 
trend to the whole Sunni community in Lebanon, because there 
were and are many class and particularistic factor at work 
within the sect itself. While the Sunnis of Beirut were 
benefiting from the service sector of the economy, which 
turned their capital into a boom town, the Sunnis of Sidon, 
Tripoli, the Bekka, and 'Akkar took a more radical stand 
because they lived in areas largely or wholly neglected by 
the central government. 
The Sunni community today has produced a new breed of 
political and religious leadership. Sunni religious leaders 
are now following the Shi'a example, whereby the Imam 
combines religious and political powers. This radical 
approach has seriously challenged the historical dominance 
57. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.36. 
58. For detail see Augustus Richard Norton,'Lebanon After 
Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over,' Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 45, No, 3, Summer 1991, pp. 457-473. 
59. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., pp.36-37. 
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of prominent Sunni families. The new rising religious elite 
r e Q a r d 1 a s E of q e o g r a p h i c a 1 d i f f i2 r e n c e a , a h a r e a a a m e general 
tendencies with the larger Sunni community. It springs from 
within the community itself, and articulates accurately the 
mood of the masses. The new elite lives in modest houses, in 
modest neighbourhoods. More important, the new elite is far 
more accessible to the public than the traditional 
leaders. 
The general tendencies of the Sunnis are well 
represented in the programmes of the new religious 
organizations. Some Sunnis fundamentalists believe that 
secularism is inconsistant with the teaching of Islam. They 
even regard secularism as a dangerous conspiracy designed by 
the communists to weaken the bonds of religion. Furthermore, 
when some Muslim call for the elimination of "political 
sectarianism," they seek only to increase Muslim 
representation in the Lebanese bureaucracy, and to dimnish 
the heavy representation of Maronites, especially in the 
most crucial and sensitive posts. The sunnis also consider 
the confrontation with the Phalangists essential in order to 
eliminate the latter's hegemony. 
60. Ibid., p. 38. 
61. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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RISE OF SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISM: 
Thus various fundamentalist organizations emerged which 
exploited the fear within the community by mobilising it 
along strictly sectarian lines. In Beirut, ' Abd al-Hafiz 
Qasim, the head of the Muslim 'Ulama' Association and the 
Islamic Military Council, is a typical representative of 
this tendency. Such new organization compose a new Sunni 
fundamentalist movement that differs sharply from the 
traditional Saudi-supported societies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Lebanon. The later movement includes such 
groups as the Islamic Liberation Party, "Ubbad al-Rehman 
(Worshippers of the Compassionate), and al-Jama'ah al-
Islamiyah (The Islamic Group). The new Sunni fundamentalist 
movement is not centralized or coherent, and is not 
restricted to or monopolized by one organization, even in 
Beirut itself. A few Shaykhs have organized and armed their 
followers in given localities into highly centralized 
networks of cells. 'Abd al-Hafiz Qasim, a close ally of the 
Murabitun and the head of the Lebanese delegation chosen by 
Yasir 'Arafat to attend the PNC meeting in Amman, founded 
the Islamic Military Council in the neighbourhood of al-
Tariq al-Jadidah to assert an independent Sunni identity in 
a city dominated by Shi 'a and Druze militias. 
There is also the charismatic al-Shaykh al-Habashi, who 
immigrated to Lebanon from Ethiopia years ago. Al-Habashi's 
62. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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influanee and appeal have been increaainq lately in West 
Beirut with the rise of anti-Shia'a attitudes among the 
Sunnis. His followers are organized into a highly 
centralized party, and are asked to pledge total allegiance 
to their leader or mawlana• His popularity can be attributed 
to his unique charisma as well as to his extremist 
sectarianism, which falls on fertile soil in today's 
Lebanon. Al-Habashi'doctrine combines enmity towards two 
major sects: the Maronites and the Shi'a. Following the 
uprising of Feb 6, 1984, when Amal and the PSP drove the 
army out of West Beirut, al-Habashi stated that it is 
muhallal (legal from the purely religious point of view) to 
spill the blood of a Shi'a. As far the Israelis, al-Habashi 
argues, it is futile to devote all efforts to fighting them 
as long as the balance of power is strongly in Israel's 
favour. His power and authority over his followers cover all 
facets of social and political life. He expects his young 
followrs, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
group, to reject the authority of their parents, presumably 
to ensure total obedience. Al-Habashi, who keeps a low 
profile and shuns press publicity, has been able to extend 
his influence from the neighbourhood of Burj Abi Haydar to 
al-Tarig al-Jadidah and Ras Beirut. Like all Sunni 
fundamentalist movements in Lebanon, the group calls for the 
restoration of the caliphate and consequently the 
establiishment of an Islamic republic in the country- A 
small Sunni fundamentalist group guided by a charismatic 
L w H 
ahaykh ia a char actatletie of Sunni cities in Lebanon 
today.^-^ 
The Islamic unification Movement in Tripoli under 
the leadership of Sa'id Sha'ban succeeded in couple of years 
in asserting his authority over the whole city in defiance 
of Syria's wishes. Sha'ban, who comes from a lower middle 
class background, has been successful in attracting the 
65 
numerous and highly active lumpenproletarlate and 
unemployed workers of Tripoli, whose number has increased 
tremendously, first because of the closing down of factories 
and commercial establishment affected by the endemic civil 
strife in the city, and secondly because of rural migration 
from Dinniya and Akkar of people looking for jobs in the 
city. Sha'ban sees no way out of the civil war except 
through an application of the Shari'ah in Lebanon under an 
Islamic authority. The Sunni vision of the Islamic state 
differs from the Shi'a notion of Welayat-e-al-Faqih (the 
Guardianship of the Jurisconsult): Sha'ban, who recognizes 
the difference between the two notions, calls for the re-
emergence of the Sunni caliphate in order to confront the 
Shi'a version of an Islamic state on the Iranian model. The 
63. Ibid., p. 41. 
64. Islamic Unification Movement is also known as Tawhid 
founded by Sha'ban in 1982. Sha'ban is widely believed 
to recieve financial support from Iran, and his 
relations with the Islamic Republic are excellent. 
65. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.41. 
66. Marius K. Deeb, op.cit., p.274. 
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lalamic Unification Movertient is strongly hostile to the 
communist movement in the Muslim world. In 1983, the 
Movement engaged in bloody massacres of communists and their 
families in Tripoli. Their bodies were thrown into the sea, 
to rid the soil of their ban influence. The forces 
opposing Sha'ban's movement included the Arab Democratic 
Party, which has been heavily backed by Syria and whose 
ranks include a number of imported "Alawis. Serious fighting 
occurred in 1984, and, despite Syria's September 1984 
efforts to reach an agreement that Tripoli would be policed 
by Syrian and Lebanese forces, fighting continued throughout 
1985.^® 
The power of Sunni fundamentalist groups is rapidly 
growing, and consequently threatening the appeal and 
Influence of the Sunni traditional establishment... The 
popularity of Sunni fundamentalism is accompanied and indeed 
augmented by the intesification of communal frictions and 
contradictions between the Sunnis and the Shi'a. The origins 
of the conflict are of course religious and historical, but 
the evolution of the conflict has to be explained within the 
present geopolitical context of West Beirut. The Druze and 
the Shi'a shook the political structure of the city on 
February 6, 1984, when by sheer military force they imposed 
their combined hegemony. This development constituted a 
67. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.42. 
68. Augustus Richard Norton, op.cit., 1987, p.138. 
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novel factor in the history of Civil War . In 1975, Kamal 
Junbalat had been aware of Sunni sensibilities when he 
extablished a political council whose membership was almost 
entirely Sunni, under the chairmanship of a prominent Sunni 
cardiologist, "Usamah al-Fakhuri, to administer the city on 
behalf of the Lebanese National Movement. This gesture had 
nonetheless failed to ally Sunni fears, because the city was 
clearly under the tight control of Fatah. Today, however, 
the Shi'a - Druze alliance has imposed a hegemony without 
being able to ensure Sunni participation - even token - in 
decision making. This has increased the narrow sectarian 
consciousness among the Sunni masses, and has also led to a 
subtle and sometimes bloody communal war between the sects. 
The Sunni Mufti (Jurisconsult), for example, wrote a highly 
controversial article in a journal published by Par al-Ifta' 
in which he suggested that Allah banned alcohal because ~Ali 
ibn Abi Talib, the founder of the Shi'a sect, was a heavy 
drinker. The article provoked the Shi'a, who accused the 
Mufti of instigating conflict between the two sects. What 
happened in Sidon in February 1985 in the wake of the 
Israeli withdrawal from the city, when members of Hizbollah 
(the Party of God) raided the city and chanted pro-Iranian 
slogans, is clearly another sectarian provocation within the 
same communal context. 69 
69. As'ad Abu Khalil, op.cit., p.39. 
I 
The Sunni community which constitutes about 26% of 
Lebanese population has always played an important political 
role in the country's political system since independence., 
Riyad Sulh, a pan-Arab sunni leader was a major party to 
1943 National Pact. This pact awarded the prime minstership 
to the Sunni community, the second most imporant political 
post in the state hierarchy. The Sunnis very much resented 
the creation of Greater Lebanon, and never fully identified 
with the Lebanese state set up as guaranteed by a foreign 
Christian power. They always regarded themselves a members 
of the world wide community of sunni Muslims. In the 
beginning the Sunnis were reluctrant to participate in the 
political process of Lebanon. Only in the late 1930s and 
1940s, with the rise to power of a young generation of Sunni 
leaders who had grown up under the new Lebanese political 
system, there opened up a modus vivendi between these 
leaders and their Christian counterparts. However, the 
efforts of the Lebanese Sunnis for the integration with the 
Syria ended, when they reached an agreement on the 
division of power with the Christians in 1943. But the terms 
of their informal agreement, known as National Pact, 
Lebanese Sunnis accepted separation from Syria on condition 
that Christians turned their back on France and accepted 
Lebanon's Arab idienity. 
The Sunni community of Lebanon lacks the coherent 
political organizations of the Druze, Shi'a and Maronites. 
It also lacks a charismatic Sunni leader behind whom Sunni 
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could rally. Tr-iidi tional leaders lost their influence during 
the Civil War and particularly after Israeli invasion of 
1978 and 1982. They became weak during the Civil War because 
they lacked a strong united militia of their own. 
Furthermore, the regional particularist tendencies of the 
Sunnis appear to be greater than they are among other 
communities. The traditional leaders lost much of their 
influence during the Civil War and finally after the Israeli 
invasion of 1982 due to their collaboration with Israel. 
Taif Agreement brokered by the Arab League reaffirmed 
the principle of confessionalism, in which the political 
claims of the fast growing Shi'a were blunted in favour of 
Sunni Muslims. The President was divested of his autonomous 
prerogatives. Presidential decisions now required the co-
signature of the Prime Minister, except in two instances: 
the appointment of a Prime Minister; and when accepting the 
government's resignation. With the stipulations of the Taif 
Agreement incorporated into the constitution, the executive 
powers were effectively transferred to the Lebanese Cabinet. 
The main beneficiary of the changes was the office of the 
Prime Minister, who became the head of the government, 
speaking in its name, implmenting its policies and 
coordinating the various ministeries. In the event of a 
vacancy in the office of the President, the cabinet, under 
the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, would assume the 
privileges and responsibi1itiea of the presidency. Moreover, 
15: 
the Sunnia were given 22 seats in the p^ irl lament equal to 
the Shi'a. Thus, it may be said that the Sunnis will 
continue to have sufficient political powers in near future. 
They proved weaker during the civil war due to lack of 
military power, however, they defended the status quo due 
to the fear that any reform in Lebanese political system 
will reduce their powers. 
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THE SHI 'A 15 '/ 
ORIGINS: 
The Shi "a Muslim sect came into being as a result of a 
schism that took place in Islam in the decade after the 
death of Prophet Muhammad on the question of his successor 
(Caliphate). Those who supported the claim to the 
Caliphate of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib are called Shi'a. They did 
so because they alleged that Ali had a Divine Right to the 
Caliphate, or successorship, and that he had received a 
special mandate from the Prophet, and because of their 
presuming a unique, spiritual authority in'Ali, which was 
2 
passed on to certain of his descendants. 
Thus, the Shi "a recognized only 'Ali, the nephew and 
son-in-law of the Prophet as the legitimate heir, but not 
the early three Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman. The 
various communities and sects of the Shi'a venerate besides, 
the Prophet, "Ali, his sons Hasan and Husayn, and their 
1. Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle 
east, London, 1980, p.136. Following the Prophet's 
death, Abu Bakr was elected as Calipha ("lieutenant" or 
"successor" to the Prophet) at the popular assembly in 
Medina. The election was carried out in haste as the 
worsening rivalry between the Ansar (native Medinans) 
and the Muhajirun (Meccan immigrants) threatened to 
split the Islamic community. Ali was not present, 
since he had stayed at the Prophet's deathbed. He was 
then just thirty years old, Arab respect for age 
naturally favoured claimants of riper years, although 
historical exeptions to such rule did exist. 
2. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, London, 1989, 
p.364. 
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deecendanta. Every year in the Muslim lunar month of 
Muhartaw the Shi'a commenjcirate the passion and martyrdom 
which Hueayn suffered in 680 A.D. at Karbala in southern 
Iraq with frenzied intensity and even self-mutilation with 
3 
knives. 
The Shi^a originated in a socio-political revolt during 
the first century of Islam and soon became a religious 
movement with "heretical, doctrines. They advanced the idea 
that there was an infallible Imam in every age to whom God 
alone entrusted the guidance of his servants. Shi "a Muslims 
as a whole accept that a believer may practice taqiya, that 
is, concealment of his beliefs to save his life in the time 
of persecution, and may enter into a form of temporary 
marriage (nikah al-mut'a). In Lebanon the Shi'a are also 
known as the Mitawali. But the Mitawali belong to one of 
the major branches of the Shi"a division. They belong to 
the largest Shi'a sect, the Imamis, which recognizes twelve 
Imams in the 'Ali- Fatima' line, the last of whom 
disappeared in 800 A.D. but will one day return as Mahdi 
('the guided one') to restore justice and righteousness to 
the world. 
3. Herald Vocke, The Lebanese War, London, 1978, pp. 6-7. 
4. For detailed study of Shiism see Concise Encyclopaedia 
of Islam, Op-cit.,pp.364-370 and Edward Mortimer, Faith 
and Power: The Politics of Islam, London, 1982. 
According to Twelve-Imam Shiism the Imams are : "Ali 
ibn Abi Talib, Hasan ibn 'Ali', Husayn ibn 'Ali',~Ali' 
Zain al-~Abidin', Muhammad al- Baqir, Ja~far as- Sadiq, 
Musa-I- Kazim, Ali ar-Rida, Muhmmad at- Taql, Hasan al-
'Askari and Muhammad' called al- Mahdi-I- Muntazar. 
5. Peter Beaumont and others. The Middle East: A 
Geographical Study, New York, 1973, p. 370. 
15) 
Shi^'a are the oldest Muslim communities in Lebanon. At 
the time of the First crusade (1095), the whole country 
belonged to one or other of the Shi~a communities. The 
distribution of Mitawalis today is largely a relic of this 
early predominance. Pressure from the Sunni Mamluks (1291 to 
1516), continued by the Ottoman Turks (1516 to 1918), drove 
them from 'Akkar ' most of the coastal plain and Kisrawan. 
Thus, the community has survived principally in the refuge 
and largely uncoveted areas of Upper Galilee and al-Bekka, 
the few Mitawali villages on the eastern side of Mount 
Lebanon are the relics of an attempt to move into an even 
more secure distr-ct during the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The dominance of Mitawalis in Sur is the result 
of a more successful attempt at expansion about the same 
time. 
Very few Shi'a lived in the cities but a number of 
important small towns grew up in the Shi"a areas during the 
period between the two world wars. This was primarily due 
to the caravan routes between northern Syria, southern 
Syria, Palestine and the Lebanese coast. Fairs and markets 
were held in such towns at Tyre, Bint Jubayl, Nabatiyyeh, 
Jwayya, Khiam and Ba-lbek, where people concluded business 
deals and exchanged the various regional agricultural 
products. Related cottage industries developed in this 
commercial atmosphere-shoemaking in Bint Jubayl and pottery 
5. Ibid,, p. 375. 
in Rashayyah al-Fakhar 7 
Inspite of these changes, the Shi'a community had not 
yet experienced the social disruption, peasant revolts, or 
rapid expansion of export farming that had already 
transformed the Maronite area of Mount Lebanon as it was 
p 
integrated into the world capitalist economy. In the late 
1940, nearly 85 percent of the Lebanese Shi 'a were 
concentrated in two "heartlands," one in the south, in the 
area known as Jebel Amel, and the other in the northeast 
region of Ba'Ibek-Hermel. No more than 10 percent of the 
g 
entire community lived in cities. And in 1948, Shi'a were 
only 3.5 percent of the population of Beirut. 
The vast majority of the Shi'a peasantry lived on 
meagre plots with poor soil and very limited water 
resources. They practiced subsistence dry farming 
(primarily grains, olive trees and vineyards in the south, 
grains and some orchards in Ba'lbek). Only tobacco 
production, well suited to the dry plateaus of southern 
Lebanon and grown as a cash crop, had expanded since the 
1930s. But in 1948, tobacco was still a minor crop, planted 
in only three percent of the cultivated area of the south 
7. Salim Nasr, 'Roots of the Shi'a Movement; Merip 
Reports, (June 1985), p. 10. 
8. Ibid., p. 10. 
9. Ibid., p. 10. 
10. Ibid., p. 10. 
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and involving some 3,000 to 4,000 farmers. 11 
In the Hermel area, the main form of property ownership 
was collectively- owned land, more often grazing area than a 
well- defined holding. In the Ba-lbek area, very large 
private property existed alongside fields collectively owned 
by villages. The breakup of large tracts of land into 
smaller, private holdings had been under way since the 
1930s, but peasant small holdings were still insignificant 
except near the towns and larger villages of Jebel Amel. 
The peasants gradually increased their access to the land 
through contract planting and buying the property of 
bankrupt feudal lords with savings from wage labour in the 
countryside and towns, and as time went on, a prosperous 
middle peasantry emerged. But the distribution of property 
remained very unequal. Large estates still accounted for 
1 2 three- fourths of the best land in the Shi"a countryside. 
In 1960s and 1970s, this situation changed radically. 
Export agriculture expanded rapidly. Banking and commercial 
networks based in Beirut, Sidon and Zahle spread throughout 
the Shi"a rural areas. This completely restructured 
traditional social and productive relations. Sharecropping 
practically disappeared (down to only five percent of 
agricultural workers by 1970). Food production greatly 
dimnished (only 15 percent of food consumed was locally 
11. Ibid., p. 10. 
12. Ibid., p. 10. 
grown by 1970 to 1975). Farmers increasingly apecialiaed in 
two branches of export agriculture: nearly two- thirds of 
the value of agricultural production was concentrated in the 
cultivation of fruit trees and paultry farming. The number 
of agricultural wage earners increased and included non-
Lebanese labour. Above all, the peasantry was in a state of 
permanent and deepening crisis, indebted to and exploited by 
merchants, the moneylenders and small local banks, and the 
suppliers of machinery, fertilizer and pesticides. The 
development of certain industrial crops such as tobacco and 
suger beets was blocked by powerful commercial cartels like 
the cigarette and sugar importers who had great influence on 
government policy. Thousands of sharecroppers and poor 
Shi ""a peasant families were uprooted by indebtedness and 
bankruptcy, and forced to sell their property and move to 
the miserable suburbs of Beirut in search of work and better 
living conditions. More than 40 percent of the rural 
population had migrated by 1975. In the south, migration 
13 
was more than 60 percent. 
The socio-economic status of Shi'a fare poorly in 
comparison to their non-Shi "a cohorts. According to Joseph 
Chamie who used the data of 1971, the average Shi "a family's 
income was 4,532 Lebanese pounds in comparison with the 
national average of 6,247 Lebanese pounds; the Shi~a 
comprised the highest percentage of families earning less 
13. Ibid., p. 11 
IB,) 
than 1,B00 L; they were the moat poorly educated (fifty 
percent with no schooling VS. thirty percent state-wide); 
and, the Shi'a was the least likely, in comparision with 
other recognised sects, to list his occupation as 
professional/technical, business/managerial, clerical, or 
crafts/operatives, and the most likely to list it as 
farming, peddlery, or labour. In his 1958 study Michael 
Hudson found that in the two regions where the Shi'a 
predominate, al-Bekka and al-junub, the percentage of 
students in the population ( about thirteen percent) lagged 
by as much as five percentage points behind Lebanon's other 
three regions. Riad B. Tabbarah, analyzing educational 
differentials, found that in 1971 only 6.6 percent of the 
Shi "a had at least a secondary education, compared to at 
least fifteen percent and seventeen percent for the Sunnis 
and the Christians, respectively. Citing official Lebanese 
government statistics for 1974, Hasan Sharif found that 
while the south had about twenty percent of the national 
population, it received less than 0.7 percent of the state 
budget. Sharif's description of the under development of 
the south illustrates the conditions under which many Shi"a 
have had to live . 14 
14. Augustus Richard Norton, "Harakat Amal' Edward E. Azar 
(ed.,) The Emergence of A New Lebanon, New York, 1984, 
pp. 163-164. 
16t 
"The South haa the feweet paved roada per person 
or per acre. Running water is still missing in all 
villages and towns although water pipes were 
extended to many areas in the early sixties. 
Electricity networks were erected at about the 
same time, but they are inoperative most of the 
time. Sewage facilities are available only in 
large towns and cities. Outside the larger centers 
telephone service is completely absent except for 
a single manual cabin which is usually out of 
order. Doctors visit the villages once a week and 
sometimes only once a month. Clinics are 
maintained only in large villages and do not 
function regularly. Hospitals and pharmacies are 
found only in the larger populations centers. 
Elementary school is usually run in an old 
unhealthy house provided by the village. 
Intermediate schools were introduced to the large 
15 towns in the mid-sixties. 
in Lebanon 
still 1 s 
According to the work done by the writer 
from 1980 to 1982, Sharif's description 
essentially correct. While there have been some minor 
improvements, the conditions depicted are for the most part 
at least as bad as noted, and in many respects have only 
been exacerbated by continued conflict and social 
disruption. Besides, South Lebanon, the condition of the 
Shi "a in some other areas were not better. Prior to the 
war, tens of thousands of Shi "a lived in East Beirut: they 
were driven out by the Phalangists through bloody military 
campaigns according to a well-planned demographic scheme. 
Yet a small shi "a community still lives near Jubayl when 
pre-war Lebanon sparkled in prosperity and gained world 
attention for its affluent society, the Shi'a were living in 
another world. They were the garbage collectors, the 
15 Ibid. , p. 164 . 
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bagaat'E/ the toilers, and the members: of radical leftiat 
organizations. The Lebanese state was always annoyed by 
Shi'a neighborhoods in Beirut. It was concerned that their 
"poverty belts" around Beirut might disturb the tourists on 
their way from and to the airport. In the first month 
after he assumed power. President Amin Gemayel ordered 
Lebanese army troops to destroy the Shi "a slums in Burj al-
1 fi Barajinah, to "beautify the city".-^ 
During the 1950s and 50s, emigration was to the Arab 
oil-producing countries. The social effects of emigration 
on the Shi'a community were considerable. Local power 
relations in the villages shifted. Traditional notables and 
religious family lost much ground in favour of the wealthy 
returning migrants who purchased land and orchards, 
established new commercial networks and carved out their own 
spheres of social influence. A new Shi'a bourgeoisie 
emerged. As a newcomer, it could not compete directly with 
the Sunni and Christian bourgeoisies, so had to seek its 
fortune in the relatively secondary sectors: real estate 
development, citrus crop cultivation, leisure activities, 
and trade with Africa. In the early 1970s, this Shi'a 
bourgeoisie began to expand its activities. Shi "a overseas 
capital now entered the banks, industries and large business 
concerns. Finally, a new Shi "a elite emerged, including 
16. As'ad Abu Khali1, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political 
Leadership in Present- Day Lebanon, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, (1985), pp. 43-44. 
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religious figures, politicians and financiers 17 
By 1974, the Shi'a had ceased to be a largely rural 
community, situated on poor lands in marginal areas; now 
they were nearly two-thirds (63 percent) urban, and more 
than 45 percent of these urban dwellers were concentrated in 
1 8 Beirut and its suburbs. 
A high birth rate and an improvement in sanitary 
conditions in the countryside speeded up the Shi "a exodus to 
the metropolis. In 1948, the Shi'a numbered 225,000 or 18.2 
percent of the population. They were the third largest 
community after the Maronites and the Sunni. By 1975 they 
had grown to an estimated 750,000, representing nearly 30 
percent of the population, perhaps the largest community in 
19 The Shi'a now constitute some 40 percent of 
20 
the country. 
 0 Lebanon's population. Not long before, they had been 
largely illiterate, confined to a declining agriculture and 
dominated by a small traditional elite of large landowners 
and a reactionary clergy. Now, their class structure had 
changed significantly, with a new migrant bourgeoisie, a 
layer of middle-level salaried workers in the cities, an 
industrial proletariat in the suburbs of Beirut and a 
17. Salim Nasr, op-cit., p.11. 
18. Ibid., p. 11. 
19. Ibid., p. 12. 
20. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, p. 43 
IB; 
u'orfirfiunity of migrant workers in the Arab oil-producing 
countries. 
Shi'a community has been equally peripheral to the 
Lebanese political system that had developed under the 
French mandate and was consolidated with independence. At 
the beginning of the mandate, the Shi'a indicated a 
preference for unification with syria. A statute was passed 
in 1926 granting the Shi'a (Ja'fari) rite official 
recognition for the first time, following their sporadic 
agitation for unification and their participation in the 
rebellion of 1925-1926. This meant a right of community 
jurisdiction in personnel status matters, which heretofore 
2 2 had been within the jurisdiction of the Sunni Courts. 
According to the Lebanese census of 1932 (the last 
taken), the Shi ""a community was the country's third largest, 
amounting to 18% of the population. Politically, it had not 
assumed the relative importance which would have been 
commensurate even with its share of the population at that 
2 3 time (let alone its subsequent growth). The intercommunai 
National Pact of 1943 was essentially a division of power 
O A 
between the Maronite and Sunni political elite. Indeed, 
21. Salim Nasr, op. cit., p. 12. 
22. Leila M.T- Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, 
Bloomington, 1965, p. 60. 
23. Olmert Yosef, Middle East Contemporary Survey, (ed) by 
Colin Legum, Vol 7, 1982-83, New York 1985, p. 572. 
24. Salim Nasr, op. cit., p.10. 
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the pact was basically an agreement between the two leading 
communities to divide Lebanon into two sphere of influence 
along Christian-Muslims lines. The Shi'as came under the 
Sunni Muslim wings in the larger Christian-Muslim balance. 
Being mostly poor isolated and underdeveloped in their hill 
country of the South and in the Bekka,-the Shi-a remained 
irrelevant, and hence hardly the object of government 
attention.^^ From the 1920s to the mid 1950s, Shi-a 
political representation was practically monopolized by six 
prominent landowning families- the Asads, the Zeins and the 
Ossirans in southern Lebanon, and the Hamadehs, the Haidars 
and the Husseinis in Ba'lbek and Bint Jubayl. The half 
dozen Shi'a traditional feudal families who had absolute 
control of their communities were content with their share 
of power within the system, which enable them to be steadily 
elected as deputies, the control of the speakership and to 
2 7 hold cabinet posts in governmental coalition. This elite 
was divided into quarreling rival factions. They were 
constantly shifting between alliance with and opposition to 
2 8 the central power in Beirut. 
25. Dr. Mahmud A Faksh, 'The Shi'a Community of Lebanon: A 
New Assertive Political Force', Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Stidies, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Spring, 
1991), p.37. 
26. Salim Nasr, Op. cit., p. 10. 
27. Dr. Mahmud A Faksh, op. cit., p.37. 
28. Salim Nasr, op. cit., p-10. 
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For uvar two decades, the Shi "a community was kept at 
the bottom of the socioeconomic and political structure, and 
its members remained essentially disenfrenchised. The great 
majority languished in their remote regions. Shi""a led a 
life of resignation to their plight, a plight that a 
quietist reliqioua leadership did little to ameliorati 29 
For over thirty years, between 1943 and 1975, the 
Lebanese polity seemed to function satisfactorily, except 
for a short but difficult period during the 1958 civil war. 
But the winds of change that then began would ultimately 
undermine the established order and lead to the rise of 
Shi-a power. During the 1960s and 1970s, the evolving 
polity produced new forces within the Shi'a community that 
upset the Shi'a status quo. Rapid socioeconomic 
modernization, the spread of education, urbanization, and 
the flood of petro-money brought greater mobilization and 
30 politicization of the disenfrenchised shi'a. 
A new Shi'a middle class, mostly Western-educated and 
modernist, that would later champion Shi'a struggle for 
social and political reform, came into being. Previously, 
enterprising young Shi'a feeling constrained by the status 
quo, had emigrated to West Africa and elsewhere. Beginning 
in the 1950s, such persons migrated to Beirut. Joining the 
exodus over the next two decades was a flood of rural poor 
29. Dr. Mahmud A Faksh, op. cit., p. 38. 
30. Ibid., p. 38. 
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Shi "a who left for the metropolia, partly because of village 
life hardship and economic insecurity under a semi-feudal 
order and partly because of increasing Palestinian Israeli 
fighting in the south following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
There in huge ghettos in the southern suburbs, they formed 
an ever-growing sector made up of industrial proletariate, 
3 1 
migrant labourers, and unemployed poor. 
In Beirut, the migrants came face to face with the 
affluence of the established communities. The city's 
general prosperity was a dismaying contrast to their 
increasingly crowded and dismal environment. Their 
heightened conciousness of the disparity contributed to 
their radicalization. The unhappy newcomers then were a 
recruitment pool for all sorts of anti-establishment parties 
and oppositional groups, communists and radical-socialist 
32 parties found support from this constituency. 
One of the major consequences of the process of 
socioeconomic change within the Shi'a community is the 
breakdown of the traditional leadership structure. The 
Zu'ama authority and influence over their village subjects 
who migrated were lost, and the old system that held the 
patron-client relationship intact was diminished and 
eventually rendered obsolete. The process also eroded the 
position of the status quo-oriented religious leaders, who 
31. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
32. Ibid., p. 39. 
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were supplanted by a socially active and reform-minded 
religions leadership, especially following the rise of Imam 
Musa al-Sadr in the 1960s. Another consequence of the 
process of socioeconomic change, coupled with the growth of 
communication, is the lessening of Shi'a isolation and the 
fostering of greater community conciousness and 
identification. The old physical and cultural barriers were 
33 gone . 
The Shi'a now had an active and radicalized 
intelligentsia, an ambitious and enterprising counter-elite, 
and other new strata with new demands. They began to 
challenge the rules of the game and to question the 
distribution of power and resources in the Lebanese system. 
In this context, the movement of Imam Musa al-Sadr was born 
in the early 1970s, an expression of the demographic and 
socioeconomic shift of the Shi "a from the periphery toward 
the city-state of Beirut. The new movement, separated from 
the leftist-nationalist forces.^^ 
IMAM MUSA AL-SADR; HARAKAT-AL-MAHRUMIN: 
The movement was called by different names: the 
movement of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the Movement of the 
Dispossessed (Harakat al-Mahrumin), the Movement for the 
Rights of the Shi'a, or, more simply,"The Shi "a Movement." 
33 . Ibid., p. 39. 
34. Salim Nasr, op. cit., p. 12-
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Whatever the name, it was a maaa movement in the Leb d 111; c; t; 
Shi'a community, guided and inspired by its spiritual head 
and charismatic leader. Imam Musa al-3adr. The main reason 
for the establishment of the Movement of Disinherited was to 
mobilize the Shi'a community and achieve specific political 
objectives, such as obtaining for the Shi"a a greater share 
of positions in the higher echelons of the civil service, 
and creating development projects in the Shi'a regions of 
3 6 the south and northern Bekka. 
During the years before the outbreak of Civil War in 
1975, the movement attempted to satisfy its social and 
political demands through various forms of mobilization, 
pressure and action. This had a powerful effect on the 
sectarian balance and the functioning of the political 
system and the state administration. It was a popular 
movement with a strong rural base in the major outlying 
towns, and among the clans of Ba-lbek and the uprooted 
migrants in the suburbs of Beirut. Stimulated by the sermons 
and the energetic personal action of Imam al-Sadr himself, 
it was essentially a spontaneous popular upsurge defined by 
religion and by its social base. Its main constituents were 
the dispossessed urban migrants, the poverty-ridden 
peasantry, the growing petty bourgeoisie whose advancement 
was blocked and the new bourgeoisie which was excluded from 
35. Ibid., p. 12 . 
36. Marius K Deeb, ""Lebanon: Prospect for National 
Reconciliation in the Mid- 1980s', The Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 38, No.2 (Spring, 1984), p. 268. 
37 the political system. 
The movement used moral and religious language and 
themes based on the Shi ""a tradition of protest. As a 
movement of "Moral"rebirth and community reorganization, it 
was clearly a reaction to the breakdown of rural Lebanon and 
the crisis of the new migrants in the cities. It was also a 
political movement of self-defence against the increasing 
Israeli attacks, and a means of pressuring the state to take 
3 8 
action. 
The movement was largely autonomous, beginning to 
develop its own character in the summer of 1973. But the 
movement grew at a fairly steady pace over several years. 
Occasionally there were periods of intense activity such as 
maas ralliea, religiciue aeiatifatiQns ? pqiit.ip.fji Sflt.ifinS; 
sit-ins, strikes, and the observation of national solidarity 
days. Such major events occurred practically every month 
during 1974 and 1975.^^ 
Following his arrival in tyre from his native Iran in 
1960 to assume the religious leadership position of the 
§hy-'F^ f.RBfliWii-t.y in t.hl^ .gpwt.h/ Im^a Muea al-Sadr soon turned 
into an activist soeial reformer. Ha sought to enter the 
political arena by politicizing his role as a religious 
cleric, a complete departure from customary clerical 
37. Salim Nasr, op-cit., p. 12. 
38. Ibid., p. 12. 
39. Ibid., p. 12. 
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acquiescence. In the midst of the transformation sweeping 
across Lebanon, al-Sadr was appalled by what he described as 
the longtime 'sufferings' (masa'ib) of the Shi'a from 
poverty, disease, and S'unni and Christian prejudice and 
maltreatment. He urged the Shi "a not to accept their lot as 
something predetermined, and set out to achieve social and 
economic justice and political equity through organization. 
For the first time in their history, the Shi "as became 
politically active under their own banner. 
The government's unresponsiveness to deteriorating 
conditions of the Shi'a in the south, and the worsening 
security there because of PLO-Israeli clashes, especially 
following the influx of Palestinians in 1970-1971, led al-
Sadr to launch at a rally in 1974 in Ba'alback in the Bekka 
valley his Movement of the Deprived. He called upon his 
followers to rise up against their oppressors, struggle for 
their rights, and even endure martyrdom if necessary. 
Imam Musa al-Sadr's mobilization strategy threatened 
both the Zu""ama's traditional leadership and the left's hold 
on the young Shi "a. In fact, he showed equal disdain 
toward the Zu'ama's exploitative, corrupt, and self-serving 
practices and the left's secularist, socialist, and pan-Arab 
nationalist rhetoric. His direct appeal to the Shi'a masses 
and his identification with their cause undermined the 
40. Dr. Mahmud A. Faksh, op. cit., p. 41. 
41 . Ibid., pp. 41-42 . 
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Zu'ama'a poaitlon and whittled down the left's 
attractiveness for the young. He had a natural advantage 
over the left by virtue of his standing as the authentic 
42 
spokesman of the community. 
Since his arrival in Lebanon, Imam Musa al-Sadr had 
lobbied for official recognition of the community's 
independence to go beyond the French decree of January 1926, 
which gave it autonomous juridical status and separate 
religious courts. He wanted the establishment of a Shi"a 
religious council similar to the councils of the other 
communities. In November 1967, the Chamber of Deputies 
passed a law enabling the creation of the Supreme Islamic 
Shi'a Council (SISC), a representative body independent of 
Sunni Muslims. Established in 1969, the council is 
basically bureaucratic organization run by Shi'a officials 
who are salaried government employees. It holds supreme 
authority in the conduct of religious affairs and serves to 
articulate Shi"a demands within the system. Its combined 
religious and political functions are a legacy of Imam Musa 
al-Sadr. Al-Sadr was elected its first chairman and held 
the post until his disappearance in 1978 while on a visit 
to Libya. He used his positions in SISC, the Movement of 
the Deprived, and AMAL to claim leadership of the entire 
community, which added to his rising popularity among the 
Shi "a and to his significance in Lebanese politics. 
42 . Ibid., p. 42. 
43. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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But the movement of Imam Musa al-3adr was; by no means 
the only important politicizing force within the Shi'a 
communities. The Communist Party of Lebanon and later the 
Organization of Communist Action recruited heavily among the 
Shi'a. Besides, communist organizations, many young Shi'a 
men joined such groups as the (pro-Syrian) Ba'ath 
organization, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the ( 
Iragi-Supported) Arab Liberation Front (ALF).'*^ The Shi-a of 
the south, the Bekka, and Beirut joined radical 
organizations as early as the late fifties. In the 1950 
parliamentary elections, for example, a candidate of the 
Arab Nationalist Movement in Tyre Muhammad al-Zayyat, who 
was from a poor background, polled more than seven thousand 
votes and seriously challenged the dominance of the 
traditional families' "mafia" in the city. The leftist and 
ostensibly secular organizations appealed to the oppressed, 
Shi"a , who desperately sought a change in their 
conditions. These organizations, along with the Arab 
Socialist Action Party-Lebanon would initiate the Lebanese 
National Resistance Front against the Israeli occupation 
beginning in September 1982. These secular parties, as well 
as the more militantly sectarian Shi'a parties (Islamic 
44 
45 
Jeo Stork, 'The War of the Camps, the War of 
Hostages' MERIP Reports, (June, 1985), p. 4. 
the 
Augustus Richard Norton, Harakat Amal m Edward E. 
Azar, The Emergence of a New Lebanon, New York, 1984, 
p.117. 
46. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, p.45. 
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Amal and Hisbollah), seem to have been responsible for the 
ntnjQvit.y Qf thw ^rm«d ;5(:?tiane ^g/^inst Js»."«eli tovaa& ^nd 
their local collaboratora, for which Amal has been glad to 
take the credit. 
Musa al-Sadr's movements though, crystallized the 
incipient politicization of this community during the years 
leading into the Civil War, when social and political 
struggles in Lebanon were inconsistently conjoined with 
A Q 
sectarian identity. But it was expedient for the Shi's to 
join the secular organizations, since sectarianism was 
basically to the advantage of the Maronite Sunni elite. It 
was unthinkable that the Shi "a would struggle to preserve a 
system that excluded them anyway, it was wiser to call for 
the elimination of sectarianism and the establishment of a 
"secular" arrangement which would certainly reflect their 
49 
numerical superiority. 
The main purpose of the Shi ""a movement in Lebanon was 
to defend a community in crisis- the crisis of breakdown in 
rural Lebanon, of Israeli attacks, of mass rural exodus, and 
of proletarianization. The movement also sought to achieve 
"equality" with other communities within the Lebanese 
confessional system, including a share in the aministration, 
the national budget and the economy 50 
47. Jeo Stork, op. cit., p.4. 
48. Ibid., p.4. 
49. As'ad Abu Hhalil, op. cit., 1985, pp. 45-45. 
50. Salim Nasr, op-cit., p. 13. 
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Two theriies of the movement's discourse stand out. 
First is the re 1atiunship of the cummunity with the state 
and the resulting distribution of wealth. This was often 
discussed in terms of the unfair allocation of government 
posts and civil service jobs, as well as, discriminatory 
economic and social policies (not enough development 
projects or irrigation schemes, limits on tobacco 
production, and so forth). There was also the extreme 
backwardness and poverty of most Shi'a areas and the 
monopoly of a minority over political power. The second 
main theme of the movement was the relationship of the Shi ""a 
community to the Arab-Israeli War. There were constant 
references to the Israeli attacks which concentrated on 
south Lebanon, the need for a national defence, and the 
right and duty of popular self-defence. 
The movement saw change as working to the detriment of 
the Shi'a contributing to their social marginalization, 
their exclusion from power, and the historical backwardness 
of the Shi "a hinterland. The goal was to remove the 
barriers, particularly at the level of state employment, 
development policy and the confessional and regional 
allocation of funds. The Lebanese ruling class and the 
confessional system stood in the way of advancement for the 
Shi'a community- and the dispossessed in general- and 
jeopardised the future of the country itself. 
51. Ibid., p. 13. 
52. Ibid., p. 13. 
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The movement emphasised economic development as a meani 
of bringing south Lebanon and the Ba'lbek region up to the 
level of the rest of the country. Detailed lists of the 
project were proposed, stressing irrigation schemes (dams, 
irrigation networks, reservoirs) and infrastructure 
(schools, hospitals, roads). The movement's view of economic 
development was narrowly conceived. It was short-term and 
regionally limited. Furthermore, the movement saw economic 
development in terms of distribution, not production. It 
demanded a truly proportionate share, seeing the state alone 
53 
as responsible for economic development and backwardness. 
The movement's political programme included: 
A gradual reform of the confessional system, to 
begin by eliminating the confessional distribution 
of civil service posts except at the highest 
executive and legislative levels. 
A chamber of religions to the created alongside 
the chamber of deputies (parliament). This body 
would strike a balance between the sects and 
arbitrate among them. It would meet for one month 
each year to take up cases of discrimination and 
"correct the unequal opportunities" available to 
citizens in their "democratic competition" 
A change in the electoral law to "allow for a 
better representation of the political 
aspirations of the Lebanese public." The proposed 
system was a proportional one, which would clearly 
give the Shl~a a greater voice. 
Overall improvement in the quality and morality 
of political life. As Imam al-Sadr said in late 
1974,"the movement was not established to take 
power or win portfolios or seats in parliament. 
Our purpose is to reform the political climate, 
not to elect politicians. We are struggling 
against corruption and voter intimidation, but it 
is not our role to influence the voter's choice. 
53. Ibid., p. 13. 
54. Ibid., p. 13. 
1 •;! 
THE AMAL; 
Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah (AMAL;Lebanese Resistance 
Battalions) had been founded by Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1975 as 
a militia group, attached to the Movement of the Deprived, 
to protect the community in the Civil War and to defend the 
south which was left largely on its own following the civil 
war. Its creation marked a turning point in the evolution 
of Shi "a power. It transformed the Movement of the Deprived 
into an armed political organization and, in the process, 
superseded it as the major Shi'a politico-military 
organization and one of the leading contender for power and 
influence. Subsequently, the name Mahrumin fell into disuse, 
and the movement that al-Sadr founded came to be known as 
Harakat Amal (or simply, Amal, not, as is sometimes thought, 
al-Amal) . 
The Shi "a community is much more powerful and organized 
than the fragmented Sunni community. Nonetheless, Amal, the 
dominant organization, does not monopolize the political 
leadership of the Shi"a although the movement is developing 
along fascistic lines, whereby all potential rivals are 
being eliminated. Moreover, Amal is far from a typical 
fascistic organization. Much like Fatah, Amal is not a 
cohesive, iron-disciplined organization. It is riddle with 
factionalism and schismatic tensions. The movement's lack of 
a well- defined ideology or Programme makes it difficult for 
members and leaders to adhere to the same set of principles. 
I S i 
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and policies. Muhammad Ghaddar, for example, who was a 
Politburo member and a leader of Amal in al-Ghaziyah, openly 
supported the Israeli invasion of 1982. In contrast to 
Ghaddar, another Amal regional leader in Sidon, Mahmud al-
Faqih, has consistently opposed the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon. These two examples illustrate that Amal's various 
geographical branches are not tied to a central ideological 
and political position, but rather are subject to the 
particularist tendencies of each region 56 
Amal was successful in recruiting some of the Shi"a 
masses by advocating armed struggle. It was supported and 
funded by Fatah and by Syria, through the Sa ' igah 
organization, presumably to confront and limit the strong 
sweeping leftist tide in Lebanon, of which both parties were 
fearful. Initially Fatah also imparted training to Amal 
militia. Amal was affiliated with the reform-oriented 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and their fedayeen allies 
during the first year of the civil war, but when the Syrians 
intervened in June 1976 to prevent the defeat of the 
Maronite-dominated Lebanese Front, al-Sadr split with his 
erstwhile allies and staunchly supported the Syrians. It 
was a minor component of LNM, overshadowed by the military 
might of its many Competitors. Musa al-Sadr only led a 
minority faction of the politically affiliated Shi~a. 
55. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, p. 45. 
56. Ibid., p. 48-
Indeed, it was the multiconfeaaional reform-oriented or 
revolutionary parties and militias that attracted the 
majority of the politicized Shi-a. Amal's still limited 
appeal even among Shi'a was evident in June 1976, when the 
PLO-LNM forces were able to take over all Amal bases in 
only two days. Moreover, Amal lost much of its popularity 
and credibility as a result of its close association with 
the Syrian regime during the war. More than that many Shi'a 
questioned the suspicious role played by the Amal during the 
battle of the Palestinian-held Shi^a quarter of Beirut, 
known as al Nab'ah in August 1976, when the Phalangists 
drove thousands of Shi "a from that district. Muhammad 
Yagub, who disappeared with al-Sadr in Libya in 1978, was 
blamed for trusting- or collaborating with the Phalangists 
c g 
during the evacuation negotiations. Thus, Amal's influence 
waned considerably in the 1976-78 period. 
Amal's resurgence can be located in a series of 
developments between March 1978 and February 1979: the 
Israeli invasion known as Operation Litani; the 
disappearance of Musa-al Sadr on a trip to Libya, and the 
success of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. 
1. Operation Litani marked an important shift of Israeli 
policy, under the new likud government, from one of 
retaliation to "relentless disruption" across south 
57. Joe Stork, op. cit., p. 4. 
58. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, pp. 46-47. 
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Lebanon. The significant conaecjuence of the Israeli 
Defence Force (IDF's) offensive was that residents of 
the south were constantly reminded that a continuing 
Palestinian presence in the region would preclude any 
surcease to the Israeli campaign. Repeated raids had 
the intended effect of fostering anti-Palestinian 
sentiments among the local population. Rather than 
casting blame on the Israeli-as had been the case in 
the past-the cause of the villagers plight was often 
said to be the Palestinians. In the south, 
Palestinians in general were increasingly viewed as 
interlopers, responsible for the periodic devastating 
Israeli attacks. Fatah and other PLO forces 
contributed to this process by alienating southerners 
with their arrogance and "excesses". This helped to 
close off the south to recruitment by the Lebanese 
groups allied with the PLO, restricting access to Amal. 
Second, person affiliated with the LNM tended to stay 
away from their villages, due to frequent raids, and 
hence from additional recruits. Third, heretofore 
apolitical villagers learned that the best protection 
against unwanted early morning visitors was affiliation 
with a movement (viz Amal) that would prevent 
"undesirable" from entering their villages. In a 
Augustus Richard Norton, op. cit., 1984, p. 173. 
Ibid., p. 174. 
Ibid., p. 173. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
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number of towns and villages, local residents even 
established their, own local security forces, which 
would petrol during the hours of darkness. Over time, 
these ad hoc militia groups tended to affiliate with 
Amal . 62 
2. Accompanied by two associates. Sheikh Muhammed Shahadeh 
Ya'gub and Shafi'Abbas Badr al-Din, Musa al-Sadr 
arrived in Libya on August 25, 1978, for visit of 
unspecified length and purpose. According to an 
account, the Imam Musa decided to leave Libya on August 
31, 1978, the eve of the Libyan national holiday 
commemorating the September 1, 1970 Revolution. Musa 
al-Sadr has not been heard from since, although 
occasional reports of dubious origins indicate that he 
is still alive. Most impartial observers believe him 
to be dead, as do a good number of his followers- when 
6 3 
speaking privately. 
While the mystery of Musa al-Sadr's fate remains, his 
disappearance has been of enormous symbolic importance 
to Amal. His persona has been elevated to that of a 
national martyr for many of Lebanon's Shi'a. By 1979, 
his face had been added to the panoply of posters that 
testify to the multitude of causes and movements in 
Lebanon. The movement's newspaper,Amal, uses a picture 
Ibid., pp. 173-174. 
Ibid., p. 175. 
62 
63, 
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of Imam Muaa on ita maathead and regularly reprinta hia 
speeches and commentary. Most of the younger members 
of Amal wear a button or a pendant with al-Sadr~s 
visage on it, and some even sport silk-screened t-
shirts depicting him. Moreover, his disappearance 
reminded Lebanese Shi~a of the ghaybah (absence) of 
their twelfth Imam. According to Shi'a religious 
tradition, the twelfth Imam, who disappeared in the 
ninth century, will return one day to rescue his 
people. The disappearance of al-Sadr revived this 
belief, and raises hopes. Like the twelfth Imam, al-
Mahdi al-Muntazar (d 878) (the Awaited Guide), al-Sadr 
6 R is believed to be on his way back to his people. All 
this worked to benefit Amal, further enhancing Shi "a 
community mobilization and assertiveness. More than a 
few Amal leaders concede that a "disappeared" Imam is 
doubtlessly of greater value for the political 
mobilization of the masses than a "present" one 66 
3. A third ingredient in Amal's revival was the success of 
the Iranian Revolution and the triumph of a 
specifically Shi'a model of political power. There is 
no question that the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran was keenly effective among the Shi"a of 
Lebanon. The deposition of the Shah in January 1979 
64. Ibid., p. 177. 
65. As'ad Abu Khalil, op, cit., 1985, p. 48. 
66. AugustuiJ Richard Norton, op. cit., 1984, p. 177. 
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E2eryed as an important exemplar demonstrating what a 
pious, well organized, and motivated ummah could 
accomplish in the face of oppression and injustice. 
Even more important, the new regime in Tehran promised 
to be an important source of material and political 
support. Even in the event that the Iranian 
Government provided no more than rhetorical support, 
the very fact that the Islamic Revolution's success has 
been an important source of pride and inspiration to 
ft fi the Lebanese coreligionists. 
There has been close relationship between Tehran and 
the Lebanese Shi"a community. One interesting example of 
that relationship is the case of Doctor Mustafa Chamran. 
Chamran, an Iranian, was the director of the Burj Ash-
Shamali Technical Institute- which was probably partially 
financed with Iranian monies-until 1979, when he departed 
Lebanon to become a member of the Supreme Defence Council in 
the new Islamic Government. While it is not illogical to 
presume that such a well-placed official would have been of 
immeasurable assistance in securing substantial assistance 
for Amal. 69 
Moreover, the Shi'a of Lebanon were increasingly 
alienated by the policies and conduct of the PLO and the 
67. Ibid., p. 178. 
68. Ibid., p. 178. 
69. Ibid., p. 178. 
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Lebanese National Movement Organizations. The slogans of 
these organizations did not particularly address Shi'a 
demands for more political and economic power. Indeed, the 
policies of the two movements were dictated more by regional 
mathematics than by purely Lebanese conditions. The 
showmanship and corruption of the leadership of the PLO and 
the Lebanese National Movement dealt a heavy blow to the few 
who maintained some hope and progressive vision. The 
situation in the south was particularly severe, where the 
"Azmis' of the "Revolution" who in the name of that 
"Revolution" committed ugly acts of theft, crimes, rape and 
7 0 
oppression dominated the region. Moreover, there was 
general Lebanese perception, particularly acute among Shi"a 
that the Lebanese National Movement and its programme of 
deconfessionalization had failed, not only against its 
Phalangist, Syrian and Israeli adversaries but also within 
the component of the movement. The movement had lost its 
momentum and potential. Amal exploited the climate to 
mobilize the disenchanted Shi ""a along chauvinist Lebanese 
and sectarian Shi-a lines. 
Amal today is the major , mainstream political 
organization representing the Shi'a of Lebanon. The secret 
of its strengh lies in the movement's extention to all 
regions inhabited by Shi"a: the Bekka, the south, and Beirut 
and its suburs. However, to underline the broad geographical 
70. As'ad Abu Khalil , op. cit., 1985, p. 47. 
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base of the movement is not to attribute cohesive bonds to 
ranks and file or leadership or to dismiss the schismatic 
implications of its strong particularistic tendencies. The 
Amal movement resembles the past organizational structure of 
Fatah in Lebanon. It advocates an ill-defined and vague 
ideology, which is often expressed in general and ambiguous 
terms. This feature is far from being a weakness within the 
rapidly changing nature of the Lebanese context and masses: 
it makes Amal more able to adjust to the growing radical 
mood of the Shi'a. Amal can easily swing with the Shi'a 
popular wind. Amal also manages to support a leader who 
enjoys the endorsement of conflictual cliques within the 
ruling elite. As in Fatah, an Amal regional leader cares 
very little about policy consistency, because recruitment in 
a particular area draws heavily upon a certain regional 
context. Muhammad Ghaddar, for example, who was a politburo 
member and a leader of Amal in al-Ghaziyah, as already 
mentioned, openly supported the Israeli invasion of 1982. 
In contrast to Ghaddar, another Amal regional leader in 
Sidon, Mahmud al-Faqih, has consistently opposed to Israeli 
occupation of Lebanon. These two examples illustrate tnat 
Amal's various geographical branches are not tied to a 
central ideological and political position, but rather are 
subject to the particularist tendencies of each region. 
The Amal movement has adjusted successfully to the 
71 . Ibid., p. 48 
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changing political situation of the country. As close as it 
was to the Syrian- sponsored National Salvation Front, Amal 
refused to join it, in order to maintain an image of 
relative independence in political action. It also refused 
to join the National Democratic Front, which includes all 
the pro-Syrian Organizations in the country, in order not to 
associate itself with the enemies of the past: the Lebanese 
communists, with whom it fought several battles prior to the 
Israeli invasion. 
The single most important event in the history of the 
emergence of Shi'a fundamentalist groups in Lebanon was the 
creation of the Salvation Committee by president Ilyas 
Sarkis in June 1982. Sarkis formed the Committee, which 
included Bashir Gemayel and Nabi Berri among others to face 
the repurcussions of the Israeli invasion- Berri's 
membership in the Committee reinforced the rift in the Amal 
Movement between Berri's faction and those who were pushing 
for more hard-line Islamic line in accordance with Iranian 
designs in Lebanon. Husayn al-Musawi, a key leading figure 
in Amal (Member of AMAL's Command Council) at the time, 
objected to Berri's acceptance of membership in the 
Committee and called for Iranian arbitration of the matter. 
The issue was referred to the Iranian ambassador in Damascus 
at the time. All Akbar Muhtashimi, who ruled in favour of 
Musawi and stated that it was inappropriate for Berri to 
72. Ibid., pp. 48--19 
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accept to ha a aambev of a Committee that included, among 
others, Bashir Gemayel. Berri did not abide by the Iranian 
ruling, and Musawi resigned and formed his own Islamic Amal 
movement. 73 
Al-Musawi comes from a middle-class background, but 
from a prestigious family that claims descent from the 
Prophet (a sayyid family). Al-Musawi is a former school 
teacher whom al-Sadr expelled from Amal in the mid-seventies 
because of his insistence on establishing an Islamic 
republic in Lebanon. He represented a complete departure, 
from the original Amal line in that he broke with the 
traditional Shi~a line of Lebanese patriotism- as 
represented by Sadr- and his wish to mobilize the community 
for the cause of a world-wide Islamic revolution. Musawi's 
line, in fact, amounted to a total rejection of the Lebanese 
75 political system of religious pluralism because it "does 
not belong to the Islamic Umma (Community of believers) 
73. As'ad Abu Khalil, "Ideology and Practice of Hizbollah 
in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational 
Principles', Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 27, No. 3, 
(July 1991), p. 391. 
74. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, p. 49. In 1978, 
Musawi was transferred from the Ministry of Education 
to the Higher Shi "a Council, where he remained until 
his rift with Berri. Despite his reputation for 
Charismatic leadership his influence has been limited 
to the Ba^albek and Zahla regions. 
75. Olmert Yosef, op. cit., p 673. 
76. Marium Deeb, Militant Islamic Movement in Lebanon: 
Origins, Social Basis and Ideology, Wasington, D.C. 
(November, 19 86), p. d. As cited m Vaziri, Haleh, op. 
cit., p. 9 . 
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and the legitimacy of the Lebanese state. ' He accused 
AMAL's leadership under Berri of moderation toward, and even 
collaboration with Israel and charged it of secularism and 
7 8 in violation of its Islamic base. 
Musawi embraced Khomeini's ideology, including the 
Ayatollah's interpretation of "the guardianship of the 
jurisconsult" [Wilayat-al-Fagih ] . He believes that Khomeini 
was the deputy of the Hidden Imam and that the Iranian 
leader was divinely empowered to determine the 
compatibility of temporal and religious laws. Thus, the 
relationship between Islamic AMAL and Iran was not simply a 
political one between a patron state and a client 
organization. 
Rather, their relationship has existed within the 
context of Wilayat-al-Faqih and resembles the bond between 
father and son. Consequently, Musawi welcomed the Pasdaran 
presence in Ba'albek and understood their dual objective as 
the dissemination of the call of Islam, and victory against 
Israel.^^ 
77. Olmert Yosef, op. cit., p. 573. 
78. Dr. Mahmud A Faksh, op. cit., p. 51. 
79. Haleh Vaziri, "Iran's Involvement in Lebannon : 
Polarization and Radicalization of Militant Islamic 
Movement' Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Winter, 1992), p. 9. 
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HIZBQLLAH: 
Hizbollah (party of God) came into being in 1962, in 
the wake of Israeli invasion, at the initiative of a group 
8 0 
of Islamic 'Ulama' close to Muhammad Husayn Fadlullah. The 
role of Fadlullah in the establishment of Hizbollah is still 
8 1 
unclear. One account maintained that he preferred to have 
Muslim Shi'a fundamentalists working within the body of the 
Amal movement in order to reach the broadest possible 
audience in the Shi"a community. But the tide of pro-
Iranian sentiments within the Shi'a community was growing at 
a pace that could not be restrained within the confines of 
Amal's alliance with the Syrian regime. Furthermore, Iran 
wanted to have a loyal and obedient organization in Lebanon 
to further its influence amongst the Shi "a and to strike at 
its many enemies. The presence of Israeli troops and US 
marines in Lebanon added another incentive for direct 
8 2 Iranian involvement in Lebanon. 
80. Fadlullah is a noted religious scholar who has 
published more than twenty books in the area of Islamic 
jurisprudence. He was born in the village of 'Ayanta' 
in the South Lebanon, near the Israeli border. He 
studied in Shi"a religious schools in al- Najaf in 
Iraq. When he finished his education, Fadlullah lived 
in a Shi-a neighourhood in East Beirut: al-Nabah. In 
1976 the Phalanglat forced evicted all Shi'a from al-
Nabah in a bloody military campaign that cost Fadlullah 
members of his immediate family-
81. Fadlullah denied that he is the leader of the movement, 
yet acknowledged his influence amonq Lebanese Shi "a. 
He has been called the organiration'5 "Supreme Guide" -
the same title given to Khomeini in context of Iran's 
Islamic Republic. 
82. As'ad Abu Khalll, op. clt., 1991, p. 390. 
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Lacking any .official structure or mambership list, 
Hizbollah is not a political party in the Western sense, 
although it served many of the same purposes. It was similar 
in "structure" to the religious organizations in Iran, its 
membership fluid and dependent upon the message and personal 
appeal of religious leaders. Musawi said of it,"Hizbo1lah 
is the people's march. It is a popular state. In other 
words, every believer who fights Israel in the south and who 
defends the honour of the Muslims in Beirut or the Bekka 
valley and has links with the Islamic revolution belongs to 
Hizbollah .... We [in Islamic Amal] work for Islam and are 
bound to the Islamic revolution. Therefore, we are part of 
Hizbollah „ 83 
The word hizb in Arabic does not have the same 
connotation that the word party has in English. According 
to classical origins of the root of the word, hizb means a 
community, sect, or a group of followers. However, 
Hizbollah ideology emphasized the Quranic Origins of its 
political terminology. Almost all of the political terms 
that the party uses in its political literature are derived 
from the Quran, one Hizbollah leader states that most of the 
activities and 'movement' of Muslims should be based on the 
Quranic Ayats. However, the claim that all policies and 
actions of the Party of God are derived from the Quran is 
not persuasive-
33. Wright Robin, Sacred Rage, London, 1986, p. 82. 
3J. Ibid., pp. 39:-393. 
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While it is true that the term Hizbollah appears in the 
Quran in more than one instance, the context of its use is 
different from its current use by the Party. In Surat al-
Ma ' idah (Ayat 56) it is stated that 'Hizbollah are sure to 
triumph.' Tabari interpreted the term Hizbollah as Allah's 
followers or supporters. The term Hizbollah also appears 
with the same connotation in Surat al-Mujadilah (Ayat 22). 
Tabari interpreted the term Hizbollah in the latter Surat to 
mean the soldiers of God. There is no evidence that the 
Quranic text implied an organizational structure from Muslim 
activists, as Hizbollah ideologues argue today. 
The ideology of Hizbollah is also based on the 
attachment to the leadership of the Ulama in Muslim society. 
The task of citing religious text in Islam to prove that the 
religion required Muslims to abide by the ruling and orders 
of their leaders is not difficult. A well-known Hadith by 
Prophet Muhammad (the Ulama are the heirs of the prophets) 
is used by the ideologists of Hizbollah to justify the 
leadership structures of Hizbollah in which the Ulama play 
the major role. In the highest ruling body of the Party of 
God, Majlis ash- Shura, only one non-clerical persons is 
reported to be a member. The emphasis on the roles of the 
Ulama in society is a fundamental feature of the ideology of 
the Party of God- The leaders of the Party of God believe 
85. Ibid., p. 393. 
86. Ibid., p. 393. 
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that the Ulaffia alone can bring about Islamic conac i outness;, 
or what is called 'the conciousness of unification', in the 
terminology of the Party. This belief accounts for the 
exclusive powers that the Ulama have in the party, and which 
makes them unaccountable for their deeds. Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Amin sees the powers of the Ulama as unlimited 87 
In Hizbollah's ideology, injustice is caused by people; 
it is the result of what some people do to others. 
Hizbollah believes that justice and equality can be achieved 
R 8 through human efforts, through a revolutionary process. 
Fadlullah discarded the notion of Tagiya and advocated armed 
struggle against Muslim governments which stray from 
religious tenets. Specially, he urged Muslims to organize 
along party lines and to take up arms against such 
y Q 
governments. Hizbollah represents a revolutionary version 
of Shi'a Islam. The conservative and orthodox Shi ""a 
theological school believes that justice and equality can 
only be achieved with the return of the twelfth Imam. The 
concept of Wilavat al - Faqih calls for a political 
revolution to establish Islamic order headed by the Deputy 
of Imam on earth 9C 
87. Ibid., p. 394. 
88. Ibid., p. 395. 
89. Haleh Vaziri, op. cit., p. 10. 
90. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit-, 1991, pp. 395-396. 
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The relicfio - political doctrine that appears to 
motivate the entire Shi~a religious elite in Lebanon today 
is the Shi~a notion of Wilayat al-Faqih (the Guardianship of 
the Jurisconsult). In the theological heritage of the 
twelvers Shi~a to whom the Shi "a of Lebanon and Iran belong, 
there are basically two theories as to what the Shi~a should 
do in the absence of the twelfth Imam (Ghaybat al-Imam), 
who, according to Shi'a religious tradition vanished in the 
ninth century but will return to save his people. The 
first theory suggest that Muslims should rule according to 
the Quranic principle of al-Shura (Consultation), whereby it 
is not important who the ruler is. This theory holds that an 
Islamic order is impossible as long as the twelfth Imam is 
in his occultational absence. The second jurisprudent 
school introduces the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, where 
the ultimate source of power and legislation is in the hands 
of the Faqih (jurisconsult), who should combine a knowledge 
of Islam with a sense of justice. Some years ago, many 
Lebanese and Iranian jurisprudents advocated the notion of 
al-Shura rather than that of Wilayat al-Faqih..^^ Fadlullah 
speaks of majority rule, yet his ideas are elitist. He 
believes that the majority's opinion is not necessarily 
"right" and that the principle of consultation (Shura ) has 
little to do with democracy. *• The Iranian revolution 
persuaded many jurisprudents of the validity of the latter 
91. As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, pp. 50-51. 
92. Haleh Vaziri, op. cit., p. 11. 
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doctrine. In Lebanon today there exists a consensus among 
Shi'a jurisprudents on the advocation of Wilayat al-
Faqlh.^-^ 
Fadlullah has been less willing than Islamic Amal's 
Musawi to embrance whole-heartedly the idea of an Islamic 
republic in Beirut. Fadlullah commented on the possibility 
of establishing an Iranian-style theocracy in 1985 
interview: 
The Iranian leaders are not thinking of an Islamic 
Lebanon in the least as the media reported. There 
are some differences... We [the Lebanese] do not 
have sufficient and necessary conditions for an 
Islamic Republic. 
The following of Hizbollah mushroomed as both the 
Iranians and their local allies indoctrinated the young and 
the poor Shi'a peasants through films and "ideological 
seminars." The decorous Ran el Ain Mosque soon blazoned a 
sign: "Martyrdom* headquarters". And banners and signs in 
the streets declaimed: "Death to America," "Martyrdom is 
the aim and hope of God's worshipers" and "Our revolution is 
Islamic before being Iranian, and it is the revolution of 
the oppressed throughout the world. 95 
The fundamentalist- militant groups activated the 
Shi'a doctrine of martyrdom and self-sacrifice against 
93 
94 , 
95. 
As'ad Abu Khalil, op. cit., 1985, p. 51. 
George Nader, 'Interview with Sheikh Muhammad Husayn 
Fadlullah' Middle East Insicht, Vol, 4. bio.2. 
(June/July 1985), p. 51. 
Wright Robin, op. cit-, p. 82. 
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oppreeeion and operationalized it into direct action. Young 
Shi-a were exhorted to emulate the much-celebrated martyrdom 
of Imam Husayn by staging suicide attacks on Israeli and 
Western targets in Lebanon. Suicide car bombings were 
carried out against the Israeli forces in November 1983 and 
continued through 1985, even after their withdrawal to their 
self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon along 
Israel's border. The attacks boosted the image of the 
radical groups as the most prominent element in compelling 
Israeli's retreat. Similarly, the US and Western troops in 
Lebanon were primary target. A series of suicide bombing 
were staged in 1983-84 against the OS embassy and the US and 
French military compounds, prompting the withdrawal of the 
(MNF) Multi National Force in 1984 and the termination of 
9 7 Western influence in Lebanon. 
The ideological and political gap between Amal and 
Hizbollah had led to armed disagreements between them that 
96. In the language of Qur'an, Martyrdom consists of three 
elements- namely, eternity, continuous movement towards 
God, and charismatic leadership as embodied in the 
Imamate. The Shi'a have a rich history of martyrs. 
However, the martyrdom of Husayn is considered most 
important. Husayn died in 680 A.D., on the day of 
"Ashura"- the tenth day of Muharram-while battling 
injustice inflicted on the Muslim community by Yazid 
and his father Mua ' wiyya, the founder of the Umayyid 
Dynasty in Damascus. Like his father 'Ali', Husayn 
rebelled against the Umayyid. For ten days, Husayn and 
his followers fought in the desert, without food and 
water, to repel the daily attacks of Umayyid loyalists. 
In the end, the Umayyid loyalists triumphed, 
decapitating Husayn's followers and imprisoning women 
and children- Husayn's martyrdom symbolized the Shi""a 
struggle against encroachment and the readiness to 
embrace death. 
97. Dr. Mahmud A. Faksh, op. cit., pp. 51-52. 
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have become a common place since 1985. Tensions were 
exacerbated by the June-July, 1985 TWA hijacking and by the 
holding of Western hostages by some radical Shi-a groups 
linked to Hizbo1lah,which AMAL opposed. The kidnapping in 
February 1988 of US Lieutenant-Colonel William Higgins, head 
of the UN observers team in Lebanon, resulted in clashes 
between Amal and Hizbollah forces in the south and in 
Beirut. Fighting broke out again in December 1939 and 
continued through early 1990 in Iglim al- Tuffah (southeast 
of Sidon) for control of strategic Shi'a villages adjacent 
to the Israeli security zone. Amal has always strongly 
resisted Hizbollah's attempts to establish a foothold in 
southern Lebanon, where Amal is the major political and 
military power. It fears that Hizbollah, under the pretext 
of continuing the struggle against the Israeli- controlled 
zone, could radicalize the Shi~a of the south and thereby 
undermine its position there. In fact, the presence of 
Israel in the security zone, following its withdrawal in the 
summer 1985, has continued to provide the basis for violent 
Israeli-Shi"a confrontation that is playing into the hands 
of Hizbollah. Despite the radical' mounting threat to 
Berri, however, Amal retains widespread Shi "a allegiance, 
enhanced by Syrian backing, even as Syria maintains its 
q Q 
alliance with Iran- still Hizbollah's main benefactor. 
The Shi "a community has come far since its days as a 
downtrodden, guietist minority. Over the past three decades 
98. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
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it has grown into the biggest, most vigorous militant 
community. Now it boasts the largest number of believers in 
Lebanon's sectarian structure and is a contender for power 
with the Maronites, who are declining in numbers and 
position. Increasingly, the Shi-a are likely to become the 
inheritors of Lebanon, as their pre-eminence in the 
country's confessional configuration is felt more and more. 
Although the Ta'if accord of 1989 enhanced the 
political role established for the speaker, traditionally a 
Shi'a Muslim who will serve a four- year term. Now the 
nomination of a prime minister by the president would 
require consultation with the speaker who conveys the 
99 
results of binding parliamentary consultations. But the 
political claims of the Shi-a were blunted in the Ta'if 
accord in favour of the Sunni Muslims. The Shi-a gained 
only three of the new appointive seats given to them, like 
the Sunni Muslims, a total of 22 seats.•'•°'^ The Shi-a 
challenge ahead is to translate their strength into actual 
political power. This can be done only through a united 
Lebanon. Indeed, the best guarantee of Shi-a interests is a 
strong and independent state. It is to the Shi-a advantage 
to work toward a state with a powerful central government. 
Only in this way could they preserve their primacy. 
99. Augustus Richad Norton,-Lebanon after Ta-if: Is the 
Civil War Over ?' Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, 
(Summer, 1991), p. 463. Before Ta-if accor::, zhe 
speaker served a one year term and was decidedly 
subordinate to both the prime minister and the 
President. 
100. Ibid., p. 464. 
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THE CIVIL WAR 
The causes of Lebanese Civil War 1975-90 remained to be 
resolved. But it has become clear to Lebanon's observers 
that the war in Lebanon is multi-dimensional; the 
combination of foreign forces and intervention have 
intensified the conflict among the Lebanese. This is not to 
say that the causes of the Lebanese war are purely external 
in their origins: the Lebanese civil wars are primarily the 
result of domestic and indigenous conditions that have 
shaped the political cultures and socio-economic formations 
of the Lebanese confessional communities. The Lebanese are 
responsible for the tragedy that befell their small country. 
As hard as they try to absolve themselves from that 
responsibility, and as long as they blame their ills on 
others, an understanding of the war will be obfuscated. The 
Lebanese wounds are self-inflicted, but the "outsiders," as 
the Lebanese denote non-Lebanese powers, added salt to these 
wounds, thereby compounding the pains and delaying recovery. 
The internal factors responsible for the conflict are 
inherently rooted in the Lebanese socio-conomic and 
political structure. These factors were primarily 
responsible in polarizing the Lebanese population into two 
opposing camps. Three such internal factors can be 
identified that were instrumental in leading upto a 
situation of civil war. These are: (1) The emergency of Clan 
divisions in Lebanese society and the coincidence of this 
2u; 
diviaion with the existing religious divisions in Lebanon 
(2) The rigidity of the Political system and (3) presence of 
a large number of armed Palestinians. The interrelationship 
between these three factors is complex and multidimensional 
and none of these factors operated to the total exlusion of 
the other at any point of time. Rather, each factor acted 
upon and reinforced the others and the sum total of the 
interactions of these three factors had the effect of 
dividing Lebanon into two irreconcilable and hostile camps, 
standing on the brink of civil war by the mid-seventies. 
THE EMERGENCY OF CLAN AND COMMUNAL DIVISIONS: 
Instead of integrating the various sects more firmly 
into the national economic life, economic development in 
Lebanon after 1943, has had differing impacts on the 
Christians and Muslims. Consequently the class division 
which emerged broadly coincided with the religious 
divisions. 
The most significant aspect of the Lebanese economy 
before independence was the predominance of service sector 
(banking,transport, managerial service, communication 
facilities, tourism and hotels). The Christian sects played 
a dominant role in this regard. A class of the wealthy 
traders mostly Christians, engaged in export and import had 
already established themselves in the port city of Beirut 
prior to the French mandate. Under French mandatory 
iiuthority Lebanon rapidly became an entrepot and a centra of 
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traneahlpmant fur We£;tern cfooda and for the raw material 
exported to Europe. Consequently a new class of agents, 
representatives and functionaries of Western capitalist 
interests, which was once again predominantly Christian, 
emerged in Lebanon. This class allied itself with the 
successful import-export merchants and the semi feudal 
landlords who were slowly turning to the commercial, export-
oriented agriculture. Alongwith French mandatory authorities 
who protected French capitalist interests, these three 
segments became the ruling classes of Lebanon. 
Thus the Christians were the most powerful economic 
group in Lebanon at the time of independence. By virtue of 
their economic strength, members of the ruling class by and 
large came from the Christian community. A white collar 
urban middle class also existed at the time of independence. 
This class had arisen with the growth of Western, especially 
French, investments in Lebanon. In part because they were 
favoured and also because they spoke the language of the 
foreigners. This middle class was also principally 
Christian.^ 
The post independence era enhanced the position of the 
Christians economically primarily because of two reasons. 
First, the economy of Lebanon was founded on the raison 
1. Samih Farsoun and Walter Carrol, 'The Civil War in 
Lebanon : Sect, class and Imperialism", Monthly Review, 
(New York), vol. 28, no.2, June 1976, p.18. 
2 - Ibid. , p. 19. 
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d'etre of laieees faire, laissez passer',i . e . , total free 
enterprise for all and almost no governmental intervention 
in the economy. Second, the fortuitous operation of a 
number of external factors which increased the dominance of 
the service sector in the economy stil further. 
The creation of Israel in 1948 was the most important 
of these external factors. With the creation of Israel, 
Lebanon inherited all of Palestines regional economic 
functions due to the Arab boycott of Israel. The Arab 
boycott gave an impetus to Beirut port and the Beirut 
international airport as well as an added appeal to the 
Lebanese schools and hospitals for Palestinian and 
TransJordanian students and patients. Banking and other 
services were also shifted to Beirut from Jerusalem and the 
tourist business of the Holy Land began to be routed through 
Lebanon and Jordan. The creation of Israel turned out to be 
effective and overshadowed the Lebanese economy. About 
1,50,000 Palestinian refugees were forced to take shelter in 
Lebanon. But all of them were not unskilled "camp' dwellers. 
Many of them possessed highly specialized skills which in 
later years helped to attract a large number of foreign-
based companies to Lebanon. Moreover, the Palestinian camps 
provided an inexhaustible supply of cheap labour not covered 
by state labour legislation and social security. Moreover, 
3. N. Kliot, 'The Collapse of the Lebanese State', Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 , (January, 1987), p.67, 
J. V. Alanov, 'Origins of Lebanon's Tragedy", 
International Affairs , No.8, (August , 1979), p.Jl. 
20 ,^ 
the Iraq Petroleura Company, which until May 1948 had U£;ed 
Haifa in Palestine as an outlet for part of its Petroleum 
exports, now chose Tripoli in Lebanon as its new outlet, 
upon the stoppage of the flow of oil through Israel. 
Similarly ARAMCO used South Lebanon as an outlet for part of 
its Saudi Oil export, by building a pipeline in 1957 from 
Saudi Arabia to Lebanon via Jordan and Syria. 
Another significant factor which served to increase the 
role of service sector and consequently strengthen further 
the Christian dominance in the economy was the mobilization 
of capital from Egypt, Syria and Iraq into Lebanon as a 
result of coup d'etats and the subsequent nationalisation of 
the economy of these three countries. 
Another external factor which gave an impetus to the 
service-sector was the post-war oil-boom that took place in 
the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf region. As a result of 
this huge inflow of foreign exchange since the early fifties 
poured in at the time when the region had very low 
absorptive and productive capacity. In contrast Lebanon was 
well-known in the region for its more advanced financial 
structure. This resulted in the direction of vast sums into 
Beirut's money market. Bank deposits rose from L 215 
million at the end of 1950 to L9,106 million by the end of 
1974. The vast majority of the banks were in the hands of 
5. Yusuf A. Sayigh, The Economic of the Arab World, 
London, 1978, p.285. 
6. Ibid., p.289. 
7. Ibid., p.289. 
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the Chtietiane. The fact that funds were concentrated in the 
hands of one religious cornruunity assured their invest-iiient in 
that community's industrial, agricultural, commercial and 
construction enterprises. 
The service sector accounted for 67 percent of the 
total national income in 1968 whereas this sector employed 
only 32 per cent of the total labour force. It was followed 
by industrial sector with the share of 22 percent and 
agriculture by only 11 percent. Simultaneously 50 percent of 
g 
the population derived their income from agriculture. 
The capital influx into Lebanon created a strong 
dynamism in the banking sector which in turn helped in 
promoting real estate, hotel, tourist, and construction 
industry, while the service-sector boomed, the agriculture 
sector of the economy on which the majority of the Lebanese 
Muslims depended, continued to stagnate. Hence agriculture 
remained as the most neglected sector. This resulted in the 
sectoral imbalances in Lebanon as it was highlighted by a 
study conducted by the Institute de-Recherches et de 
Formation en Vue de Development (IRFED) in 1960. This study 
classified 70 percent of the localities dominated by 
Christians in Beirut and Mount Lebanon as being in the 
8. Fuad I. Khuri, 'The Social Dynamics of the 1975-77 War 
in Lebanon, Armed Forces and Society , Vol.7, No.3, 
spring 1981, p.390. 
9. David C. Smock and Audrey Smock, The Politics of 
Pluralism: A comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana , 
New York, 1975, p.79. 
20 S 
developed cateciory and only 5 percent as under-deve 1 oped. 
While 46 per cent of the localities in the North, 35 percent 
in Bekka and 30 per cent in the South were underdeveloped. 
In Bekka and South Lebanon (inhabited predominantly by 
Shi'a) 70 percent of the populace lives in the countryside 
whereas in the North (which is Sunni), it is slightly lower 
at 55 percent. These regions have the highest proportion 
of people depending on agriculture as their source of income 
and therefore have the lowest income as was estimatd at 
1 2 $3580 in the 1960's. Thus the sectarian implications of 
the lopsided economic development becomes evident. The 
position of Muslims was slightly better but the Christian 
13 
community dominated in the industrial sector. 
The uneven economic development brought about a steady 
flow of Muslim migrants from the rural to the urban areas. 
The population of Beirut, for instance, rose from 250,000 in 
the early 1950's to 1.4 million in 1975 when the Lebanese 
civil war started and the rural to urban migration coutinued 
to increase until the rural population came down from 65 
percent at which it had stood after World War II to no more 
than 17 percent of the total population at the time outbreak 
10. Ibid. , p.97. 
11. Mechael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The 
Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture (New York, 
1967) , p.34 . 
12. Samih Farsoun and Walter Carrol, op.cit., p.20. 
13. Yusuf A. Sayigh, Entrepreneurs of Lebanon , Cambridge 
1967, pp 69-80. 
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14 of Civil War.'"'' Rural to urban migration of Musliwis was 
partly the result of the development in agriculture of 
export-oriented fruit and vegetable farming which is 
different from the old type of agriculture producing cereals 
and requires intensive cultivation and greater investment of 
captial. Consequently urban capitalists came to have a 
dominant position in agriculture either by means of 
ownership of fruit and vegetable orchards or by control of 
marketing of the produce of such farm. This development 
led to a majority of Shi'a and Sunni peasantry being 
displaced from their small land holdings who consequently 
flocked to the cities in search of livelihood. 
The migrant Muslims tended to settle in sectarian 
clusters which underscored the link between religious and 
class affiliation. With the pasage of time two poverty belts 
inhabited predominantly by Muslims sprang up in Lebanon. One 
surrounding the country itself and other surrounding Beirut. 
The poverty belt surrounding the country included the 
southern region, the Akkar region of the North and Bekka. 
These impoverised areas surrounded the prosperous Christian 
Mount Lebanon. Muslim migrants coming to Beirut from these 
regions formed another poverty belt around Beirut which 
14. Jamal Toubi, "Social Dynamics in War-torn Lebanon", The 
Jerusalem Quarterly , (Jerusalem), no.17, Fall 19S0, 
p. 95. 
15. Georges Hakim, "The Economic Basis of Lebanese Polity", 
in Binder ed. no.6, pp. 59-60. 
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surrounded the rich Christian neighbourhoods in the centre 
of the city.^^ 
The economic growth in Lebanon was initiated by the 
private sector whereas the public sector remained relatively 
small and inefficient. On account of predominance of the 
private sector in the field of education, health and housing 
services were available to only those who could afford it. 
The high cost at which these services were provided by the 
private sector made it prohibitively expensive for people of 
small means - a feature of social inequality of grave 
dimension in view of the fact that social inequality in 
Lebanon was beginning to coincide with religious inequality. 
It can, therefore, be substantiated from the fact that 
Muslims were lagging behind the Christians in educational, 
health and housing faciltities. 
This the analysis of the developments in Lebanese 
economy and its impact on the religious sects clearly 
highlights the economically deteriorating position of the 
Muslim section of the population and the strengthening of 
the economic position of the Christian community. By the 
1970s the Muslims in general were poorer than the 
Christians. Family income of the Christians averaged about 
50 percent higher than those of Muslims and some two-thirds 
higher than those of Shi "a Muslims who were the worst 
16. Halim Barakat, "The Social Context", P. Edward Haley 
and Lewis (ed) Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and 
Issues , New York, 1979, p.10. 
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affected by the distorted economic development. ' What might 
have been simply a conflict of interests among social 
classes elsewhere, in Lebanon came to take on a sectarian 
1 8 
and communal colour. 
The Civil War of 1958 gave an indication of the dangers 
1 9 inherent in class and religious structure in Lebanon. The 
feeling among Muslims that whereas their socio-economic 
status had deteriorated that of the Christians had 
significantly improved since independence and further that 
the government itself was doing precious little to bridge 
the gap between the rich and the poor was the major source 
of Muslim animosity .^ '^  However, after the Civil War of 1958, 
the new President Fuad Shihab tried to bring about a more 
equitable distribution of wealth among the Christians and 
Muslims. But Shihab's attempts to regulate the economy were 
resisted by the powerful Christian oligarchy on the grounds 
that the regulation of freedom even if it took the mild form 
of 'putting order into freedom' would inevitably lead the 
2 1 
country to socialism. 
17. Riad B. Tabbarah, "Background to the Lebanese 
Conflict", International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, (Toronto) vol. 20, nos. 1-2, March-June 
1979, p.117. 
18. Albert Y. Badre, "Economic Development of Lebanon" in 
Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander eds. Economi c 
Development and Population Growth in the Middle East 
(New York, 1972), p.199. 
19. For an indepth analysis of the civil-war of 195S see 
Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington , D.C. 
1961 ) . 
20. David R, Smock and Audrey Smock, op.cit., p.79. 
21. Yusuf A. Sayigh, op.cit., 1978, p.306. 
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Thus the contradications between various religious 
groups became sharper and sharper and the interrelationship 
between various sects could not be reconciled. 
RIGID POLITICAL SYSTEM: 
The major demands of the Lebanbese Muslims had been 
that the sectarian allocation of parliamentary, cabinet and 
administrative posts which was based on the French sponsored 
census of 1932 had become obsolete and did not reflect the 
true demographic situation, hence it had to be changed. They 
claimed that the size of the different sects had undergone 
tremendous change because of Christians migration to the 
West and the higher fertility rate of the Muslims, 
especially the Shi'a. Even if the claim of Muslims of the 
Christian out-migration is not taken into consideration, the 
differential fertility rates of the Christians and Muslims 
cannot be ovrlooked. On the basis of the most reasonable 
assumptions regarding rates of growth between 1932-1971, at 
the outbreak of the Lebanese conflict in 1975 the Christian 
community formed less than 43 percent of the total 
population, while the Muslim community had risen to over 57 
percent. The Shi'a who had constituted 20 percent of the 
total population in 1932 and ranked third behind the 
Maronites and the Sunnis now constituted 28 percent of the 
total population and were thus the largest single group in 
the country . 
22. Riad B. Tabbarah, op.cit., pp.111-112 
There was a minor change in the appointment to civil 
services in 1958 under constant pressure from the Muslims. 
Even the 5 to 6 ratio was not followed in the civil services 
before 1958. For example Maronite Christians who constituted 
29 percent of the Lebanese population 1958, held 
2 3 
approximtely 50 percent of government posts. It was in 
1958 that the government decided that Muslims and Christians 
be equally appointed in the civil services. However, 
political representation between Christians and Muslims 
remained the same. Wehereas both the size of parliament and 
the number of electoral districts, i.e. constituencies have 
changed frequently since indpendence what has remained 
constant is the proportional representation of Muslims and 
Christians. No doubt the religious ratio has changed in 
favour of the Muslims but the Christian elites never allowed 
a new census and strongly objected to any suggestion for 
amendment of the constitution. They insisted that the 
2 5 President of the Republic be a Maronite. If a new census 
is taken and a fresh division of the parliamentary seats is 
made on the basis of such a census, the Christians, 
particularly Maronites will loose their monopoly of 
political power that they now enjoy. But the political 
23. Kamal. Salibi, 'Lebanon under Fuad Chehab 1958-64' 
Middle Eastern Studies , vol, 2, No.3, (April, 1960), 
p.215. 
24. This is the reason why the total number of 
parliamentary seats has always been a factor of 11 
changing from 44 to 55 to 66 to 77 as it is at present. 
25 Halim Barakat, op.cit., p.13. 
under-repreeentiit ion of Muslims only served to enhance their 
alienation still further from the political system. 
Socio-economic changes had resulted in the emergence of 
various new political forces but there was little or no 
accommodation of these new political forces within the 
existing framework of the political system. This was 
reflected in the great disparity between popular support for 
progressive political parties (vize., the Communists, 
Sociolists, and the Syrian Social Nationalists.) and their 
representation in parliament. This disparity arose due to 
the nature of Lebanese electoral laws. List system is a 
permanent feature of the elctoral laws of Lebanon since 
independence. The constituencies are usually multi-member in 
Lebanon and from each constituency more than one 
representatives are elcted. Electoral allliances worked out 
in individual constituencies are called 'lists'. Alliances 
between candidates forming a 'list' is in terms of what 
strength each candidate bering to the 'list'. Normally 
geographical, sectarian and family considerations are upper-
most in the formulation of a 'list'. These alliances are 
neither permanent nor ideological and in many cases they 
crystallize at the last moment before the election and 
generally break as soon as the elctions are over. 
In fact the 'list system' helped to perpetuate the 
:6. Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political Dev 
elopment Lebanon, 1 842 - 1 972, (Durham, 1972), p.147. 
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duminance of the traditional leaders and notabla in Lebanese 
politics and prevented the emergence of ideologically 
oriented political parties. Political parties in general 
cannot insure that their members can be relied upon to vote 
for the whole 'list' regardless of the nature of the 
alliance they enter into. If their candidates are to have a 
chance of winning an election, they have to join a 'list'. 
But joining a 'list' will certainly involve compromises with 
local leaders and forces that are considered by these 
parties to be traditional, feudal or even reactionary. Their 
cooperation may face the prospects of insubordination and 
even defection of the cadres. If they do not cooperate they 
are certain to lose the election and possibly leave their 
followers frustrated. This is the reason why only non-
doctrinnaire, compromising sectarian political parties have 
2 7 been able to send their representatives to the parliament. 
Simultaneously, electoral law also worked against the 
ideological political parties. It bound the voter to his 
village according to this law a Lebanese citizen, 
irrespective of where he was living or for how long, could 
exercise his right to vote only in the place of his birth. 
That is, if he wanted to vote he should go back to his home 
2 8 town to exercise this right. The rural population had come 
27. Ibid., p.148. 
28. Fuad Faris, "The Civil War in Lebanon", Race and Class 
(London), vol, 13, no.2, Autumn 1976, p.176. 
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down to a mere 17 percent of the total population as a 
result of migration. The vast majority of the migrants 
belonged to the poor and economically deprived classes. It 
is among these poor Muslims that the ideological parties 
spread their influence. Had these migrants been allowed to 
vote in the cities, then the ideological parties would have 
been successful in sending their members to the 
2 9 parilament. 
It is evident that the poor Muslim migrants from the 
peripheral areas of the country living in the poverty belts 
around Beirut and other cities could not usually afford to 
travel back to their districts of origin just for the sake 
of casting a ballot. They found little point in voting for 
people far removed from their places of work and 
unresponsive to their day to day problems. This led to their 
alienation from the electoral process and therefore from the 
process of government as a whole. 
The secular political organiztions were suppressed on 
the ground of preserving the Lebanese identity. This had two 
consequences First, the electoral system only served to 
further strengthen the sectarian forces and loyalties. Thus 
resulted in weakening the state and its institutions. This 
fact has been highlighted by Elie Salem in his study on 
29. Ibid., p.176. 
30. Fuad I. Khuri, op.cit., p.392 
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31 cabinet politics in Lebanon. Due to the weakness of the 
state institutions, many ideological and sectarian parties 
and religious sects began to establish paramilitary groups 
(know as militias), to be the coercive arm of the party or 
sect often against state intervention. They justified their 
militias by claiming that it would be used to protect the 
state and its interests. Their claim itself was in fact an 
admission of the state's weakness and lack of trust in the 
government. Second, as the new political forces could not 
enter the political arena in the existing form, they began 
to advocate the overthrow of the political system itself. 
The Muslims were already discriminated against in the 
political sphere. After independence the economic 
development of Lebanon was such that it went in favour of 
Maronite Christians. The class division that emerged in 
independent Lebanon broadly coincided with the religious 
divide to the existing political discrimination against 
Muslims and added to economic frustration which proved to be 
highly detrimental for the confessional system. 
Consequently, it was in the Palestinians presence that the 
Muslims found a convenient tool in their efforts to 
challenge the Christian hegemoney. 
31. According to Elie Salem traditional families and local 
leaders have more control of their followers than the 
central government. All religious and ethnic groups 
have their own pyramid of power and their own internal 
sources of strength and it is with these pyramids that 
the cabinet must deal and at times even negotiate. For 
detail see Elie Salem Cabinet Politics in Lebanon' 
Middle East Jornal , Vo.21, (Fall, 1967), p.496. 
32. FuaU 1. Khufl, up.L'it., p.39<i. 
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PALESTINIANS IN THE CIVIL WAR: 
Although Lebanon officially stayed out of the 1948, 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it was never isolated from 
them. Each conflict swelled the number of Palestinian 
33 
refugees in Lebanon. Such an influx was bound to cause 
trouble in a country where the relative numerical strength 
of the Christian and Muslim communities was a subject of 
bitter political argument. Their attitude was officially 
that they did not interfere in Lebanese affairs, and they 
could not see that their very presence was an interference. 
They were certainly not interested in any internal conflict: 
their aim was to have a base from which to wage their 
compaign for the restoration of their homeland. Against 
their will and inclination, their policies drew them 
inexorably into conflict with the Lebanese Right, who feared 
their growing power and saw them as an army of occupation in 
alliance w ith the Lebanese Left."^'' Thus, their pres ence m 
Lebanon involved them in the Civil War which started in 
1975. 
The Palestinian resistance movement started in the 
middle and late 1960s. The resistance movement had widspread 
popular support among the Lebanese in the coastal 
33. Yussef M. Ibrahim,'The sorrow of Lebanon' The Link, 
vol.11. No.5, New York, (Winter 1978), p.3. 
34. John Bulloch, Death of a Country; The Civil War in 
Lebanon, London 1977, p.2. 
cities,especially among the poor and middle classes 
conscious of their Arab identity. This support was probably 
strongest among the Sunnis but was also evident among Shi'a 
and Greek Orthodox. It was very popular among students and 
35 
Intelligentsia. 
But the popularity and support the resistance movement 
received appeared as potentially dangerous and destabilizing 
factor to many other Lebanese, particularly the Maronites of 
Mt Lebanon who placed higher priority on their Maronite 
national identity than on Arabism. It was also a political 
threat to the principal traditional Maronite leades, notably 
Camille Sham'un , who not only saw pan-Arabism as a threat 
to "their" Lebanon but also perceived that the Palestinians 
might catalyze a movement for change among those segments of 
the Lebanese population who were either frozen out of 
effective participation or limited by custom to an inferior 
position vis-a-vis the Maronites. The resurgence of the 
Maronite parties in the spring 1968 elections, just after 
the Palestinians' psychological victory over the Israelis at 
Karama, was perhaps one sign of this apprehension. The new 
Christian militias included Sulayman Franjiyah's Zyhorta 
Liberation Army, and Camille Sham'un's National Liberal 
Party "Tigers" and the Kata'ib. The civil war in Jordan in 
September 1970 intensified Maronite fears of the 
35. Michael C. Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the 
Lebanese Civil War", The Middle East Journal, vol.32. 
No.3, (Summer, 1978), p.26J. 
Paleatiniana considerably. Just as the Palestinian 
guaci:i 1 las were tAliing bi^ak intQ U^om't^n tw cagi-Qug aftet 
losing their confrontation with King Hussein, so too were 
the Christian militias beginning to arm themselve for what 
they must have seen as a probable future conflict, and one 
in which they could not count on the Lebanese army, given 
the fact that its own iternal cleavages mirrored those of 
the country in general. Acording to one study, during the 
five years after Black September (1970) "the Christians were 
already arming themselves rapidly, smuggling in M 16 rifles, 
Czech M 58 rifles and other small arms they could fire, and 
spending their evenings in arms drill. 
It appears that the later half of 1973, Maronite 
leaders began actively preparing for a showdown with the 
3 7 Palestinians. Although, from the beginning of the 
resistence movement, the Maronites, in the form of the 
Phalangist Party, saw the possibilities: if the Palestinians 
were not subjugated quickly, they would provide the muscle 
which the growing Leftist movement lacked. So, from 1969 
onwards, when the first open clash between the Palestinians 
and the Rightists occurred, the Phalangist aim was clear: 
the Palestinians liad to be stopped, if possible they should 
be sent out of the country, dispersed through all the Arab 
States and not concentrated into one. If that was not 
3 fl possible then they had to be 'controlled'-
36. Ibid., pp. 26J-265. 
37. Ibid., p.266. 
38. John Bulloch, op.cit., p.4. 
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Throucfhuut 1973/ fierce battles were fought between the 
Palestinians fedayeen and the Lebanese army, but Lebanon's 
President, Sulaiman Franjieh, fearing a mutiny by Muslim 
soldiers in his army, refrained from ordering a general 
assault. The result was further frustration and each camp 
began to arm itself to the teeth. Palestinian refugee camps 
brimmed with weapons and ammunition. As mentioned earlier, 
the more nationalistic of the Christians, pre-judging the 
army's ineffectiveness, imported their own arms to do the 
job themselves. The Lebanese Muslim groups turned to the 
39 Palestinians for arms and support. Thus by spring 1973 
there were clear signs of a Palestinian-Christian rightwing 
confronation in the making, as the Kata'ib , the President, 
the Christian army officers and other conservative Maronite 
groups began to challenge the Palestinians openly and 
violently, and at the same time sought to reduce the power 
of the Muslims elite.^° 
The mounting internal tension Intensified as a result 
of the clashes between the Lebanese army and the 
demonstrators in Sidon protesting on 26 February 1975, 
against the government's granting of a liecence to a fishing 
enterprise (The Protein Company) which they maintained would 
affect the livlihood of the local fishermen (mostly 
39. Youssef M. Ibrahim, op.cit., p.3-
40. Michael C. Hudson, 'The Lebanese Crisis: the limits of 
consociational Democracy',Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol 5, No.,3-4, ^Spring/Summer 1975), pp. 116-117. 
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muslims). In the clash an army corporal was killed and the 
Sidon leader Maruf Sad, who was walking at the head of the 
demonstration, received a serious bullet wound which later 
brought about his death. On 29 February, the Sidon populce, 
which accused the army authorities of responsibility for the 
shooting of Maruf Sad, organized a demonstration in the city 
and blocked the main road leading out of Sidon in the 
direction of Tyre. When Army troops arrived to remove the 
road block on the grounds that it obstructed essential 
military movements along the coastal road to and from the 
Israeli border, armed civilians who appear to have included 
at least some Palestinians from the nearlby camp of Ayn al-
Hulwa, opened fire on the troops. This tension constituted 
the immediate background for the incident, which occurred in 
Ain-Rummanah, in Beirut on 13 April 1975, and which 
triggered the Lebanese civil war. 
41. Sirriyyeh Hussein, "The Palestinian Armed Presence in 
Lebanon since 1967**, Owen, Roger(ed) Essay on the 
crisis in Lebanon, Ithaca Press London, 1976, p.82. and 
on fishing dispute also see Paul D. Starr, "Lebanese 
Fishermen and the Dilemma of Modernization", in M. 
Estellie Smith (ed). Those who Live From the Sea St. 
Paul, Minn : American Ethnological Society and West 
Publishing Company 1977. 
42. Good analyses of the praximate causes of the war and 
its early phases include Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to 
Civil War : Lebanon 1958-1976 , Samih Farsoun, "Lebanon 
Explodes", MERIP REPORTS , no.44, February 1975, and 
Halim Barakat, Lebaiion in Strife: Student Preludes to 
the Civil War , Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1977. 
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The first stage extended from 13 April 1975, when the 
incident of Ain-Rummanah took place, to the formation of 
Lebanese military cabinet on 23 May under the premiership of 
Brigadier Nur-eddin Rifai. During this stage, the conflict 
was primarily between the Phalange party and the Palestinian 
resistance. 
The second stage began with the rejection of the 
military cabinet by Lebanese Muslim leadership communicated 
to President Franjieh by Kamal Junbalat on 24 May. As a 
result. Brigadier Rifai submitted the resignation of his 
cabinet on 25 May and Rashid Karami was entrusted, on 28th 
May, with the formation of a new cabinet, on 30 June, which 
was preceded by a three-hour meeting between Yasir Arafat 
and Presdient Franjieh, in which it was agreed to enforce 
the 'Cairo Agreement' of 1969 as well as that of May 1073. 
Moreover, Arafat also agreed to give a statement of policy 
on the part of the PLO concerning Palestiian- Lebanese 
relations. This statement which was broadcast on Lebanese 
radio and television on 25 June, maintained that the 
Palestinians would unconditionally support Lebanese 
sovereignty, that they would not get involved in Lebanese 
affairs, that they would not support any Lebanese faction 
against the other, and that they acknowledged that the 
resistance movement depended on the security and stability 
of Lebanon. The PLO leadership attempted to make a balance 
between sticking to the above-declared Palestinian policy 
and giving limited support to the Muslim and Leftist groups 
2 2 t 
in order to guarantee, in return, the latter's support to 
the Palestinian militry presence in Lebanon. 
The blockade of the two Palestinian camps opened a 
third stage in the Palestinian involvement by pulling the 
resistance into the fighting on a large scale, thus 
restoring the Palestinian dimension to the civil war. On the 
Palestinian level this development reduced the polarization 
between the PLO's and 'Rejection Front's' stances in the war 
by pushing them both in the direction of more military 
involvement. The fighting escalated rapidly when Phalangist 
forces besieged the Palestinian refugee camp of Dhbai, north 
of Bierut, and occupied it on 13 January. On the same day, 
the Lebanese Maronite leadership held a summit meeting in 
Ba'abda, after which they issued a statement, which 
maintained that the present conflict in Lebanon was a 
Palestinian-Lebanese one. In response to the Phalangist 
blockade of the camps, Muslims and leftist forces, aided by 
Palestinian resistance, blockaded the Christian town of 
Damour and the village of Al-Jiyya, south of Beirut. At this 
stage, and by the time the Phalangist forces committed what 
was later called the 'Quarantine Massacre' in Beirut on 18 
January, the Lebanese and the Palestinian dimensions of the 
war became more intertwined through the heightened 
involvement of the resistance forces in the fighting. 
However, in view of the continuation of the conflict in 
spite of the announcement of the above 'Declartion', 
Brigadier Aziz Ahdab attempted to make a coup d'etat on 1 
March 1976, and demanded the resignation of both the 
President and the Prime Minister. The persistent refusal of 
President Franjieh to resign triggered a new stage in the 
escalation of fighting in the country. 
o u iJ 
During the early phase of the new fourth stage, the 
resistance played a two sided role. On the one hand, the PLO 
leadership attempted to ease the rising tension between 
Syria, which was trying to stablise the conflict situation, 
and Muslims and leftist groups, which were escalating the 
fighting in an attempt to force the resignation of President 
Franjieh. On the other hand, the resistance forces, mainly 
from the 'Rejection Front' , were participating in the 
fighting on the side of the Muslims and leftist groups. 
Later, during this stage, and in view of the actual Syrian 
intervention and of Palestinian anticipation of Syrian 
attempts to reach another settlement over the Golan Heights, 
there occurred a shift in alliances among the Palestinians 
resistance organistions. In parts of the country some 
Palestinian forces in the Syrian-controlled Al Sa"iqa and 
the Palestine Liberation Army acted as a buffer, to separate 
the fighting forces on either side. There were also 
instances in which some Palestinian elements from these 
organizations were reported to have participated in the 
fighting on the side of the Christian forces. 
Since the outbreak of the civil war various outsidti 
powers and forces have intervened overtly or covertly on one 
side or the other. Syria was the first which intervened in 
1975, the Israelis in 1978 and again in 1982, and finally 
as "peacekeepers" - Western Multi - National Force (MNF) led 
by, the United Stats in 1983. Of them all, Syria has been 
the most determined. From 1975 and despite some internal 
opposition and repeated edxternal pressures, it has refused 
to budge on its Lebanese involvement. Syria has become 
stronger in Lebanon each year, giving Damascus a pivotal 
role in the search for a solution to the crisis. All 
parties, inside Lebanon and out, acknowledge that Syria's 
position in Lebanon is at its zenith, and hence its 
influence on Lebanon's future is paramount. 
SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT; 
Syrian involvement in Lebanon has been due to its 
conviction that Syria and Lebanon are indivisible. It is 
universally accepted that historically the whole of present 
day Lebanon has been a part of Syria. The name "Suria" 
referred not Just to an area that included Syria and 
Lebanon. But also to Israel and Jordan and parts of South 
eastern Turkey. It is this vast territory which is sometimes 
referred to as "Greater Syria" 
The "Greater Syria" of yesteryears continues to 
permeate the psyche not only of the Syrian elite but also 
and more broadly, of Syria's general public. They feel that 
0 9 
,43 their country: Greater Syria was unjustly divided by tht: 
French in order to create the so-called modern state of 
Lebanon. In fact Lebanon came into existence only on 
September 1, 1920 when General Gouraud proclaimed the 
"independence" of Greater Lebanon". Greater Lebanon included 
the areas for which Maronite Christians had been clamouring, 
i.e. the Bekka valley in the east, Jabel Amil in the South, 
and the coastal areas including the towns of Tripoli, 
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre. Syrian nationalist leaders as 
indicated earlier regarded it as an arbitrary unjust and 
unnatural dismemberment of their homeland. The Syrians are 
generally still inclined to hold to the belief that their 
country's boundary with Lebanon was artificially drawn up by 
France to suit the latter's colonial ambitions and 
interests. President Asad echoed an almost universally held 
Syrian perception when he once said that "throughout history 
4 5 Syria and Lebanon have been one country and one people. 
Besides the historical claim, Syrian leaders especially 
President Asad regard Lebanon as vital to their national 
interests whether military, political, economic or 
strategic. Moreover, Lebanon's pluralist society and its 
democratic system provided an antithesis to the Syrian 
43. Adeed Dawiaha, 'The Motives of Syria's involvement in 
Lebanon', The Middle East Journal , vol.38. No.2, 
(Spring, 1984), p.229. 
44. Leila M.T. Meo, Lebanon : Improbable Nation, 
Bloomignton, 1965, p.47. 
45. Adeed Dawisha, op.cit., p229. 
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political ayatem, riotably to Aaad's autocratic rule. No 
wonder Beirut became a haven for Syrian opposition groups 
who bitterly attacked the rulers of Damascus and often tried 
to overthrow them. President Asad has always been anxious to 
eliminate these elements. Moreover, he has always wanted to 
control the various PLO groups which in the late 1970s 
transferred their headquarters from Jordan to Beirut and 
established their military bases in Southern Lebanon. This 
objective has been a part of the "Greater Syria strategy" in 
which Asad intended to employ the PLO as well as to use 
Lebanese territory for both defensive and offensive purposes 
vis-a-vis Israel. Thus following his ascendancy to power 
Asad pursuing his Greater Syria policy sought to extend his 
influence over Lebanon if not to turn it into a Syrian 
4 6 protectorate. 
The Lebanese Civil War started in 1975. It provided 
opportunity for Syria to realise its goal in Lebanon. In the 
initial stages of the conflict Syria supported Palestinians 
and the Lebanese leftists with arms and diplomatic 
intervention aimed at forestalling the formation of an anti-
Palestinian military government. At the same time Syria also 
established itself as a mediator tried to restrain its 
clients, and engineered compromise agreements meant to 
dampen the Civil War. Syria was thus trying to contain the 
46. Ma'oz Moshe, Asad: The sphinx of Damascus, London, 
1988, pp. 123-124. 
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crieie on the one hand and uaed it to insert a Syrian 
presence in Lebanese politics on the other. 
Toward the end of 1975, when the Lebanese crisis took 
an ominous turn and threat of partition and Israeli 
intervention mounted, Syria more overtly asserted its 
interest in Lebanese events for it saw a chance to realize 
4 8 their dream of Greater Syria. This prompted Abd al- Halim 
Khaddam, the foreign Minister of Syria, to warn the 
Maronites of the dangers of partition: "Lebanon" he said, 
"was part of Syria before the French Mandate. Syria will 
recover it the moment a serious partitioning attempts gets 
under way. However, in early 1976 Lebanese rightist forces 
taking this as a bluff launched an offensive aimed at 
carving out a Maronite mini-state. Syrian controlled 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border, curbed 
the rightist advance and imposed a cease-fire. Syrian 
involvement in Lebanese civil war succeeded in maintaining 
the integrity of Lebanon and prevented its partition. Thus, 
it prevented the emergence of a Christian mini-state that 
could be natural ally of Israel. 
47. Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the 
Palestinians, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol.8. No.1, 
(Winter, 1986), pp.4-5. 
48. Ibid., p.5. 
49. Mahmud A. Faksh, 'Syria's role in Lebanon', Journal of 
South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.19. No.4, 
(Summer, 1986 ) , p. 12. 
50. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, cp.cit., p.5. 
Syria waa oppoaed to a military solution to the 
Lebanese Civil War. It advocated instead national 
reconciliation between various factions on the basis of the 
essentially Lebanese formula la ghalib wa la maghlub "no 
winner and no loser" which would preserve the country's 
plurali sm. 51 
In keeping with this approach Asad put forth a peace 
plan that provided a moderate redistribution of power in 
favour of Muslims and disengagement of Palestinians from 
Lebanon's internal affairs. But the Lebanese Left rejected 
the plan and radical Palestinians supported them. These 
radical Palestinians intended to turn Lebanon into a base 
for their struggle against Israel. The mainstream PLO under 
Arafat began to view Syria's growing intervention in Lebanon 
as a threat to the Palestinian autonomy essential to 
Palestinian interest. To safeguard the interests of the 
Palestinians a Palestinian-left counter offensive was 
launched to defeat the design of the Maronites on the one 
hand and put an end to the Syrian peace plan on the other. 
Syria was however, angered and decided to chastise the 
Palestinian-left forced in collaboration with the Lebanese 
51. Mahmud A. Faksh, op.cit., p.13. 
52. According to this plan seats in the parliament were to 
be incrased and equally divided between Christian and 
Muslims. However no change was to be effected in 
presidency which was to remain in the hands of 
Christians. Christians accepted this plan. 
53. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, op.cit., p.5. 
S<h. Ibid., p.5. 
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Cfuvernment. In June 1976 at the request of the Lebanese 
government Asad dispatched 30,000 Syrian troops to support a 
Maronite war of attrition and finally launched a massive 
offensive that swept deep into Lebanon in a major fight 
55 
against Palestinian forces. 
But the Syrian-Maronite honeymoon ended in 1978 when 
relations between the two were strained with the emergence 
of Bashir Jumayyil as the leader of the Lebanese Front. He 
asked Syria to withdraw. Asad switched side again, joined 
hands with the Palestinians and successfully checked the 
growing power of the Maronites. Moreover, he eliminated his 
enemy Kamal Junbalat and endeared himself to those factions 
of the National Movement which were beholden to his regime. 
The situation, however, changed after the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. In 1983, Syria encouraged a 
split in PLO because relations between Arafat and Asad had 
become strained. Arafat weakened by the Israeli invasion 
wanted to pursue a dialogue with Egypt a stance that 
threatened the cornerstone of Syrian policy namely to 
56 prevent the legitimation of Camp David Accord. The 
relations of Syria with PLO further deteriorated in 1985 
when Arafat joined hands with King Hussein in proposing 
negotiations with Israel on the question of West Bank. 
Syria's relations with radical Palestinians who were aligned 
55. Ibid., p.7. 
56. Ibid., p.13. 
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with Damaacua also took a new turn when Asad backed Shi'a 
attack on Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Syria supported 
Amal militias (a Shi'a militia founded by Imam Musa Sadr) 
during the war of camps from 1985 to 1987. The Amal militia 
led by Mr.Nabi Berri feared that the large scale return of 
PLO meant a definite setback to their own political and 
military position inside Lebanon. Asad supported Amal mainly 
due to his personal grievances against Mr.Arafat. Moreover, 
he feared that the re-entry of PLO fighter loyal to Arafat 
5 8 
might creat further problems for Syria. 
However, in 1988 Syria was forced to stop its proxy 
Amal from attacking PLO fighters entrenched in Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon because of the Palestinian uprising 
in the Israeli-occuppied territories which earned Arab as 
well as world sympathy for the Palestinian cause. 
Soon after the conflict with PLO Asad decided to use 
Amal to discipline the Hizbollah, a radical Shi'a group, 
which opposed Syria's policy in Lebanon. He directed Amal to 
crush th Hizbollah in South Lebanon where the later had been 
escalating attacks on Israel and the Israeli-backed South 
Lebanon Army. Having succeeded in South Lebanon Asad engaged 
Amal to suppress the Hizbollah in the Southern suburbs of 
57. Ibid., p.17. 
58. The Hindu, 9 April, 1987. 
59. The Middle East and North AFrica, 36th edition, 
p. 605 . 
1990, 
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Beirut.^'^ However, Hizbollah proved strong enough to be 
defeated by the Amal in this region. On the contrary they 
the Hizbollah wrested control of about 90 percent of the 36 
sq km, Amal controlled southern suburb of Beirut from Nabi 
Berri's forces. This prompted Asad to order his troops to 
help the Amal militia. On May 13,1988 Syrian troops attacked 
Hizbollah positions pushed them back from their newly 
occupied territories but failed to break the bone of their 
military power. As a resuwlt Hizbollah is still powerful in 
Lebanon. 
The latest challenge to Syria's Lebanon policy came 
from General Michel Aoun who was appointed Prime Minister of 
Lebanon on September 22, 1988 by President Mr. Amin Gemayel 
just before the expiry of his term in office and after the 
failure of a Syrian plan to get elected a President of their 
6 2 
own choice. Lebanese Muslims however rejected Aoun's 
government and continued to recognise the government of the 
acting premier Salim al-Hoss. This led to a bitter 
controversy and there was a potential threat to Lebanon's 
unity and integrity. General Aoun, however, remained adamant 
and in March 1989 demanded the withdrawal of all Syrian 
forces from Lebanon. He also declared that he would wage a 
"War of Liberation" against Asad's forces until Syria 
60. The Middle East, August 1988, No.166, p.12. 
61. The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p.605 
62. The Middle East, November 1933, No.169, p.9. 
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complied. He blocked the Lebanese ports used by Syria's 
allies mainly for commercial purposes. Consequently, a 
fierce fighting started on March 14, 1989 between Christian 
army under Michel Aoun and Syrian forces backed by the 
militias supporting Syrian stand. 
TA'IF AGREEMENT: 
Alarmed at development in Lebanon on May 25, 1989 heads 
of Arab states met in Casablanca in order to find out a 
lasting solution to the crisis and bring about a peace in 
the country. But they failed to bring about any acceptable 
solution. 
Again on October 22, 1989 at the initiative of Saudi 
Arabia 62 surviving Deputies of Lebanon's 99-members 
parliament gathered in Ta'if and agreed on a plan for the 
re-establishment of the Lebanese constitutional state. This 
plan in known as Taif Agreement. The salient features of 
this agreement were the transfer of executive power from 
the (Christian) President to a Cabinet composed of equal 
number of Christian and Muslim ministers. The cabinet was to 
be responsible to the parliament which was to be re-
constituted with equal number of Christian and Muslim 
deputies. The existing confessional distribution of the 
principal offices of the state was, however, to remain 
unchanged. It called for "the liberation of Lebanon from the 
63. Strategic Survey, 19S9-1990, p.98 
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Israeli ouceupation" and "distinctive relations between 
Lebanon and Syria," as two independent Arab states. Syria 
insisted that it had legitimate security interests in 
Lebanon. Hence the Taif Agreement stipulated that Syrian 
withdrawal to the Bekka Valley should be possible only two 
years after political reforms are implemented. The 
agreement was rejected by General Aoun. But Syria supported 
the Agreement. with full support of Syria. Deputies of 
Leobanese parliament met at Qlaiaat air-base in Syrian-
controlled northern Lebanon. They ratified the agreement and 
elected Rene Mouwad as the new President of Lebanon. But on 
November 22, 1989, Rene Mouwad was killed. Two days later 
Elias Hrawi was elected to succeed Mouwad. The President 
dismissed General Aoun from his post as Commanding Officer 
of the Lebanon's armed forces. Syria supported the move and 
was ready to provide military assitance and troops to the 
President to evict Aoun from the Presidential palace. 
However, Aoun managed to surround the palace with a human 
shield which frustrated Hrawi's move to. 
The Gulf crisis, precipitated by Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990, had serious repurcussions from 
Lebanon. On 28 September 1990 units of the Lebanese army 
loyal to the government imposed an economic blockade on the 
areas of Beirut which were under the control of Gen Michel 
64. Pof Massoud Daher, The Japanese Institute of Middle 
Eastern Economics, No.11, (Winter, 1991), Cairo, p.3S. 
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Auun. The blockade, which enjoyed Syrian and U.S. support, 
was designed to force Aoun into either cooperating with al-
Huss Government, or evacuating the presidential palace at 
Baabda, where he was based. On 13 October 1990 Syrian forces 
commmenced a military assault against the presidential 
palace at Baabda and other strategic areas under Aoun's 
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control. In a clear breach of the 'Red Lines' agreement " 
betwseen Syria and Israel, which regulated the parameters 
within which each country could operate in Lebanon, the 
Syrian air force shelled the presidential palace. The Syrian 
military operation was the first of the repurcussions of the 
Gulf crisis in Lebanon, where Syria had been granted freedom 
of action as a reward for its participation in the US-led 
multinational force deployed in Saudi Arabia. Aoun forces 
were completely defeated, and the areas under his control 
overrun. The defeat of Aoun ended the challenge which he 
posed to the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. 
It can be rasonably concluded from the above discussion 
that the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war 
ensured the unity of Lebanon and prevented its partition 
along religious lines. Syrian involvement also maintained a 
power-balance between various militias and no single militia 
could become so powerful as to defeat other one. Although, 
Amal always sided with Syria but the latter did never allow 
65. The Middle East and North Africa 1992, 
London, 1991, p.550. 
66. Ibid., p.650. 
38th edition. 
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the fotmer to cornpletly crush Hizbollah. Moreover, it is due 
to the support of Syria that Gen Michel Aoun was defeated 
and Taif Agreement could be implemented which envisaged the 
moderate distribution of power between Muslims and 
Christians. 
ROLE OF ISRAEL; 
Israel concern with ending the armed Palestinians 
presence on her northern borders drew her gradually into 
open involvement in the Lebanese Civil War. By early summer 
1975 considerable transfers of tanks, vehicles, artillery, 
and other military equipment had been made by Israel to the 
rightists. Israeli patrols frequently crossed into south 
Lebanon to discourage Palestinian activity in the region and 
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to protect the Israeli "open fence" border crossing-
Israel's interest in establishing a Maronite 
dominated state in Lebanon, controlling the Litani River, 
and annexing southern Lebanon have long historical 
67. Israel since early summer 1976, had permitted Lebanese, 
mainly Maronites, but also some of the poor Shi'a 
residents of the south, to enter Israel for work, 
business, medical treatment, and visits to relatives. 
68. Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: 
Confronation in the Middle East, Harvard University 
Press, Harvard, 1983, p.1972 
59. Plans for acquiring the Litani were articulated soon 
after Israel came into being in 1948. One prominent 
Zionist scholar wrote :"In order to have resources 
sufficient to allow it to ;perform its proper function 
in solving the Jewish problem, Palestine (e.g., the 
Jewish state) needed control of the Litani waters as 
well as agricultural land east of the river. 
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precedents. But these obJectlveE; were found not feasible 
until mid-1970s. 
When Lebanbon was wrecked by Civil War, Israel 
perceived the necessity to support Phalangist secessionist 
tendencies. Because a Maronite state with a religious rai son 
d' etre would be a natural ally of Israel. 
To achieve the above objectives, Israel developed close 
relations with Bashir Gemayel, who commanded the largest 
Christian militia in Lebanon, the Kata'ib, the military wing 
of the Phalange Party. As early as 1977 Gemayel began to 
receive direct military aid from Israel which reached over 
&100 million by 1982. Large numbers of Gemayel's men 
received training in Israel, and Israel provided the 
Phalange with sophisticated weapons as well as political and 
military advice. In addition, Israel supported the renegade 
major Saad Haddad with arms, money, and advice, after 
installing him as commander of the area of southern Lebanon 
it conguered during its 1978 invasion. Through Haddad, 
Israel solidified its control over a significant portion of 
Lebanese territory, and Haddad's militia gradually became 
fully integrated into the Israeli Defence Forces(IDF) . 
70. Mahmud A. Faksh, 'Syria Role in Lebanon"", Journal of 
South ASian and Middle Eastern Studies,, Vol. 9, No.-i 
(Summer, 1986), p.16. 
71. Cheryl A. Rubenbery, 'The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: 
Objectives and consedquences,~ Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eaatern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Winter, 
1984), p.7-a. 
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laraeli'e invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 - "Operation 
Peace for Galilee"- was initially declared to be a campaign 
avowedly to end permanently the Palestinian "threat' to its 
norther borders. The PLO forces were to be driven out of 
"Fatah Land" and there would be a twenty - five mile wide 
security zone in souther Lebanon. But the invaders went on 
to encircle Beirut and push the Syrians out of the central 
mountains around the city. Their forces were directly 
72 
opposite Syria's in the eastern Bekka region and within 
73 twenty miles of Damascus. 
Israeli's quick military successes and evacuation of 
PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut exposed its real aims. 
Sharon, the architect of the invasion, planned to destory 
the PLO militarily and politically, to oust the Syrians, and 
to create a Maronite - dominated central government. This 
would pave the way for a state with enough authority to 
establish order and to sign a peace treaty antecedent to 
normalizing relations with Israel. 
The emergent Martonite - Israel alliance, represented 
by Gemayel and Sharon, conducted a compaign to change some 
72. In geopolitical terms, the Bekka is the soft belly of 
Syria, and whoever controls it controls the southern 
half of Syria. Also the region is the source of the two 
major rivers, the Jordan river which flows south into 
Jordan, and Orontes which flows North into Syria 
73. Mahmud A. FAksh, op.,cit., p.17. 
74 . Ibid., p.17. 
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fundemental political and strategic realities in the Middle 
East. Israel sought to translate its battlefield victories 
into political advantage by way of influencing development 
in Lebanon in its favour. The Maronites seiged the 
opportunity to gain ascendancy and establish their 
dominance. As a result, Lebanon would be removed from the 
traditional Syrian zone of influence in particular and the 
75 Arab systems in general. 
However, subsequent events have shown that Israel's 
objectives could not be realized because they were based on 
a misunderstanding of political realities in Lebanon... It 
was not long before Israel realized the limits of its powers 
to shape Lebanon ' spolitical realities. Its military power 
could not produce the desired changes in a hostile 
environment highly charged with conflicting forces and 
loyalties and ever-changing alignments. Nor could its 
allies, the Maronite Lebanese forces, establish their 
control over areas occupied by Israel. Contrary to Israeli 
expectations, the Phalangist Maronites' power was limited as 
witnessed in the fighting in the Chouf mountains against the 
Druze during the summer and fall of 1983, and later against 
the Shi'a militia in West Beirut during the winter of 1984. 
In both conflicts, the Druze and the Shi'a emerged 
triumphant, and that the Christians of Lebanon were no 
longer assured of ascendance because of demographic 
75. Ibid. , pp. 17-11 
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condition3 unfavourable to them and because of strong Muslim 
opposition. Accordingly, other than helping along the 
election to the presidency of the pro-Israeli Phalangist 
leader Bashir Gemayel - whose assassination shortly before 
his inauguration in September 1982 was a major blow to 
Israeli strategy. While for a time the Phalange appeared 
to be in firm control- although Bashir Gemayel reneged on 
the military support he had promised the Israelis during the 
fighting and had began to distance himself from Israel soon 
after his election, and Amin Gemayel turned to the US for 
support specifically to counter Israeli influence - after 
the ravages of the Civil conflict a new formula for power-
sharing has emerged among the various confessions, giving 
the Muslim groups more power than they had before 1982. 
Moreover, it was Syria, not Israel, which dominated 
Beirut."^'^ 
Moreover, the cancellation of the Lebanese-Israeli 
agreement on March 5, 1984, was another setback to Israeli's 
objective of increasing its influence over Lebanon. 
The dream of Moshe Dayan to annex the territory from 
the Litani southward could not be realized. To realize the 
full value of the Litani river, Israel must control an area 
of Lebanon (either by occupation or through arrangements 
with a compliant government), far into the Bekka Valley and 
76. Ibid., p.18. 
77. Cheryl A. Rubenbery, op.cit., p.26, 
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well above the Karaoun Dam. The Israelis, who had occupied 
south Lebanon since 1978, worked on building a tunnel at the 
90 degree bend into the Litani which passes within only 2-5 
miles of the Israel - Lebanon border - to divert the Litani 
waters into northern Israel. But diverting the Litani water 
would be costly for the Israel, both economically and 
diplomatically, and would anyway only bring a negligible 
flow of water into Israel since most of the Litani waters 
upstream have either been redirected through the Markabi-
Awali-Joun chain of hydro-electric power stations or used 
for irrigation in the Bekka Valley as only overspill from 
79 the Karaoun Dam flows down the Litani's natural courses. 
The "security belt" came into being in the wake of the 
invasion of March 1978, when the Israeli forces surged into 
Lebanon with the declared objective of occupying a 10-km 
wide belt north of the border to prevent Palestinian attacks 
against Israel. Instead, the forces pushed all the way to 
the Litani river, occuying more than a tenth of Lebanese 
territory. Faced with strong international pressure, in the 
form of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 425,which 
called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
all Lebanese territories and the establishment of a special 
78. Ibid., p.9. 
79. Giles Trendle, "Whose water is it," The Middle East, 
issue No-207, January 1991, p.19. Also see Time Coione, 
Sara O'Niel, Ian Meadows etal, "Reports," in Judith 
Ferera, review, "Water Politics, The Middle East, 
No.75, February 1981 
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UN force, UNIFIL, Israel partially withdrew in two stages. 
But just before it had to make the final withdrawal in June 
1978, it turned the remaining 10-km strip over to its proxy 
militia under Major Saad Haddad. While Israel had officially 
withdrawn, it was no secret that the SLA continued to be 
"thickended" by Israeli soldiers and that Israeli officers 
were a permanent presence. UNIFIL was prevented from 
entering the area. The "security belt" was born. 
The establishment of the "security belt" necessitated 
an important overhauling of the SLA, hitherto an almost 
exclusively Maronite force composed of local boys - mainly 
Lebanese army deserters, Kata'ib militants, more recent 
recruits... An intensive recruitment and training drive was 
undertaken, aimed at the Shi'a as well, not only to expand 
the force's numbers but also to avoid the stigma that would 
accompany a purely Maronite force patrolling a large Muslim 
region. 
In September 1982, the Lebanese resitance was born with 
the Israel occupation of Beirut. The resistance was 
tremendously effective. For more than two years, the Israeli 
losses approached the unprecedented average of one soldier 
killed a day, and forced Israeli withdrawal from an occupied 
Arab territory. In June 1985, the Israeli completed the 
third stage of their withdrawal from the occupied south. The 
area they refused to evacuate they handed over to the 
nominal control of the SLA. As was the case in 19""S, 
,. t t 
h o w e v e r , the I s r a e l i r e m a i n e d , a l b e i t in r e d u c e d n u m b e r , 
their permanent presence in the zone more discreet. 
The new, post - 1985 "security belt" added two new 
pieces of territory (in the east and in the centre - west) 
8 0 to the former border zone of 1978. The ostensibly 
unofficial border of the "security zone" constitutes a far 
more forbidding barrier than the frontiers between most 
Eovereicfn states. Barbed wire flanks each of the three or 
four points of access, observation posts from which any 
movement can be seen line the border, and mine fields have 
been laid where the terrain makes control difficult. Permits 
for non-residents to enter the zone must be obtained at the 
entry points, today generally manned by SLA soldiers alone 
rather than the mixed SLA - Israeli units. 
80. In contrast to the former southwest-northeast 
"crescent," the new "security zone" traced somewhat of 
a semicircle. It was no longer just a buffer zone 
insulating the Israeli border. It allowed the Israeli 
to keep their heavy machine guns, not to mention their 
large cannons, trained on the heart of the Bekka, on 
part of Mount Lebanon (the essentially Druze and 
Sunni), and the totality of the south, including Sidon, 
Nabatiyya, and Tyre. Finally, the guns were trained on 
all the Palestinian camps. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Republic of Lebanon as it exists today was created 
in 1920. Prior to this Lebanon referred to only Mount 
Lebanon. Mount Lebanon had throughout its history provided a 
refuge to persecuted religious minorities fleeing the wrath 
of conquering invaders or religious intolerance. Mount 
Lebanon was in the main the home of two important minority 
communities namely, the Maronites and the Druze: the former 
lived in north and the latter inhabited the south. The Druze 
managed their internal affairs as a virtually autonomous 
community and developed a peculiar feudal system from the 
time they were first established in Lebanon. Even during the 
Mamluk period, the Druze maintained their peculiar feudal 
traditions with the tacit recognition of the Mamluk 
government. The central government invested the leading 
Druze Chief of his day with some formal authority, 
technically as an officer of the Sultan's provincial 
cavalry. But as supreme emir, the paramount Druze Chief 
headed a feudal system based on hereditary land tenure and 
was the overlord of a number of feudal families who 
controlled the various Druze districts. They emrged as a 
dominant political force in Mount Lebanon with the 15th 
century Tanukhid dynasty. 
The Ottomans did not attempt to change the Druze 
political status. Like their Mamluk predecessors, they 
permitted the Drure to maintain their special feudal 
traditions and to manage their internal affairs as they 
pleased. Under the Ottomans, the Druze came to enjoy a power 
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and prestige which they had never known under Marnluk. They 
extended their domain which was originally confined to al-
Shuf, both in south Lebanon and towards the north. Dru2e 
hegemony established in the early seventeenth century, 
remained unchallenged for a long time. Although Maronite 
notables frequently rose to position of influence as the 
assistants and advisors of the emirs, it was the Druse 
feudal chiefs who remained the mainstay of the Lebanese 
Emi rate . 
Following the establishment of the Emirate, Maronites 
began to move from northern Lebanon to southern Lebanon. 
Freedom and protection were extended to them by the Druze 
feudal lords of the area, particularly in matters of 
personal safety and the exercise of religious activities. 
The Maronite Churches, in particular, started to grow and 
flourish under the auspices of the feudal lords. The monks 
and their orders cultivated the land of the feudal lords, 
reclaimed waste lands and purchased land of their own 
wherever they could. In the early stages of economic 
relations between the Church and the Druze feudal lords, the 
church was the weaker and more dependent partner. But as a 
result of its growing economic strength, the Maronite church 
began to oppose feudalism in Mount Lebanon with the twin 
purposes of defending the rights of the peasants perhaps in 
their own self interest and defeating their political 
rivals, the feudal lords. 
Historically, the Ottomans kept the country dividetl. 
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They followed the policy of divide and rule. Thus they 
encouraged the rift betweeen the rival factions. The 
Ottomans continued to do this even after succession of 
Shihabs. The latent rivalry between Yaman and Qays branches 
of the Druze community culminated in 1711 in the battle of 
'Ayn Darah, which resulted in the Yamani Druze having to 
flee the area for the Hawran. The expulsion of the Yamani 
Druze from the country was of serious consequence in the 
long run for it reduced the size of the Druze community and 
increased the relative numerical strength of the Maronites. 
The Maronites benefitted considerably from this development 
of the Druze community as more and more Maronites entered 
the services of the emirs and settled within the territory 
of the emirate. They played an indirect role in building the 
emirate's central powers through their positions as 
hereditary chieftains in possessions of fiefs. 
Thus the Druze-Maronite balance of power underwent a 
serious change in the eighteenth century as the Maronites 
replaced the Druze in political predominance. The conversion 
of Emir Mulhim's sons to Christianity in 1756, and the 
succession of the Maronite Yusuf Shihab in 1770 finally set 
the -seal to the decline of the Druze. However, although the 
Maronites were now recognizably the dominant group, the 
Druze remained a powerful force with which the Shihabs had 
to reckon. 
However, Baahir Shihab II further reduced the power of 
Druze by infringing t-jpon the hereditary privileges of their 
feudal familitii; .juJ in .-iomc! cases;, such as the Junbalats, 
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the Imads the Abu Nakads, dispossessed them outright. He 
followed a policy of favouritism towards the christian 
majority and at times, instigated them against the Druze. 
By confiscations and forced sale, Bashir II had robbed the 
Druze feudal class of vast lands, and these lands had come 
in time to be redistributed among the rising class of well 
to do christian villagers and townsmen. Besides, he absorbed 
under his emirate those prerogatives which were 
traditionally enjoyed by Druze Chiefs in their districts: 
they collected taxes for the government at a profit, 
maintained peace and order and above all exercised judicial 
authority of the first instance over all civil and criminal 
cases involving penalties short of death. 
Thus, by late eighteenth, more especially, by the 
nineteenth century, the Maronites emerged on the poltical 
scence of Lebanon. In this the church played a crucial role, 
seizing the opportunity offered by emir Bashir II to be 
dealt into the cental power structure, and determining the 
direction of the violent events that scarred the epoch. The 
monk took the lead in voicing the demands of the community 
and in its ideological and military organization and 
mobilization. The Maronite church played prominent role in 
shaping Lebanbon's political history during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, and the establishment of 
Geater Lebanon in 1920 was largely the successful 
culmination of their efforts. 
The establishment of Greater Lebanon on 1 Septembe: 
.J!) 
1920 by France, with the inclusion of the fertile Bekaa 
plain and the regions around the coastal cities of 3idon, 
Tripoli and Beirut further complicated the confessional 
situation. The establishment of Greater Lebanon brought 
about a great demographic changes. The population of Sunni 
sect was multiplied approximately eight times and Shi'a 
strength was vitually quadrupled, while the Maronite 
population was increased by only one third. Consequently, 
the Lebanese christian now slightly out-numbered the Muslim. 
Whereas in the Mutasarrafiya the Maronites had formed an 
overwhelming majority (59 percent of the total population), 
in Greater Lebanon they became the largest single community 
(29 percent of the total population). 
The sunni resented the creation of Greater Lebanon 
because the incorporation of Sunni in Lebanon involved a 
grave religious, cultural, political and economic crisis and 
powerful emotional blow. It also accompanied the demise of 
an independent Arab Kingdom in Arabia, Iraq and Greater 
Syria in which they formed the overwhelming majority. 
Furthermore, they were cut off from their coreligionists in 
Syria and the rest of the Arab World, thereby becoming a 
minority group in the Lebanese state. They were to be ruled 
by the French and the Maronites, both Christians. 
In the beginning, the Sunnis v;ere reluctant to 
participate in the political process of Lebanon. An 
organized Sunni opposition manifested itself in the summer 
of 19 21, when preparation were being made for the cenrus as 
a first steps toward;: a general election. The sunni refused 
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to participate in the census on the grounds that they were 
being defined as citizens of Greater Lebanon and that this 
could be interpreted as their recognition of the Lebanese 
state. The Sunnis also withdrew from the constitutional 
consultations. It was in the late 1930s and 1940s, with the 
rise to power of a young generation of Sunni leaders who had 
grown up under the new Lebanese political system, that the 
way was opened to a modus vivendi between these leaders and 
their christian counterparts. However, the effort of the 
Lebanese sunnis for the integration with Syria ended, when 
they reached an agreement in 1943 know as National Pact on 
the question of sharing power with the christians. 
The Shi'a Muslim sect came into being as a result of a 
schism that took place in Islam in the decade after the 
death of Prophet Muhammad on the question of his successor 
(Caliphate). They recognized Caliph "Ali, the newphew and 
son-in-law of the Prophet as the legitimate heir, but not 
the early three Caliphs - Abu Bakr, 'Umar and Usman. They 
are the oldest Muslim community in Lebanon. At the time of 
the First Crusade (1096), the whole country belonged to one 
or other of the Shi'a communities. Very few Shi'a lived in 
the cities but a number of important small towns grew up in 
the Shi'a areas during the period between the two world 
wars. The vast majority of the Shi'a peasantry lived on 
meagre plots with poor soil and very limited water 
resources. They practiced subsistence dry farming. Export of 
agriculture expanded rapidly. Banking and jomiauTC i a 1 networl. 
based in Beirut, ;;idon and Zalile i^pread throughout the Shi 'a 
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rural areas. This completely restructured traditional social 
and productive relations. 
Shi'a community has been equally peripheral to the 
Lebanese political system that had developed under the 
French mandate and was consolidated with independence. The 
National Pact of 1943 was basically an agreement between 
Sunni and Maronite, the two leading communities to divide 
Lebanon into two spheres of influence along Christian 
Muslim lines. From the 1920s to the mid 1950s, Shi'a 
political representation was practically monopolized by six 
prominent landowning families- the Asads, the Zeins and the 
Ossirans in southern Lebanon and the Hamadehs, the Haidars 
and Husseinis in Ba'lbek and Bint Jubayl. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, the evolving polity produced new forces within 
the Shi'a community that upset the Shi'a status quo. Rapid 
socio-economic modernization, the spread of education, 
urbanization, and the flood of petro-money brought greater 
mobilization and politicization of the disenfrenchised 
Shi "a. 
The Shi'a now had an active and redicalized 
intelligentsia, an ambitious and enterprising counter-elite, 
and other new strata with new demands. They began to 
challenge the rules of the game and to question the 
distribution of power and resources in the Lebanese system. 
In this context, the movement of Imam Musa al-Sadr was born 
in the earl>' 197Cs, an expression of the demographic and 
socio-economic Lihift of the Shi'a from the pijriphery toward 
" 1 •••' 
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the city-state of Beirut. Following his arrival in Tyre from 
his native Iran in 1960 to assume the religious lead<irsliip 
position of the Shi'a community in the south. Imam Musa al-
Sadr soon turned into an active social reformer. He sought 
to enter the political arena by politicizing his role as a 
religious cleric, a complete departure from customary 
clerical acquiescence. In 1975 Imam Musa al-Sadr founded 
Lebanese Resistance Battalions (Amal), a militia group, 
attached to the Movement of Deprived, to protect the 
community in the Civil war and to defend the south which was 
left largely on its own following the Civil War. Its 
creation marked a turning point in the evolution of Shi'a 
power. It transformed the movement of the Deprived into an 
armed political organization and, in the process, superseded 
it as the major Shi'a politico-military organization and one 
of the leading contender for power and influence. 
The salvation Committee formed by president Ilyas 
Sarkis in June 1982 to face the repurcussions of the Israeli 
invasion gave rise to the emrgence of Shi'3 fundementa1ist 
groups in Lebanon. Husayn al-Musawi, a key leading figure in 
Amal, objected to Berri's acceptance of membership in the 
committee. Later on, he resigned from Amal and formed his 
own Islamic Amal. He represented a complete departure, from 
the traditional Shi'a line of Lebanese patriotism as 
represented by Sadr and his wish to mobilize the community 
for the cause of a world-wide Islamic revolution. Mu;.;awi 
embraced khomeinl's ideology, including the Ay ato i 1 .jh ' :; 
interpretation of " the guardianship of the jurisconsult" 
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(volay5t=e=faqih)• Hisbollah, another fundamentalist group 
also came into being in 1932 at the initiative of a grcup of 
Islamic 'CJlama' close to Muhammad Husayn Fadlullah. The 
conservative and orthodo;c Shi 'a theological school believes 
that justice and equality can only be achieved with the 
return of the twelfth Imam. Hizbollah believes that justice 
and equality can be achieved through Human efforts, through 
a revolutionary proces. Fadlullah discarded the notion of 
Taqiya and advocated armed struggle against Muslim 
government which stray from religious tenets. Fadlullah has 
been less willing than Islamic Amal's Musawi to e.Tibrace 
whole - heartedly the idea of an Islamic republic in Bierut. 
The fundamentalist-militant groups activated the Shi'a 
doctrine of martyrdom and self-sacrifice against oppression 
and operationlized it into direct action. Young Shi'a were 
exhorted to emulate the much-celebrated martyrdom of Imam 
Hysayn by staging suicide attacks on Israeli and Western 
targets in Lebanon. Suicide car bombings were carried out 
against the Israeli forces in November 1983 and continued 
through 1985, even after their withdrawal to their self-
proclaimed security zone in souther Lebanon along Israeli's 
border. The attacks boosted the image of the radical groups 
as the most prominent element in compelling Israeli's 
retreat. A series of suicide bombing were staged in 1983-84 
against the US embassy and the QS and French military 
compounds, prompting the withdrawal of the Multi National 
Force (MNF) in 198-1 and the termination of Western influence 
in Lebanon. Thuij tlu.' Clii 'a enierijt^ J a;: a powerful force in 
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1990s in Lebanon. 
Confessionalism which embodied in the Lebanese 
constitution of 1925 in its article 95 reads: "As a 
provisional measure and for the sake of jusitce and amity, 
the sects shall be equitably represented in public 
employment and in the composition of the ministry, provided 
such measures will not harm the general welfare of the 
state". Confessionalism, further, strengthened by the 
National Pact of 1943, it was agreed upon that the President 
of the Republic was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime 
Minister a Sunni Muslim, sepaker of the Chamber of Deputies 
a Shi'a Muslim, the Deputy Sepeaker a Greek Orthodox, the 
Defence Minister a Druze, and the Commander of the Military, 
a Maronite Christian. Furthermore, seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies were divided among Christians and Muslims in a 5 to 
5 ratio based on the official census of 1932. 
Confessionalism served a number of conflict management 
function. It removed potentially uncontrollable issues from 
the day to day political arena. It accomplished this end by 
ensuring to all the sects that the normal competition for 
power and influence would not lead to unacceptable 
domination by any one of them. Although in a important way 
it neutralized sectarian competition, it also 
institutionalized sectarian structures and perpetuated 
sectarian identifications. The requirements of 
proportionality introduced additional administrative 
inefficiency, compared to a syi:;tt2i;i of appo i n t:.ien t-, by iPerit. 
Nor did the L^yLiLi.-m ..ippijar to be rtaii^ ponL; i ^-e or structurally 
?5f, 
flg:-!iblB in the face of modernization and its attendant 
governmental problems, the spread of new radical ideologies 
and the growth of new organizations and counter elites. In 
short, the confessional solution worked well when there was 
not very much for government to do. 
Abolition of confessionalism from Lebanon's political 
framework is a major issue. Most Lebanese leaders, at least 
outwardly, deplore the contemporary confessional nature of 
the state. And it is through the abolition of this system 
that the Muslim community, now the majority in the country, 
aims to redress the existing distribition of power in the 
state and the concomitant special privileges which the 
Maronites have enjoyed. All Muslim leaders and parties 
broadly agree on the desirability of abolishing political 
confessionalism of all levels, including that affecting 
political and administrative appointments and parliamentary 
representation. This has led to consistant demands for 
reform of the electoral law, which provides for 
parliamentary elections to be held on a sectarian basis and 
regulates voting accordingly, and for change in Article 95 
of the constitution, which provides a confessional basis for 
public appointments. Abolishing only the political aspects 
of confessiona1ism would to a great extent meet the demands 
of Muslims for their personal and family affairs to be 
governed by religious rather than civil law. Ever since it^ ; 
formation in 1969, the National Movement, under the 
leadership of Kamal Junbalat, had also pressed and agitated 
in favour of a radical reform of the Lebanese political 
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system. 
Although confessional ism is being criticised for many 
reasons, yet it is an ideal political formula for Lebanon, a 
country composed of many religious comunitiea, each with a 
keen sense of its peculiar historical and social identity 
and interest. That sectarian loyalties in Lebanon is strong 
beyond dispute, and it is hardly imaginable that a political 
system which did not take these loyalties into consideration 
could be successfully established in the country within the 
framework of democracy. Indispensabi1ity of confessiona1ism 
was also felt at the Taif Conference held in 1989 which 
decided to retain it. 
The Lebanese Civil war which started in 1975 is multi-
dimensional, the combination of foreign forces and 
intervention have intensified the conflict among the 
Lebanese. But the Lebanese Civil War is primarily the result 
of domestic and indigenous conditions that have shaped the 
political cultures and socio-economic formations of the 
Lebanese confessional communities. Three internal factors 
can be identified that were instrumental in leading upto a 
situation of civil war. These are (1) the Em-gence of Class 
Divisions in Lebanese society and the coincidence of this 
division with the existing religious divisions in Lebanon, 
(2) The Rigidity of the Political System and (3) Presence of 
a large number of armed Palestinians. 
The most £;ig:-iificant aspect of the Lebanese economy 
before independtBnce w.,13 the predominance of service sector. 
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Under French mandate and even after independence the 
economic development in Lebanon further boosted the services 
sector which was dominated by Christians while thie 
agriculture sector dominated by Muslims, remained neglected. 
Muslim felt that the government was not doing anything to 
improve their socio-economic condition. Secondly, the 
Muslims, especially, Shi'a felt that the allocations of 
parliamentary, cabinet and administrative posts which was 
based on the French sponsored census of 1932 has become 
absolete and did not reflect the true demographic 
situtation. Besides, the electoral law also worked against 
the ideological parties. According to this law a Lebanese 
citizen could exercise his right to vote only in place of 
his birth. The poor Muslim migrants living in poverty belt 
and around Beirut and other cities could not usually afford 
to travel back to their districts of origin just for the 
sake of casting a ballot. Moreover, the secular 
organizations were suppressed on the ground of preserving 
the Lebanese identity. As the new poltical forces could not 
enter the political arena as it existed, they began to 
advocate the overthrow of the political system itself. 
Thirdly, the Palestinian guerrillas who fell back into 
Lebanon after losing their battle in Jordon in 1970 were 
sympathized by Muslims while Christians perceived them as a 
threat to their domination. Thus, Christians prepared 
themselves for a showdown with Palestinians. While Lebanese 
Muslim groups turned to the Palestinians for arms ar.d 
support. M l these three factors contributed to Civil War 
w hich started in 1975 
.V] 
Since the outbreak of Civil War various outside power 
and forces have intervened openly or covertly on one aide or 
the other. Syria intervened in 1976 due to its national 
interests whether military, political, economic or 
strategic. Syrian intervention increased the military power 
of Shi'a, especially that of Amal militia. Although, Amal 
always sided with Syria but the latter did never allow the 
former to completely crush Hisbollah. Thus, Syria maintained 
a power balance between various militias and no single 
militia could become so powerful as to defeat the other one. 
Syria also ensure the unity of Lebanon and frustrated the 
Christians attempt of partitioning Lebanon along religious 
lines. Israel which intervened in 1978 and again in 1982 
with the purpose of ending the armed Palestinians on her 
northern border succeeded in its mission upto some extent. 
But failed in establishing a Maronite dominated state in 
Lebanon. However, Israel succeeded in carving out a security 
zone in south Lebanon contrlled by South Lebanon Army 
dominated by Christians. 
Fed up of prolong Civil War Christians and Muslims 
reached an agreement in Taif in 1989. This agreement reducea 
the powers of Christian President and gave equal 
representation to Christians and Muslims in Parliament. Now 
the executive power will be exercised by Lebanese cabinet. 
The main beneficiary of the changes was the office of the 
Prime Minister, who became the head of the government, 
speaking in it:^  nami-', iinplementina its policies and 
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coordinating the various ministries. Maronite losr. their 
political dominance while the political claims of Shi'a were 
blunted in the Taif accord in favour of Sunni Muslims. Shi'a 
challenge ahead is to translate their strength into actual 
political power. Druze will continue to play important 
political role being a cohesive community and due to their 
concentration in Shuf mountains. Confesiona1ism is there to 
stay because it is an ideal formula for Lebanon, a country 
composed of many religious communities, each with a keen 
sense of its peculier historical and social identity and 
interest. Civil War has ended because people of Lebanon 
realized its futility. 
?-;! 
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